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ABSTRACT 
 
THREE ESSAYS ON SOCIAL LEARNING 
Jae Young Lee 
Raghuram Iyengar 
 
Social learning broadly refers to learning through the acquisition of information from 
social sources. In the three essays of my dissertation, I investigate the various underlying 
drivers of social learning and how such learning can impact purchase decisions. 
 In Essay 1, I investigate the link between social learning and sales of experiential 
products. In particular, I focus on how social capital (i.e., the propensity for people to 
trust and communicate with each other) moderates the level of social learning for 
experiential products and thus impacts aggregate sales. 
 In Essay 2, I study how social learning operates differently across the various stages 
of physician prescription – trial and repeat of a new prescription drug. Given that the 
mechanisms of social influence varies across trial and repeat stages, the second essay 
further assesses who is most influential and who is most influenceable across stages. 
 In Essay 3, I examine how consumers make purchases of experiential products and 
link it to their active search for information from interdependent social sources. Essay 3 
assesses the impact of the pattern of similarity of preferences in individual-level social 
networks (homophily, i.e., the tendency of individuals to associate with similar others, 
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and structural balance, i.e., the congruency of preference in a social network) on 
consumer search, learning, and purchase. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Social learning broadly refers to learning through the acquisition of information from 
social contacts such as friends, neighbors, colleagues, etc. Researchers have long 
recognized the theoretical importance of social learning, and documented that social 
learning is a significant driver of consumer decisions. In an influential study, Roberts and 
Urban (1988) formally modeled consumers’ decision to choose a brand based on, among 
other factors, word-of-mouth from their friends, and showed that the social learning is a 
significant driver of consumers’ decision. Duflo and Saez (2003) analyzed a randomized 
experiment and showed the role of social learning in employees' decisions to enroll in a 
Tax Deferred Account (TDA) retirement plan within a large university. Conley and Udry 
(2010) investigated the role of social learning in the diffusion of a new agricultural 
technology in Ghana. 
 Beyond the significant effect of social learning in consumer decisions, recent studies 
have investigated different drivers of social learning and provided insights on the factors 
which make social learning more efficient. For instance, Iyengar, Van den Bulte, and 
Valente (2011) consider the adoption of a new drug and find that physicians’  self-
reported opinion leadership moderate the weight they put on others prescription behavior. 
Godes and Mayzlin (2009) show that, for products with low awareness (a brewery chain 
in their study), word-of-mouth information from less loyal customers is more effective 
than more loyal customers at driving sales.  
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 My dissertation adds to this stream of literature by investigating different moderators 
of social learning. In Essay 1, I investigate how the neighborhood social capital, i.e., the 
aggregate propensity for neighbors to trust and communicate with each other, moderates 
social learning and the evolution of new trials at the aggregate level. Essay 2 focuses on 
social learning at an individual level, and broadens the scope of interest by including not 
only the new product trial but also repeat stage, and examines how social learning 
operates differently across the different stages. In Essay 3, I extend Essay 1 by focusing 
on a characteristic of an individual’s immediate social network which can potentially 
drive aggregate-level social capital. To be more specific, I examine how the pattern of the 
similarity of preferences in an individual’s immediate social networks affects consumer 
search, learning from social contacts, and purchase behavior. As the similarity of 
preferences is often confounded with other network characteristics (Aral and Walker 
2012), I assess the role of the similarity of preferences in an experimental setting.  
 In each essay, I further provide managerially actionable insights on how practitioners 
can effectively leverage social learning based on their understanding about the drivers of 
social learning. 
Essay 1 investigates the link between social learning and aggregate sales of products 
with experience attributes, i.e., attributes of products that cannot be fully verified prior to 
the first purchase. Experience attributes are prevalent and salient when consumers shop 
through catalogs, home shopping networks, and over the Internet. Using data from 
Bonobos.com, a leading US online fashion retailer, I find that local social learning not 
only facilitates customer trial, but also that the effect is economically important as about 
half of all trials were partially attributable to it. Furthermore, merging data from the Social 
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Capital Community Benchmark Survey, I find that “neighborhood social capital” (See 
Putnam 1995 for details), enhances the social learning process, and makes it more 
efficient. Social capital does not operate on trials directly; rather, it improves the learning 
process and therefore indirectly drives sales when what is communicated is favorable. 
These findings suggest that online retailers may want to use geographic targeting based on 
the embeddedness of social relationships, and I propose a proxy of neighborhood social 
capital that practitioners could act on. 
 Essay 2 proposes that social influence may affect not only trial but also repeat 
behavior, though the process and source of influence are likely to differ between trial and 
repeat. The analysis of the acceptance of a risky prescription drug by individual 
physicians suggests that social learning drives social influence at the adoption stage, but 
social conformity drives social influence at the repeat stage. Given that the mechanisms 
of social influence vary across trial and repeat stages, who is most influential varies 
across stages. Physicians with high centrality in the discussion and referral network and 
with high prescription volume are influential in trial but not repeat. In contrast, 
immediate colleagues—few of whom are nominated as a discussion or referral partner—
are influential in both trial and repeat. Furthermore, who is most influenceable also varies 
across stages. For trial, it is physicians who do not consider themselves to be opinion 
leaders, whereas for repeat, it is those located towards the middle of the status 
distribution as measured by network centrality. The pattern of results is consistent with 
informational social influence reducing risk in trial and normative social influence 
increasing conformity in repeat. The findings suggest that practitioners should consider 
adapting their messaging so that considerations of perceived risk, status, and normative 
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conformity receive different weights when trying to get prospects to adopt versus trying 
to get adopters to repeat.  
 In essay 3, I examine how the similarity of preference in individual social network 
impacts information search, learning, and purchase of products. To rule out potential 
confounds with the similarity of preferences, I conduct an incentive compatible stated choice 
experiment where each participant searches for information about a product from their 
contacts, learns about the product, and makes a purchase or not. I build a formal model for 
search and purchase decisions, that flexibly accommodates the behavioral aspects of the 
similarity of preference. There are two key insights. First, the reason consumers prefer to 
gather information from similar others (i.e., homophily) is the greater informational benefit 
rather than the greater convenience of collecting information from them. Second, structural 
balance, which captures the consistency in the pattern of the similarity of preference among 
individuals’ immediate social networks, is another key driver of consumer search and 
learning from social contacts. Analogous to Heider (1946), we term a social system as 
balanced if the valence of preferences (i.e., positive for similar preferences, and negative for 
dissimilar preferences) in the system multiples out to be positive. While people understand 
that informational benefits are greater under an imbalanced relationship, their cost of 
information seeking is also higher. As a result, consumers search less under an imbalanced 
than a balanced system, yet the lower amount of search still leads to a higher rate of purchase. 
The findings have implications for companies that facilitate social search for products. For 
instance, companies that facilitate social search may be able to increase their search traffic 
by making consumers perceive that the search results are from others whose preferences are 
similar to theirs and to each other. Also, companies that provide consumers with reviews for 
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experiential products to increase the purchase rate may be able to increase their purchase rate 
by making consumers perceive that the search results are from those who have similar 
preferences, and that they are also being exposed to others with diverse preferences. 
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ESSAY 1: NEIGHBORHOOD SOCIAL CAPITAL AND SOCIAL 
LEARNING FOR EXPERIENCE ATTRIBUTES OF PRODUCTS 
1.1. Introduction  
Information about new products passed from existing to potential customers is an 
influential and widely studied driver of sales (e.g., Iyengar, Van den Bulte, and Valente 
2011; Manchanda, Xie, and Youn 2008). Information regarding experience attributes, i.e., 
attributes which cannot be fully observable and verifiable pre-purchase, plays a key role 
in reducing the uncertainty faced by potential customers in their first-time purchases. The 
“experience attribute problem” is a general one; it is, however, particularly acute for 
consumers who buy products through catalogs, home shopping networks, and over the 
Internet.1 Firms selling through these channels face a ubiquitous issue: How to help 
consumers overcome initial apprehension about buying what they sell. 
 By any measure, online retailing is by far the fastest growing retail sector around the 
world. According to Forrester research, the United States will see growth from $231b in 
2013 to $370b in 2017 (CAGR of 10%); projected rates are almost identical in Europe 
where the total market should reach $247b by 2017.2 This phenomenon is not confined to 
developed markets; in China, year-on-year growth through March 2012 exceeded 50% 
and The Economist predicts that China will quickly become largest market by value.3 
                                                            
1 Complementary terms have been introduced to the literature for use in particular contexts, e.g., Degeratu, 
Rangaswamy, and Wu (2000) refer to “searchable sensory attributes” for goods sold online, whereas Lal 
and Sarvary (1999) use the term “non-digital attributes” to describe product attributes which cannot be fully 
conveyed when items are sold over the Internet.  
2 http://techcrunch.com/2013/03/13/forrester-2012-2017-ecommerce-forecast/. 
3 http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21573980-alibaba-trailblazing-chinese-internet-giant-will-soon-
go-public-worlds-greatest-bazaar. 
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Thus, the global consumer economy is one in which information about experience 
attributes plays an increasingly larger and more important role in buying decisions. 
 In this dissertation essay, we document how social learning reduces consumer 
uncertainty for experience attributes in this context; more specifically, we explain why 
and how neighborhood social capital (defined shortly) makes the social learning process 
more efficient. Critically, it is not simply the case that social capital stimulates trial and 
adoption of new products per se—it does not—rather, it works through a specific 
mechanism to improve the quality of information transmitted in the social learning 
process.  
 The institutional setting for our empirical work is best understood by example. 
Premier and rapid-growth US Internet retailers like Bonobos.com, Trunkclub.com and 
WarbyParker.com employ methods that include “totally free” return policies, “home-try 
on”, and “pop-up stores” in large part to combat consumer uncertainty about the 
experience attributes of the products they sell. In September 2012, leading industry 
observer GigaOm.com reported on a $40m fundraising round by WarbyParker.com and 
noted: “That (home try-on) has helped Warby Parker overcome one of the biggest hurdles 
(italics added) for online fashion brands, getting people to feel comfortable about their 
online purchase.”4 
 Naturally, these firm-initiated methods can be costly. We document a complementary 
customer-initiated process for the resolution of pre-trial uncertainty that occurs naturally 
offline: Social learning and information transmission between existing and potential 
                                                            
4 See http://gigaom.com/2012/09/10/warby-parker-raises-36-8m-to-expand-fashion-eyewear-brand/ for 
details. 
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customers. Neighborhood social learning is observed in numerous settings including 
diffusion of information about agricultural, healthcare, and retirement practices (e.g., 
Conley and Udry 2010; Sorensen 2006; Duflo and Saez 2003); we add to this body of 
literature by demonstrating why social learning is so important for the growing consumer 
Internet sector. Furthermore, we show why social capital, i.e., “the information, trust, and 
norms of reciprocity inhering in one’s social networks” (Woolcock 1998, p. 153) 
moderates local social learning, and makes the learning process about experience 
attributes more efficient.  
 We model social learning and the proposed moderating effect of social capital using 
data from Bonobos.com, a leading pure-play US fashion retailer, and neighborhood social 
capital data from the Social Capital Community Benchmark Survey (SCCBS).5 
Identification of social influence from secondary data is challenging (Manski 2000) and 
the identification of a specific mechanism of social influence requires additional model 
assumptions that are based on the institutional setting. 
 In this study, we identify the social learning process under the widely-employed 
Bayesian Learning approach for modeling learning through direct experience (Erdem and 
Keane 1996) or from advertisements (Narayanan, Manchanda, and Chintagunta 2005). 
The Bayesian Learning assumption behind social learning is justified conceptually in 
Section 1.4.1 and validated empirically in Section 1.5.2. Specifically, we develop a model 
                                                            
5 For an interesting introduction to social capital concepts data by one of the foremost authorities on the 
SCCBS, see Robert D. Putnam (2000), Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community. 
These data are housed at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University and have been widely 
used in social science research; we are the first researchers, to our knowledge, to utilize them in marketing. 
We provide more details on applications and the data themselves in Sections 1.2 and 1.3, respectively. For 
information on access, visit http://www.hks.harvard.edu/saguaro/communitysurvey/index.html. 
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of individual learning and from there derive a neighborhood level (zip-level) model of 
new trials arising in each time period.  
 Our model identifies social learning process as a process that is distinct from 
alternative forms of social influence such as awareness dispersion (Van den Bulte and 
Lilien 2001), social conformity (Amaldoss and Jain 2005), and network externality 
(Manchanda, Xie, and Youn 2008). Moreover, we control for possible confounding 
effects from correlated unobservables (Section 1.4.2), and capture the efficiency of social 
learning in a single parameter. 
 We make three new substantive contributions. First, we show that social learning 
about experience attributes is a key phenomenon in the rapidly growing consumer Internet 
sector. In our empirical application, more than fifty percent of all trials in the first three 
and a half years of operations at Bonobos.com are partially attributable to social learning. 
Second, we explain and document a novel and critical role of local social capital in this 
process. Again, it is important to note that local social capital does not per se stimulate 
trial and diffusion; rather, it operates only on the learning process itself. It reduces 
inefficiency in information transmission; in our empirical application the moderating 
effect impacts about 8% of all trials. This effect is roughly constant throughout the data 
period, suggesting that a fixed increment in social capital results in a fixed improvement 
in information transmission, independent of the total number of customers at any time 
period, or when they arrive.  
 Third, we highlight an important theme from recent related work; namely, that “real 
world” factors influence consumer decisions to buy online (see, for example, Anderson et 
al 2010; Brynjolfsson, Raman and Hu 2009; Choi and Bell 2011; Forman, Ghose and 
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Goldfarb 2009) and that insights from geographic variation in online buying are 
actionable. SCCBS data are not available commercially so we identify and justify a 
readily accessible measure, the “number local bars and liquor stores per capita per zip 
code” as a proxy for neighborhood social capital in the target group. We show that this 
variable moderates learning (of course it is not significant in a model that also contains the 
“true” measure of social capital). 
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 summarizes relevant 
prior research and develops the conjectures for social learning and social capital. Section 
1.3 describes the research setting, data, and measures. The empirical model is developed 
in Section 1.4. Section 1.5 reports the findings and Section 1.6 concludes the paper. 
1.2. Background and Prior Research 
1.2.1. Consumer Uncertainty about Experience Attributes of Products Sold Online 
Prior to their first purchase, consumers buying via catalogs, home shopping networks, 
and the Internet lack complete knowledge about experience attributes of products (e.g., 
“fit, feel, touch, and taste”); for example, “ … fit is not fully observed by the customer 
prior to purchase … [in] retail settings where customers select from a catalog or Internet 
site without being able to fully inspect the product.” (Anderson, Hansen, and Simester 
2009, p. 408).  
 For a consumer who is considering buying a pair of pants in a store, the texture of the 
pants is a search attribute, i.e., an attribute that is directly verifiable pre-purchase. As 
implied by Anderson et al. (2009), when the consumer considers buying the same item 
online or through a catalog, this same attribute—the texture of the pants—becomes an 
12 
 
 
 
experience attribute, i.e., not fully observable and verifiable pre-purchase. The 
consequences are well known. Uncertainty about experience attributes decreases 
purchase frequency (Cox and Rich 1964) and dollars spent (Jasper and Ouelette 1994) for 
catalog and home shopping purchases.6  
In some instances, offline distribution that allows customers physical access to 
products is imperative, at least for some segments, as: “There are still people who want to 
touch and feel (italics added) clothing before they purchase.” (Andy Dunn, CEO of 
Bonobos.com).7 Moreover, when a product is available online and offline, consumers 
might visit the offline store to inspect it and then order it online, perhaps from a 
competing retailer.8 Thus, in general, the experience attribute issue is particularly acute 
for consumers when they consider buying from vertically integrated brands without 
offline distribution. Consequently, Bonobos.com (fashion apparel) has “insanely easy 
returns”, Zappos.com (shoes) offers “totally free” returns and WarbyParker.com 
(eyewear) has a “home try-on” option where potential customers are shipped five frames 
(without lenses) to try for free.  
                                                            
6 According to the National Mail Order Association, the first cataloger in the United States is believed to be 
Richard Sears in late 1880s (http://www.ehow.com/facts_4925839_history-mail-order-shopping.html). TV 
home shopping emerged in 1977 and Amazon.com first opened an online bookstore in 1994. About 7-8% 
of all US retail sales are now online. 
7 See http://www.forbes.com/sites/kellyclay/2012/04/12/nordstrom-invests-16-4-million-in-bonobos-now-
available-in-stores/ for details. 
8 This phenomenon of “show-rooming” (see http://moneyland.time.com/2012/01/24/target-
doesnt-want-to-be-a-showroom-for-the-stuff-you-buy-for-less-at-amazon/) where consumers 
scout out and examine products at giant offline retailers such as Best Buy or Target, and then 
purchase (at a lower price) at online alternatives like Amazon.com is problematic for offline 
stores. “Show-rooming” is a major reason why Circuit City went bankrupt (see 
http://business.time.com/2012/04/10/best-buy-ceo-brian-dunn-resigns-amid-shift-to-online-
shopping/). 
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These efforts are costly, and absent an understanding of how information about 
experience attributes spreads naturally and organically for free, e.g., through social 
learning, firms may be relying too much on efforts that undermine margins.  
1.2.2. Local Social Learning in Local Neighborhoods and Internet Retailing  
Consumers often learn from their peers before making purchase decisions, i.e., through 
social learning. When consumers shop online, we expect, ex ante, that social learning is a 
plausible source of information about experience attributes for new customers and 
thereby helps trial at Bonobos.com (our empirical application) and at other online 
retailers as well.  
Conceptually, this social learning process operates as follows. A potential consumer 
updates her belief via signals on experience attributes that are received from previous 
purchasers. Signals relate to the typical quality, “texture”, and “style” of products sold on 
the website. There are various kinds of signals—including those from observations of use, 
direct conversations, and online reviews—all of which can drive social learning for a 
focal customer. We focus on local social learning; that is, learning that operates through 
signals from physically close others who have made a prior purchase, all else held 
constant.  
Social scientists have a longstanding interest in how physically proximate neighbors 
influence each other, i.e., so-called “neighborhood effect” and how it drives consumption, 
investment and purchase decisions. In addition, recent studies pinpoint social learning as 
a key mechanism underlying the observed neighborhood effects in categories where 
agents face risk or uncertainty (Conley and Udry 2010; Duflo and Saez 2003; Sorensen 
2006).  
14 
 
 
 
In the substantive domain of online retailing, contagion phenomena have been 
documented (e.g., Bell and Song 2007; Choi, Hui, and Bell 2010) but the underlying 
mechanisms largely unexplored. Local social learning is interactive (information senders 
and recipients know each other) and visceral (McShane, Bradlow, and Berger 2012), so it 
is potentially more powerful than learning via other sources such as online reviews and 
Internet-mediated interaction (Choi, Bell, and Lodish 2012). Thus, a more detailed 
elaboration of social learning as it relates to this important domain is needed. 
1.2.3. Local Social Capital as a Moderator of Local Social Learning 
In general terms, social capital is the ability of focal actors to secure collective, economic, 
or informational benefits by virtue of social networks, trust, and other norms in a 
community (Adler and Kwon 2002; Putnam 1995). In a review article, Nahapiet and 
Ghoshal (1998) provide a conceptual summary and describe relational and structural 
dimensions of social capital.9 In this study, we operationalize the relational dimension as 
social trust and the structural dimension as frequency of interaction and provide 
illustrative examples in Table 1.1. In Section 1.3, we develop our operational measure of 
local social capital from the SCCBS and note its consistency with extant approaches in 
the literature. 
Prior work implies that a higher level of social capital leads to more efficient 
information transfer (Reagans and McEvily 2003; Uzzi 1997). In our context, we 
                                                            
9 In an influential paper Adler and Kwon (2002) note that, for substantive and ideological reasons, 
there is no “commonly agreed upon” definition of social capital that will suit all contexts. Thus, 
particular operational definitions may vary by discipline and level of investigation (Robison, 
Schmid, and Siles 2002). Our study therefore focuses on the relational and structural dimensions 
of social capital (Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998) as they are a good conceptual fit to the mechanism, 
have operational variables available in the SCCBS, and as explained in Section 1.3, have 
precedent in the extant literature. 
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conjecture that local social capital enhances local social learning by affecting the 
proportion of signals arising from previous purchases and the noise associated with 
these signals. Specifically, we test whether higher levels of social capital reduce 
inefficiencies in the social learning process. The theoretical prediction is very specific—
social capital operates on the information transformation process and there is no reason 
to expect that it will have a direct effect on the rate of diffusion. Our empirical 
specification mirrors this as we model the moderating effect on social learning while at 
the same time controlling for a potential direct effect on diffusion (and we find it to be 
insignificant). 
There are three interesting aspects to this empirical test. First, as discussed in the 
Introduction, geographic variation in the propensity of consumers to buy online is 
explained by geographic variation in various neighborhood characteristics, e.g., offline tax 
rates, presence of stores, and so on. We examine whether variation in this propensity is 
related to the quality of interaction among members of a local community as well. Note 
too, that the effect of neighborhood social capital is qualitatively different from these 
other factors as it arises from the “multiplier” produced by previous purchases.  
Second, previous studies relate social learning and individual characteristics such as 
opinion leadership (Iyengar, Van den Bulte, and Valente 2011; Nair, Manchanda, and 
Bhatia 2010). In contrast, we connect the efficiency of social learning to relational 
characteristics between individuals. Third, most studies focus on benefits from social 
capital accruing to community members; we show that Internet retailers (who are outside 
the local community) can benefit as well. 
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Table 1.1. Dimensions of Social Capital and Effects on Local Social Learning 
Dimensions Definition Effect on Local Social Learning 
Relational 
Dimension 
Social assets in a relationship. This involves 
factors such as trust and intimacy (e.g., 
Coleman 1988; Granovetter 1985; Putnam 
1995). 
Social cohesion arises from the relational 
dimension of social capital because it 
motivates actors to devote time and effort 
to communicating and should enable 
potential customers to get a better sense 
of experience attributes (e.g., Aral and 
Van Alstyne 2011). Hence, a higher 
relational dimension will lead to higher 
quality signals. 
 
Structural 
Dimension 
The pattern of connections and interactions 
between actors. This involves strength of ties, 
interaction frequency (e.g., Granovetter 
1985), and network closure and density (e.g., 
Coleman 1988). 
Social cohesion arises from the structural 
dimension of social capital because actors 
connected by stronger and denser 
networks are more likely to interact. 
Hence, a higher structural dimension will 
make it more likely that signals are 
observed. 
 
 
1.2.4. Summary and Testable Conjectures 
We examine two new conjectures. First, that incomplete consumer knowledge about 
experience attributes prior to trial is partially resolved through local social learning from 
past local purchases made by others. Second, that local social capital reduces 
inefficiencies in the local social learning process by improving the likelihood that signals 
are: (1) observed by potential customers, and (2) less noisy. Finally, as noted previously, 
it is important to recall that social capital does not, per se, make purchases more likely. 
Rather, it improves the efficiency of the learning process itself. In instances where the 
social learning process results in favorable updating, i.e., potential customers come to 
learn that the product is better than they might have initially imagined, sales will be 
positively impacted.  
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1.3. Research Setting, Data, and Measures 
1.3.1. General Condition and Research Setting 
Our data for the empirical application need to satisfy two conditions. First, the products 
need to have experience attributes, and second, consumers should have incomplete 
consumer knowledge about experience attributes ex ante. Our data from Bonobos.com, 
an iconic Internet-based fashion retailer, satisfies these conditions. (More details about 
Bonobos’ origins are provided shortly.)  
In the apparel category fit, feel, and style are very important to consumers (Kwon, 
Paek, and Arzeni 1991) and these attributes are by definition experience attributes and 
non-verifiable pre-purchase when consumers buy online for the first time (Park and Stoel 
2002). Since Bonobos.com targets trendy and fashion-forward males, the importance of 
these attributes is amplified. (Industry observer TechCrunch.com refers to the target 
customer as a “hip, semi-athletic, 25-to-40 year old guy.”—See 
http://techcrunch.com/2010/12/16/bonobos-raises-18-5-million-metrosexuals-unite/ for 
details.) 
By way of additional background, Bonobos.com has manufactured and sold 
fashionable men’s apparel under their own brand online since October 2007. Unique 
pants are their signature product—even several years after launch—the site leads with 
“Pantsformation—Fit changes everything” (see http://www.bonobos.com/welcome/n). As 
Bonobos grew, they established offline “guide shop” stores in Boston, Chicago, 
Georgetown and San Francisco and in April 2012 Bonobos also partnered with 
Nordstrom. Nordstrom contributed $16m in capital and agreed to carry Bonobos products; 
this accomplished two things—Bonobos could not only to reach new segments of 
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consumers but also provide consumers with an opportunity to “touch and feel” the 
products before purchase.10 (As noted below, our data precede these moves into offline 
retail.) 
1.3.2. Data 
The data come from three sources: (1) monthly observations on the number of purchases 
at Bonobos.com from October 2007 (when the site opened) to March 2011, (2) social 
capital data from SCCBS, and (3) zip-level demographic information and information on 
spending at offline retailers from the 2010 ESRI Business Database. Summary statistics 
for the key variables (all described subsequently) are given in Table 1.2. 
 Purchase data at Bonobos.com. Our dependent variable is the number of new trials 
in a zip code for each period since the site opened, i.e., an aggregate count of individual 
customer trials from inception of the site. As such, the data do not suffer from “left-
censoring”. We focus on trials, because pre-trial customers have no direct experience, i.e., 
we deliberately model decisions of consumers who have incomplete knowledge about 
experience attributes ex ante. (The data we use pre-date the period where Bonobos 
products were made available at either “guide shops” or local Nordstrom stores, so there 
is no alternative channel where consumers can “touch and feel” the products prior to 
purchase; see also, Section 1.3.2). Specifically, we analyze data for 42 months from 
launch (October 2007 through March 2011), during which time more than 40,000 
customers tried Bonobos.com.  
                                                            
10 For popular press stories on the Bonobos.com “guide shop” store concept and the Nordstrom deal, see 
http://bostinno.com/2012/05/01/bonobos-launches-first-offline-store-on-newbury-st-bringing-color-fit-
discounts-to-bostinno-readers/ and http://www.forbes.com/sites/kellyclay/2012/04/12/nordstrom-invests-
16-4-million-in-bonobos-now-available-in-stores/, respectively. 
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The lagged number of total transactions in a zip code (the sum of trial and repeat 
transactions) is a key independent variable that serves two control roles. First, it is the 
source of local signals on experience attributes in the local social learning process (see 
Section 1.4.1). Second, it controls the potential confounding effects of temporal, spatial, 
and time-varying spatial influences on the social learning process as well as social 
influence through mechanisms other than social learning (see Section 1.4.2).  
Table 1.2. Descriptive Statistics for Model Variables 
    Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
1 New Trials .28 .83
2 Lagged Transactions .62 1.94 .61            
3 Social Capital .00  1.00 .08 .09 
4 Target Population 5.30K 3.13K .18 .18 .22 
5 Density 1.04K 1.56K .24 .24 .30 .40 
6 Local Stores 541.87 412.54 .11 .12 .18 .40 .52 
7 Total Spending 5.14M 2.86M .21 .21 -.11 .65 .26 .28 
8 Average Income 87.2K 37.5K .21 .20 -.38 -.05 -.02 .01 .57 
9 Gini Coefficient .62 .06 -.15 -.16 -.35 -.03 -.34 -.18 .17 .33 
10 Age25 .19 .06 .14 .16 .42 .24 .39 .16 -.09 -.40 -.44  
11 Age40 .30  .07 -.17 -.18 -.46 -.41 -.45 -.23 .03 .45 .39  -.87  
12 Education .42  .17 .27 .26 -.24 -.13 .12 .02 .39 .69 -.01  .07  .08  
13 Race Diversity 51.91  22.18 .05 .05 .31 .50 .50 .41 .19 -.11 -.22  .32  -.44  -.23  
14 Internet Score .00  1.00 .10 .10 .01 .06 .11 -.01 .23 .19 .00  .12  -.11  .29 .05 
Note: In the analysis we standardize all non-dummy variables aside from Lagged Transactions. 
 
Social capital data from the SCCBS. The SCCBS was undertaken by the John F. 
Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University between July 2000 and February 
2001 and the data are widely used by social science researchers. Published articles report 
effects of local social capital on local behaviors such as home ownership (Hilber 2010), 
labor force choices (Aguilera 2002), social vulnerability (Cutter, Boruff, and Shirley 
2003), and public health (Harpham, Grant, and Thomas 2002). Documentation for the 
SCCBS describes it as the “first attempt at systematic and widespread measurement of 
social capital in the United States, particularly as it occurs within local communities.” 
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Our key zip-level social capital measures for the main model and falsification tests 
were extracted from the SCCBS. Specifically, we utilized questions relating to the two 
dimensions of social capital described in Table 1.1: (1) trust among local neighbors 
(relational dimension), and (2) the frequency of interaction between neighbors (structural 
dimension). The local trust and interaction scores are simple averages of the relevant 
survey questions (e.g., “How much do you trust neighbors?”) in the SCCBS. Section 
1.8.1 (Appendix) provides the details. The neighborhood social capital measure is, in turn, 
a simple average of trust and interaction frequency, consistent with the standard concepts 
in the literature (Burt 1992; Marsden and Campbell 1984) and with empirical studies that 
utilize the SCCBS (e.g., Hilber 2010). 
Data on neighborhood characteristics. Zip code characteristics and the aggregated 
individual demographics of zip residents serve as controls in the empirical analysis 
(Brynjolfsson, Hu, and Rahman 2009; Forman, Ghose, and Goldfarb 2009). Our control 
variables are constructed from data purchased from ESRI in Redlands, CA and are 
available through the 2010 ESRI Demographics and Business Database (see 
http://www.esri.com/data/esri_data/demographic-overview for details). Specific variables 
describing zip code characteristics are: Target Population (total number of 25-45 year-
old males in the zip code), Population Density (target density per square mile), Local 
Stores (number of offline clothing stores in the 3-digit zip code area). Non-metro Area, 
Near-suburb Area, and Far-suburb Area dummies control for the geographic proximity 
of the focal zip to city centers. 
Variables aggregated from individual demographics of zip residents are: Total 
Spending (total annual offline retail spending on the men’s clothing category in a zip 
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within the 42-month period after the site was launched. Thus, the data consist of 20,790 
zip-month observations on the number of new customers. The SCCBS covers 1,104 zip 
codes so it is possible that the 609 (1,104 – 495) zip codes with no trials at all are 
somehow different from the 495 zip codes used in estimation, with respect to social 
capital status. To check that this is not the case we estimate a binary choice model of 
having at least one trial, using data from all 1,104 zips (see Section 1.8.2). There is no 
effect of neighborhood social capital in this model, confirming that there is no “selection” 
of zips with buyers versus no buyers, on the basis of neighborhood social capital. We also 
fitted a model with the entire 1,104 zip codes in Section 1.8.3 (Appendix). 
These data are not geographically condensed as the 495 zip codes span 23 different 
states and 201 different cities. By virtue of where the SCCBS was conducted, the data 
exclude New York City and Los Angeles—two locations where Bonobo.com has high 
sales. This strengthens our study because it means that the findings will not be skewed by 
particularly “high growth” locations where sales are potentially driven by other 
mechanisms (such as the fashion orientation of the community and so on). Furthermore, 
it removes Manhattan zip codes and makes it extremely unlikely that potential customers 
in our sample are visiting Bonobos.com headquarters on 25th Street and evaluating 
products in person.12 
                                                            
12 Potential customers have always had the option of visiting Bonobos.com headquarters in Manhattan and 
examining products there in a showroom that is part of the head office. (As noted in Section 1.3.1, in 2012, 
after the period of our data, Bonobos.com opened additional “guide shops” in Boston and Palo Alto and 
obtained distribution via Nordstrom.) It is approximately 200 miles from Bonobos.com headquarters on 
25th Street in Manhattan to the nearest zip code in our data, 02215 in Boston, MA. This makes it very 
unlikely that potential customers in our data were resolving their pre-purchase uncertainty about experience 
attributes by physically inspecting products in Manhattan. 
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Figure 1.1 is a model-free view of trial evolution based on the final dataset. It 
compares the number of new trials in each time period in zips that are in the top one-third 
based on their social capital scores (165 zips) with the number in the bottom one-third 
(165 zips). In both groups, the number of new trials increases over time (p < .001). 
Furthermore, in every period, the number of new trials in zips with higher social capital 
tends to be greater than the number of new trials in zips with lower social capital (p 
< .001). Absent a formal model (see Sections 1.4 and 1.5) this is not conclusive evidence 
of our proposed effects, but it is nevertheless interesting to observe such a clear pattern in 
the raw data. 
1.3.4. Steps Taken to Mitigate Threats to Validity  
Our research setting and data provide us with an opportunity to identify social learning 
while at the same time offering protection from the four standard threats to validity in 
social contagion studies. First, we avoid truncation bias (see Van den Bulte and Iyengar 
2011) by estimating the trial model on all potential consumers in the risk set of 495 zip 
codes, not just those who ultimately made a purchase in the 42-month data window. 
Second, we avoid simultaneity bias by using the lagged rather than contemporaneous 
number of total transactions in a neighborhood. Third, endogenous group formation is not 
a credible threat to validity because individuals do not decide on where to live based on a 
neighbor’s trial of a specific website. Of course, we also control for observed and 
unobserved factors that vary by location. Fourth, by using the lagged number of total 
transactions in a neighborhood as a control on correlated unobservables between 
neighbors, we mitigate potential bias arising from the Bayesian learning mechanism (see 
Sections 1.4 and 1.5 for details).  
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1.4. Model  
Individual consumers make a binary decision every period—to try Bonobos.com or not—
on the basis of the expected utility from trial. The overall utility that consumer j in zip 
code i obtains by trying Bonobos.com at period t  is 
Uijt  UijtE UijtD   ijt , where  ijt ~ IID Standard Gumbel Distribution.      (1.1) 
UijtE  denotes random utility under incomplete knowledge about experience attributes. 
This utility component evolves through social learning and information acquisition on 
experience attributes.  denotes deterministic utility and is unrelated to the social 
learning process. As explained shortly, deterministic utility serves as a control to help 
identify social learning and establish its significance. Finally,  represents the 
individual- and time-specific random errors that are not observed  
1.4.1. Experience Attributes and the Social Learning Process 
 Random utility on experience attributes. We assume that there is general agreement 
about the objective quality of Bonobos.com products (in texture, style, color, etc.) among 
consumers who have tried them. We denote this by Q. For potential consumers, 
knowledge of Q (how good the texture is, how fashionable the color is, etc.) is a key 
input to the trial decision. However, when shopping online, potential consumers are not 
fully informed of Q because they cannot physically verify experience attributes. Thus, 
they form beliefs aboutQ.  
Let Qijt denote the belief about experience attributes for consumer j in zip code i at 
period t who has yet to try Bonobos.com. Beliefs relate to products only not 
D
ijtU
ijt
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Bonobos.com “service”. This is reasonable because in the period 2007-2011 in the United 
States there should be no uncertainly about the legitimacy of the site, e.g., Bonobos.com 
is not going to take orders and then not fill them. In addition, the “Fast and free shipping. 
Insanely easy returns”13 promise eliminates uncertainty about service-dependent 
experience attributes.  
Random utility on experience attributes for consumer j in zip i at time t is14: 
UijtE  Qijt .          (1.2) 
 Social learning as Bayesian learning. Uncertain beliefs about experience attributes 
( ) are represented by a distribution: 
,                 (1.3) 
where 0Q  is the mean of initial belief distribution before trial. Initial uncertainty is set to 
1 for identification. The prior belief comes from local signals emanating from previous 
purchases by local neighbors. Of course social learning alone cannot fully resolve 
uncertainty, which is resolved only when the product is tried on.  
Because they are based on actual purchases, local signals convey information about 
average objective quality of experience attributes, but these observed signals do not 
                                                            
13 See http://www.bonobos.com/welcome/n (top left) and especially 
http://www.bonobos.com/about/ where it states: “Free both ways. Always.” under “Free Shipping” 
and “Return anything, any time, any reason.” under “Painless Returns”. 
14 We can also define UijtE  as a quadratic function of the uncertain belief rather than a linear 
function to allow for a flexible specification with respect to risk (Erdem and Kean 1996; 
Narayanan, Manchanda, and Chintagunta 2005). Here, the risk aversion parameter is theoretically 
estimable, but with a single category data it is hard to know how meaningful this is. We estimated 
the quadratic model and found that the risk aversion parameter was not significant (p = .45), and 
that the substantive findings were unchanged. Details are available from the authors upon request. 
 
Qijt
Qij1  Q0 ~ N (Q0 ,1)
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perfectly represent Q. This is because: (1) previous buyers who are sources of signals 
might differ in their assessments of the average quality of Bonobos.com products 
depending on their experience, and (2) some information could be “lost in translation” in 
the sense that a prior buyer may not be able to fully express their assessments of the 
products to recipients. Given this, the kth local signal in zip code i at time t, , is: 
ikt ikt iktS Q u v   , where  and .      (1.4) 
iktu  allows assessments of quality in zip code i at time t to vary by different purchases (k); 
similarly, iktv  allows for individual-level variability in signal transmission. Spatial 
variation in the random components of signals is captured by 2ui  and 
2
vi  which vary over 
zip codes. Assuming independence between the two errors, we write Equation (1.4) as: 
.                (1.5) 
As analysts, we cannot observe signals directly, so we assume that the number of signals 
sent in a location is proportional to the number of transactions there in the previous 
period.15 
 Now, let 1itN   denote the lagged number of local transactions in zip code i at period 
t-1. Our assumption implies that the number of observed signals is 1i itN   where i  
denotes the proportion of signals arising from the lagged local purchases ( 1itN  ). Spatial 
variation in the observability of signals, (perhaps stemming from spatial variation in local 
relationships), is captured by 
 
which varies over zip codes. Potential consumers update 
                                                            
15 Narayanan, Manchanda, and Chintagunta (2005) assume that the number of signals that a physician 
observes on the quality of a prescription drug is proportional to the dollars spent on marketing efforts. 
iktS
uikt ~ N (0,ui2 ) 2~ (0, )ikt viv N 
2 2~ ( , )ikt ui viS N Q  
i
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their prior beliefs in a Bayesian fashion so that the uncertain belief about Q in zip code i 
at time t ( Qijt ) is: 
,         (1.6) 
where the variance ( ) and the mean ( ) of the posterior belief are as follows: 
, , and . 
We write the posterior mean and variance in terms of  because , , and  are not 
separately identified, but identified only up to . (The over-parameterized model, while 
not directly estimable, is helpful for exposition.) Most straightforwardly,  represents 
the “inefficiency of social learning” because as it increases, potential consumers place 
less weight on local information. Thus, the smaller the value of  the more quickly Qijt  
converges to the true Q, or, alternatively, the more efficient the social learning process.  
The over-parameterized model also helps in showing that the effect of local social 
capital on information transfer is unambiguous. Specifically, in Section 1.2 we 
conjectured that social capital boosts the “observability” of signals and reduces noise in 
information transmission, i.e., that it increases  and decreases , respectively. (The 
nature of social relationships has no effect on variation in the assessment of Q, i.e., no 
effect on ). Thus, by increasing i  and decreasing , an increase in social capital 
must lead to a smaller value of  as 
2 2
2 ui vi
i
i
  
 . We test this empirically by specifying: 
Qijt ~ N (Qijt , ijt2 )
2
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0 1log( )i iSC    , where iSC  is social capital in zip code i.   (1.7) 
Zip-level variables are mean-centered so log(i) = 0  when zip i has an average amount 
of social capital, i.e., iSC = 0. Since social capital reduces inefficiency in social learning, 
we expect that 1  < 0. 
1.4.2. Deterministic Utility and Means of Identifying Social Learning 
Deterministic utility (Equation 1.1) is unrelated to social learning. While not of central 
interest, it nevertheless serves to control for confounds that might affect our ability to 
measure the social learning process, and the moderating role of social capital as well. 
To control for correlated unobservables, we specify temporal, spatial and time-
varying spatial effects that are separate from the effects of social learning, and the 
moderating role of social capital on social learning. It could be the case, for example, that 
consumers in cities with more opportunities for socializing prefer Bonobos.com. If this 
were true, an observed correlation between the propensity to try and the number of 
previous trials in the local community could simply reflect local preferences and not a 
causal effect of prior trials on current behavior. Since we focus on social learning as a 
specific mechanism of social influence we need to control for awareness dispersion, 
social conformity, network externality, as they are competing mechanisms. Thus, we 
specify:  
Uijt
E  0t  Xi1  2SCi   0  1SCi Nit1  it .     (1.8) 
 is the period-specific intercept and controls global period effects unrelated to social 
learning, e.g., an increase in customer trials from (locally untargeted) marketing activities 
0t
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such as press coverage, via a flexible semi-parametric approach.  is a vector of 
observed zip-level characteristics (see Table 1.2) as well as two-digit zip fixed effects16 
and 1  are the corresponding parameters. iSC  is zip-level neighborhood social capital, 
and its direct impact on the utility is captured by 2  and our theory of the mechanism 
predicts 2  = 0. 
Lagged local transactions ( ) control for types of social influence other than 
social influence through social learning (e.g. awareness diffusion, social conformity, 
network externality, etc.), and their effects are captured by . We allow them to 
vary with social capital to prevent the effect of social capital on social learning ( ) from 
being confounded by its potential moderating effect on the other social contagion 
mechanisms ( ).  
Finally,  represents unobserved spatial and time-varying spatial effects. Here too 
we use  to control  because time-varying spatial effects are typically auto-
regressive trends so factors affecting  will also be correlated with lagged local 
transactions. For instance, suppose a zip code is revitalizing and over time residents have 
come to desire more fashionable apparel. This would increase  over time, so  is a 
reasonable control for ; hence, Equation 1.8 becomes: 
0 1 2 0 1 1 0 1 1( ) ( )
D
ijt t i i i it i itU X SC SC N SC N              ,   (1.9) 
                                                            
16 Ideally, we could include five digit zip code-period specific fixed effects to control for potential 
correlated unobservables (Narayanan and Nair 2012); however, given the non-linearity of our model this 
will yield an inconsistent estimator with unconditional estimation methods (Arellano and Honore 2001). 
X i
1itN 
0 1 iSC 
1
1
it
1itN  it
it
it 1itN 
it
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    0 1 2 0 0 1 1 1t i i i itX SC SC N              , 
0 1 2 3 1 4 1t i i it i itX SC N SC N           . 
In Equation 1.9, 0  and 0  ( 1  and 1 ) are not separately identified, but identified 
only up to 3 and . The equation clearly shows how lagged local transactions help with 
correlated unobservables and time-varying spatial trends in error term, .17 
1.4.3. Expected Utility Function and Aggregate Model of Trial 
 Since Uijt  is a random variable from a consumer’s prospective, the consumer makes 
trial decisions so as to maximize expected utility, E Uijt  , where: 
E Uijt   E UijtE  UijtD   ijt  E Qit  UijtD   ijt                           (1.10) 
      0 1 2 3 1 4 1it t i i it i it ijt
Q X SC N SC N              . 
From Equation 1.1, the probability that consumer j in zip i tries Bonobos.com at period t 
is: 
   
.
        
(1.11) 
   Our dependent variable is itY , the number of trials in a neighborhood (zip code) and is 
the aggregate of individual trial behavior. It follows a Poisson distribution as an 
approximation of a Binomial distribution. This is because given a large population size 
and a small event probability a Binomial distribution with parameters ( ,n p ) can be 
                                                            
17 As with Equation 1.8, the interaction effect of social capital on the time-varying spatial pattern is 
included to prevent the effect of social capital on social learning ( ) from being confounded by any 
potential interaction effect between  and social capital on  i.e., via .  
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expressed as a Poisson distribution with the parameter np .18 The likelihood of observing 
ity  is: 
   
, where ij it itM Pr   .
  
     (1.12)
 
where Mit denotes the observed number of non-triers in zip code i at time t.  
   To estimate the model we simulate 50 draws for signals, and compute the entire belief 
vector on the quality of experience attributes for these draws. Next, we compute the 
conditional likelihood of observing  for all observations under different combinations 
between 50 different strings of . The unconditional zip-level likelihood of observing 
 is obtained by sequentially integrating conditional  over 
conditional  over signal samples through Monte Carlo simulation. We estimate the 
parameters by maximizing the integrated likelihood. 
1.4.4. Identification of Parameters 
Observations with no local signals (i.e., before the first trial in the zip), identify . 
Similarly, Q is identified with the observations under steady state, i.e., when there are 
sufficiently large numbers of signals such that there is little updating; in our data the 
cumulative number of signals reaches 525 so we can assume that steady state is 
achieved.19  (Equation 1.7), the average inefficiency in information transferred is 
identified from the pattern of increase in trials.  (Equation 1.7), the effect of social 
                                                            
18 These two conditions are met in our data: The range of the observed number of subjects at risk, i.e., target 
customers, in a zip code is [451, 19321] and the range of the empirical hazard rate is [0,0.009]. 
19 Figure 1.3a is additional evidence that the steady state is achieved in our data set. It shows that there is 
little change in utility when cumulative number of signals reaches around 100. 
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capital on the inefficiency of information transferred, is identified from the differences in 
the cross-sectional variability of the pattern of increase in trials under different levels of 
social capital. 
   In the deterministic utility component, the average effect of lagged local transactions 
( ), is separately identified from the social learning process from the observations in the 
steady state. The interaction effect between social capital and lagged local transactions 
( ) is identified from the differences in sales evolution patterns by social capital under 
steady state. 
1.5. Empirical Findings 
Table 1.3 shows the parameter estimates. They suggest that: (1) local social learning is at 
work, and (2) neighborhood social capital moderates the social learning process by 
reducing inefficiency in information transfer. The effects are statistically and 
economically significant and in Sections 1.5.2 and 1.5.3, we report falsification tests and 
robustness checks, respectively. 
   Statistical significance of the social learning process is established when the model 
indicates that consumers enjoy significantly better expected utility from trial as a result of 
social learning, and it is based on the interplay of several parameters ( 0Q , Q, 0 , and 
1 ). This is identical to saying that the local social learning process is statistically 
significant when an additional local transaction significantly increases pre-trial expected 
utility; thus, we use a Bootstrap method to quantify the marginal utility increase from an 
additional local transaction. In Figure 1.2a the solid line is the marginal utility increase 
from an additional local transaction under the average level of social capital (mean- 
3
4
33 
 
 
 
centered SCi = 0). The 95% bootstrap confidence interval (indicated by dotted lines) is 
always positive; hence, there is significant evidence of local social learning. 
 
Table 1.3. Social Learning and Local Social Capital: Estimates from Bonobos.com 
 Model Estimates 
Standard 
Errors 
   
Parameters of the Social Learning Process   
   Q0, Initial Prior Mean of the Quality of Experience Attributes -12.517  (.153)** 
   Q, True Quality of Experience Attributes -11.107  (.082)** 
0,log (Signal SD|SC=0) 1.092  (.089)** 
1, log (Signal SD|SC)/ SC -.204  (.065)** 
   
Control Variables   
Lagged Local Transactions (Nit-1) .013  (.005)** 
Social Capital (SCi) -.019  (.033)  
Lagged Local Transactions Social Capital  (Nit-1  SCi) -.002  (.003)  
Race Diversity .071  (.040)  
Gini Coefficient -.318  (.029)** 
Average Income .329  (.062)** 
Education .502  (.050)** 
Target Population Density .168  (.040)** 
Local Offline Stores in Three-Digits Zip -.232  (.092)* 
Offline Spending on the Men’s Clothing Category .035  (.031)  
   
Observations and Model Fits   
   Number of Observations 20,790  
Log Likelihood -9,846.2 
BIC 20,607.04 
Notes: * indicates that p < .05 and ** indicates that p < .01. The models include 41 period fixed 
effects and 29 two-digit zip fixed effects and all variables listed in Table 1.2. Estimates for the 
dummies and non-central control variables are not reported for ease of exposition but are 
available from the authors upon request. 
 
 
Figure 1.2. The Estimated Significance of Social Learning 
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We quantify the economic value of social learning as the number of trials partly 
attributable to social learning on experience attributes, i.e., the number of actual triers 
minus the number who would have tried without the benefits of local social learning. This 
benchmark is computed as the number of new trials when the quality belief distribution 
does not update from the initial belief, all other parameters and variables held constant. 
We find that about 50% of trials (2,987 out of 5,745) are affected. This is consistent with 
a common practitioner belief; namely, that incomplete knowledge about experience 
attributes in general, and underestimation of product quality in particular, is a major 
barrier to trial. We demonstrate an important antidote: Information transferred locally 
from existing customers to potential customers helps to mitigate this problem. 
 Social capital as a moderator of social learning. The estimate of  in Table 1.3 
shows that social capital reduces the inefficiency in social learning ( = -.20; p < .001). 
In terms of magnitude, this implies that when social capital is increased by one standard 
deviation from the average, the inefficiency inherent in social learning ( ) will be 
brought down to about two-thirds of its original value (an approximately 50% increase in 
). In Section 1.5.1 we reported that for an “average community” nine local 
transactions are required to accomplish this reduction; in neighborhoods that are one 
standard deviation above average in social capital, only six local transactions are required. 
 We quantify the economic value of social capital as the number of trials attributable 
to the efficiency of social learning, i.e., the number of actual triers minus the number who 
would have tried if the level of social capital were lowered by one standard deviation in 
all zip codes. (Alternatively, we can interpret economic value as the difference in new 
1
1
2
i
21/ i
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trials between two zips that are exactly the same in all regards except one—they differ in 
the extent of social capital by one standard deviation.) Our simulations show that about 8% 
(438 out of 5,745) of the new trials were affected by the efficiency of social learning 
process.  
Control variables. Effects of the control variables are not of interest per se; we 
document them to illustrate consistency with prior findings and provide additional face 
validity for our main findings. The number of lagged local transactions ( 1itN  ) is 
positively related to local demand ( 3 = .01, p < .05), perhaps a result of other contagion 
mechanisms, time-varying spatial effects, or both. As expected, there is no main effect of 
local social capital on local demand (2= -.19, p = .55); social capital does not, per se, 
increase trial, but operates only through the learning mechanism, which identifies the 
effect.20 New trials are higher in more densely populated areas (p < .001) perhaps due to 
greater use of the Internet in such locations (Katona, Zubcsek, and Sarvary 2011), and in 
locations where residents have more education and higher average incomes (p < .001 in 
both cases). More offline stores reduces new trials at the online retailer (p < .05), 
consistent with online-offline demand substitution (Brynjolffson, Hu, and Rahman 2009).  
1.5.2. Falsification Tests 
Falsification tests for the local social learning finding. The controls in Equation 1.9 
notwithstanding, additional evidence that the learning process for experience attributes is 
                                                            
20 Moreover, as noted earlier and reported in Table 1.4 there is no evidence that the 1,014 zip 
codes “select” into those with buyers (495 zips) and those without (609 zips) on the basis of 
social capital stock. The absence of a main effect in Table 1.3 further affirms that social capital 
works not directly on sales, but indirectly through the specific mechanism of reducing 
inefficiency of information transfer among local residents.  
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not contaminated by other contagion mechanisms (e.g., awareness dispersion, normative 
pressure, etc.), or by temporal, spatial, and spatio-temporal effects, is helpful.  
For that purpose, we perform a falsification test for social learning. The test relies on 
the premise that the Bayesian updating process on learning about experience attributes 
should not be significant when estimated on repeat transaction data where Bonobos.com 
consumers have been able to resolve their uncertainty about product quality in general via 
their first purchase. 
To analyze repeat purchases we use the same model as before (Equation 111), but this 
time the dependent variable is the count of repeat customers. Since the number of 
consumers who can make repeat purchases are limited to those who have tried the 
website previously, the aggregate number of repeat transactions follows a Binomial rather 
than a Poisson distribution. 
 The pictures in Figures 1.2a (trial) and Figure 1.2b (repeat) are very different even 
though they represent an identical test for social learning about experience attributes. For 
trial (Figure 1.2a), the 95% confidence interval never contains zero, whereas for repeat 
(Figure 1.2b) it always does. In Figure 1.2a this is because the estimated difference 
between the initial belief (pre-trial Q0) and the updated belief (trial Q) is highly 
significant as noted previously (see Table 1.3). Consumers have a positive update after 
trying the product. In Figure 1.2b, as expected, the estimated difference between the 
initial belief (trial Q0) and the updated belief (repeat purchase Q) is not significant (p 
= .41). The finding is additional evidence that our model of social learning for experience 
attributes performs as it should—it does not find evidence of social learning when 
individual customers already direct experience with the product.  
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Falsification test for the moderating role of social capital. This falsification test is a 
subtle test of social capital measure itself.21 The SCCBS asks respondents not only about 
trust and communication with neighbors but also about trust and communication with 
workplace colleagues (see Section 1.8.1 (Appendix)). Our proposed measure of social 
capital is defined using the questions about neighbors (see Section 1.3.2). Neighbors, by 
definition, live in the same zip code, whereas work colleagues need not. In fact, commute 
times and related data strongly suggest that they often do not.22  
Hence, we define a new variable “workplace social capital” and re-estimate the model 
with this variable as a replacement for “neighborhood social capital”. If the moderating 
effect of social capital really is about local information transfer, there should be no 
moderating effect of workplace social capital. As with the counterpart, neighborhood 
social capital, workplace social capital is a simple average of local scores on: (1) 
workplace trust (the average among related SCCBS survey questions such as “How much 
do you trust colleagues?”), and (2) workplace interaction frequency (the average among 
related SCCBS survey questions such as “How much do you socialize with your 
colleagues outside work?”). This measure captures the embedded-ness of relationships 
with colleagues among those who “live” in a specific zip code, not “work” in a specific 
zip code. Details are in Section 1.8.1 (Appendix).  
We fit two models to demonstrate the test. First, we replace neighborhood social 
capital with workplace social capital and re-estimate the main model. When workplace 
                                                            
21 We are extremely grateful to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this analysis. 
22 According to a 2011 OECD survey, the average commuting time per day in the U.S. is around 50 
minutes. (http://www.economist.com/blogs/freeexchange/2011/10/surveys). It is therefore very unlikely 
that many US residents live and work in the same zip code. 
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social capital enters the model alone it does not enhance the efficiency of the local 
neighborhood social learning process (p = .06). The corresponding effect for 
neighborhood social capital reported in Table 1.3 is, on the other hand, highly significant 
( 1 = -.20, p < .001). Second, we include both variables in equation 1.7 and find that 
neighborhood social capital moderates the local social learning process ( 1 = -.26, p 
< .001) whereas workplace social capital does not (p = .38).  
1.5.3. Robustness Checks 
Unobserved time-varying spatial effects. In Equation 1.9, we used lagged local 
transactions ( 1itN  ) to control unobserved time-varying spatial effect ( it ). While this is 
in some respects a reasonable control, it is potentially incomplete in that we cannot be 
fully assured that there is no concurrent demand shock in a specific zip code that is not 
explained by past local transactions. To alleviate this, we would ideally find a proxy to 
control concurrent demand shocks, but it is challenging to find such a variable for each 
zip code every period. As an alternative we introduce a random component for the 
unobserved time-varying spatial effect unexplained by lagged local transaction ( it ) and 
specify Equation 1.9 as:  
0 1 2 0 1 1 0 1 1( ) ( )
D
ijt t i i i it i it itU X SC SC N SC N                .  (1.13) 
Note that Equation 1.9 is a special case of Equation 1.13 where there is no unobserved 
time-varying spatial effect that is unexplained by past local transaction (i.e., 0it  ). 
   We fit models with two different distributional assumptions for it . First, we assume 
that: 
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   ~it IID 2(0, )N  .          (1.14) 
Under this assumption, we estimate a model with zip-period specific random effect. To 
estimate  , we simulated 50 draws of it  for each observation and integrated 
numerically when computing the likelihood. Under this relatively straightforward model 
of IID shocks, we found no significant effect of time-varying spatial elements that are 
unexplained by lagged local transactions (p = .06). Moreover, the substantive findings 
from our focal model are preserved. 
   In Equation 1.14, the IID assumption implies that a random shock has no influence on 
demand in a subsequent period, and all those carry-over effects are captured by lagged 
local transaction. To relax this assumption, we specify it  as: 
   1 ,it it it     where ~it  IID 2(0, )N  .      (1.15) 
To estimate   and  , we simulated 50 draws of it  for each observation, computed 
entire vectors of it , and numerically integrated as before. There is evidence of 
significant concurrent effects of it  if   is significantly greater than 0, and carry over 
effects if   is significantly different from 0. In this more general specification, neither 
the concurrent (p = .21) nor carry-over effects (p = .72) of random shocks were 
significant. Again, the substantive findings while our key findings remain robust.  
Spatially varying Q. In the main specification, we assume that previous triers agree 
on the quality of Bonobos.com products. If, however, there is any systematic difference 
in evaluation of Q, the assumption that signals are IID breaks down.23 We relaxed this 
                                                            
23 Unbiasedness of signals is standard assumption. We assume that: (1) signals represent agreement about 
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assumption and fit two models where Q (now iQ ) is a function of observed 
demographics. In the first model, both iQ  and i are defined as functions of neighborhood 
social capital, SCi. The purpose of the specification is to show that the estimate of 1  in 
Table 1.3 is not confounded by spatially-varying iQ  over SCi. We found that social 
capital still significantly reduces signal variance (1 = -.21, p < .001), but does not affect 
iQ  (p = .14).  
Next, we define iQ  as a function of three variables most likely to be related to the 
evaluation of fashion items—population density, average income among target customers, 
and offline spending in the category. Again, we found that social capital still significantly 
reduces signal variance ( 1  = -.21, p < .01) even when iQ  varies over density, average 
income, and spending on the category (p < .001 in all three cases).  
Our earlier findings in Table 1.3 are robust under spatially varying iQ . In addition, 
the BIC of main model reported earlier (20,607) is better than either of the alternative 
models that allow iQ  to vary by location. (The respective values are BIC1 = 20,614 and 
BIC2 = 20,632.) 
Alternative specification of moderation. Equation 1.7 specifies inefficiency of 
information transfer as a function of social capital only. The falsification tests in 1.5.2 
notwithstanding, it is helpful to examine alternative specifications. From a conceptual 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
quality with no systematic deviation, and (2) potential consumers believe that signals are unbiased. It is 
hard to test whether both assumptions hold or not. Conceptually, our findings are valid as far as (2) holds 
where Q becomes “perceived agreement” rather than “objective agreement” about quality. When (2) breaks 
down, our finding will be valid only when consumers know the direction and extent of systematic 
deviation, and Q becomes objective agreement after cancelling out systematic deviation. 
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perspective, previous purchases by local neighbors with demographics similar to those of 
potential customers, but with whom potential customers do not interact, should boost 
neither the observability of signals (i) nor the richness of signals (vi). What matters is 
the “embedded-ness” (Granovetter 1985) of relationships. When we allow signal variance 
to depend on racial diversity, income inequality, and social capital we find that social 
capital reduces inefficiency as before, ( 1 = -.20, p < .01), but that diversity (p = .41) and 
income (p = .12) have no effect. 
1.6. Summary 
1.6.1. Key Findings  
We began with the observations that information passed from existing to potential 
customers is a key driver of sales, and that information about experience attributes (which 
cannot be fully observable and verifiable pre-purchase) is important in reducing the 
uncertainty faced by potential customers. Moreover, the global consumer economy is 
driven increasingly by online commerce, such that information about experience 
attributes plays a critical and ever larger role in buying decisions. The top-line message 
from our research is that while firms can expend considerable resources to reduce 
consumer uncertainty about experience attributes, naturally occurring customer-driven 
processes, specifically interactions between existing and potential customers, could 
perform a similar role.  
Drawing on existing conceptual frameworks and empirical studies, we proposed that: 
(1) local social learning is a specific mechanism for reducing uncertainty about 
experience attributes, and (2) the local social learning process is enhanced by 
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neighborhood social capital such that higher levels of social capital reduce inefficiency in 
the learning process. Both conjectures are supported from models estimated on data from 
Bonobos.com, a leading and iconic US online apparel retailer.  
To our knowledge, our paper is the first in marketing to identify the proposed 
mechanism of social learning in this important context, and in addition, to demonstrate 
the novel moderating role of social capital. It is crucial to note that social capital does not, 
per se, influence trial of new products. It operates directly on the learning process itself, 
by reducing inefficiency in information transfer. In instances where consumers update 
favorably, e.g., in the case of Bonobos.com where initial beliefs underestimated true 
quality, more efficient information transfer will naturally help trials indirectly.  
1.6.2. Actionable Insights, Limitations, and Future Research  
Managers are of course well aware that existing customers are important sources of 
information and uncertainty resolution for potential customers, i.e., that “social learning” 
is a mechanism for information transmission about experience attributes in particular, 
even if they don’t phrase it in exactly those terms. Nevertheless, the magnitude of this 
effect might be cause for surprise—we estimate that up to half of all Bonobos.com trials 
were affected by it.  
Furthermore, the fact that neighborhood social capital reduces inefficiency is 
potentially actionable as well. While the SCCBS is extensive (over 30,000 respondents), 
it covers only just over 1,000 zip codes (there are more than 30,000 residential zip codes 
in the US; moreover, it may not be possible for managers to obtain the SCCBS from the 
Kennedy School.) To demonstrate the practical value of the social capital finding, we 
first conceived and obtained data on a proxy variable that is widely available.  
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As noted earlier, the Bonobos.com target customer is a “hip, semi-athletic, 25-to-40 
year old guy”. We sought a neighborhood-level proxy for the “potential for interaction” 
among such individuals and this led us to collect data on the number of bars and liquor 
shops per capita per zip code, for all 495 zip codes in our data (these data can be obtained 
manually via the Internet, or, as we did, from a professional supplier such as ESRI). This 
proxy is suitable because individuals are not usually alone (or, at least, not exclusively!) 
when they drink liquor. Most likely, they are with friends or neighbors watching sports, 
celebrating birthdays, having parties, and so on. Likewise, local bars are places where 
people, especially males, socialize with neighborhood residents.  
Therefore, we expect that the number of bars and liquor shops is a reasonable proxy 
for embedded-ness of local relationships and interaction frequency among local 
neighbors. Consistent with this expectation, the correlation between the neighborhood 
social capital measure from the SCCBS and the number of bars and liquor shops per 
capita is significantly positive (  = .32, p < .001). Of course, as we found with our 
falsification test using workplace social capital, we would not expect the bars and liquor 
store variable to be significant in a model that also included the true neighborhood social 
capital measure.    
First, we fit a model where neighborhood social capital is replaced with the “local 
bars and liquor shops” variable. Like neighborhood social capital, this variable does 
enhance the efficiency of social learning process (p < .05). Next, we included both the 
neighborhood social capital variable and the local bars and liquor shop variable into the 
model. In this case, the local bars and liquor shop variable loses its significance (p = .80) 
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while neighborhood social capital remains significant (1 = -.20, p < .05) as before. 
These findings imply that the local bars and liquor shop variable, which is conceptually 
related to embedded-ness of relationships—especially among males in the target 
segment—is a proxy for neighborhood social capital in our context. More generally, 
managers could act on the “social capital finding” by looking for observed local 
characteristics that suit their own product context (e.g., number of churches, gyms, or 
cooking clubs, etc.), and use it as a proxy for the extent of offline social relationships that 
are product-relevant. In locations with better and more frequent interaction among 
constituents, information transfer will be more efficient, which is of course desirable 
when firms have valued products. 
The limitations of our study suggest future research directions. First, we focus on 
social learning on vertical quality only, but social learning on horizontal fit is important 
too—especially for experiential goods. Second, we controlled time-varying spatial effects 
using both the trend captured by past purchases and alternative error structures for 
concurrent demand shocks. Alternative methods (perhaps natural experiments) with other 
exogenous controls on time-varying spatial effects would be helpful in further 
establishing the implied casual relationships in our work. Third, we focus exclusively on 
the identification of social learning only; one could of course explicitly separate other 
social contagion mechanisms such as awareness dispersion, and attempt to determine the 
relative importance of each.  
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1.8. Appendix 
1.8.1. Measures from the SCCBS 
 Neighborhood social capital. The following survey question is used to construct the 
neighborhood social trust score. 
- How much can you trust neighbors? 
1. Trust not at all. 
2. Trust only a little. 
3. Trust some. 
4. Trust a lot. 
 
The following survey questions are used to construct the local interaction frequency 
score.  
- How often did you interact with your neighbor within last twelve months? 
- How often did you have friends over to your home within last twelve months? 
- How often did you hang out with friends in a public place within last twelve 
months? 
1. Never did this 
2. Once 
3. A few times 
4. 2-4 times 
5. 5-9 times 
6. About once a month on average 
7. Twice a month 
8. About once a week average 
9. More than once a week. 
 
 SCCBS data include two versions of variables for each question, the raw score and 
standardized score in the local community (zip code). For each question, we use the local 
average of standardized scores to construct social trust and interaction frequency scores. 
We operationalize neighborhood social capital as the average between neighborhood trust 
and interaction frequency scores. 
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 Workplace social capital. The following survey question is used to construct the 
workplace social trust score. 
- How much can you trust co-workers? 
1. Trust not at all. 
2. Trust only a little. 
3. Trust some. 
4. Trust a lot. 
 
 The following are survey questions to construct local interaction frequency score.  
- How often did you socialize with co-workers outside of work within last twelve 
months? 
1. Never did this 
2. Once 
3. A few times 
4. 2-4 times 
5. 5-9 times 
6. About once a month on average 
7. Twice a month 
8. About once a week average 
9. More than once a week. 
 
 For each question, we operationalize workplace social capital as the average between 
workplace trust and interaction frequency scores. 
1.8.2. Zip Codes With and Without Customers 
The SCCBS data cover 1,104 zip codes and since the purpose of our research is to 
understand how information from a previous trial influences potential subsequent first 
trials by local neighbors, we focus on 495 zips with at least one customer within the 42 
month period after the site launched. Since the observation period is quite long—three 
and a half years—it’s possible that the 609 (1,104 – 495) zips with no trials at all could be 
different from the 495 zips used in estimation. To check and document these differences, 
we estimate a binary probit of the probability of at least one trial, using data from all 
1,104 zips. The results are in Table 1.4.  
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 Significant effects for some control variables are to be expected; indeed, there is 
higher probability of least one Bonobos.com customer in zip codes with a more educated 
population and in those where residents spend more on men’s clothing. Most important 
however, is that zip codes do not sort on our key independent variable, neighborhood 
social capital. The estimate is not significantly different from zero (p = .29). We thank an 
anonymous reviewer for suggesting this analysis.  
Table 1.4. Probit Estimates - The probability of at least one customer in a zip code 
 Model Estimates 
Standard 
   Error 
Estimated Parameters   
  Intercept -.219  (.468) 
Social Capital (SCi) .063  (.060) 
Race Diversity .609  (.372) 
Gini Coefficient -7.216 (1.382)** 
Average Income -.355  (.297) 
Education .794  (.180)** 
Target Population Density .102  (.112) 
Local Offline Stores in Three-Digits Zip .033  (.109) 
Offline Spending on the Men’s Clothing 1.388  (.554)* 
   
Observations and Model Fits  
  Number of Observations 1,055  
  Log Likelihood -428.5  
  BIC 1,198.1  
 
1.8.3. Analyses with 1,104 zip codes 
To check the robustness of our finding, we also fitted a main model with the entire 
1,104 zip codes. As we found in our main model (where we focus on 495 zips with at 
least one customer within the 42 month period), local social learning is a significant 
driver of sales. We also found that social capital reduces signal variance (1 = -.11), but 
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not significantly (p = .22). The impact of social capital on learning process might have 
lost its significance because 609 zips with no trial for three and a half year have 
systematically different preferences from 495 zips with at least one trial. People in 609 
zips may have preferences strongly against Bonobos.com no matter how much 
information they have, and such preferences cannot be fully captured by observable zip 
characteristics, 2-digit level fixed effects, or lagged number of transaction. Therefore, it is 
likely that the learning model is confounded with other unobservable factors when we 
fitted a model with 1,104 zips. In our main model, we rule out the zip codes which 
potentially have extreme preferences, so we can better understand the impact of social 
learning and the role of social capital.  
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ESSAY 2: SOCIAL CONTAGION IN NEW PRODUCT TRIAL AND REPEAT 
 
2.1. Introduction 
How new products gain market acceptance is of key interest to marketers. The notion that 
adoption or trial can be affected by peer influence or social contagion is well accepted. 
Having customers try a new product, however, does not mean that they will keep using it 
and that the product will gain market acceptance. Marketers seek not only trial but also 
sustained use or repeat purchases. Research on how social contagion helps new products 
gain market traction, however, focuses almost exclusively on adoption or trial.  
So, several important questions remain unanswered. Can social contagion affect not 
only trial but also repeat behavior? If so, are those who influence others to adopt the same 
as those who influence others to repeat? i.e., are the same customers influential in both 
trial and repeat, or should marketers seek to leverage different customers to support trial 
versus repeat? And what about differences in susceptibility to social influence? i.e., are 
those who are the most influenceable at trial also the most influenceable at the repeat 
stage? Finally, if contagion operates differently at each stage, can we gain some insights 
about why this happens? 
The presence of social contagion in repeat may appear a bit puzzling. Why would 
adopters’ subsequent behavior be affected by peers, since adoption provides the 
opportunity to learn directly about the product’s advantages and disadvantages? Theory 
and empirical evidence suggest four reasons. The first is that social contagion can result 
from both informational and normative peer influence (e.g., Deutsch and Gerard 1955). 
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Whereas one expects informational influence to decline as customers proceed from trial 
to repeat, theory and empirical research provide no basis for normative influence to 
decline—some work even implies the opposite (e.g., Tolbert and Zucker 1983). The 
second reason is that informational influence need not be limited to trial but may affect 
repeat as well. When learning about product quality from personal experience is slow, 
customers may rely on peers as a source of information not only for trial but also repeat 
decisions (e.g., Dulleck and Kershbamer 2006). The third reason is that for products and 
services where interconnectivity or standardization is important, the utility of use 
increases with the number of other users, such that contagion affects not only adoption 
but also repeat or churn (e.g., Haenlein 2013; Nitzan and Libai 2011). The fourth reason 
is that environmental shocks can raise new doubts about an accepted product, making 
repeat users again susceptible to informational influence from peers, as suggested by Nair 
et al. (2010). 
Investigating social contagion in trial versus repeat can provide new insights that are 
both theoretically and managerially valuable. Three benefits stand out. First, who the 
influentials are, who the influenceables are, and how that varies across trial and repeat 
matters to marketers keen on leveraging social contagion to help their products gain 
market acceptance. Who should they seek for leverage at trial versus repeat? Who can 
they afford not to target with costly resources, and does that change from trial to repeat? 
Second, research focusing exclusively on trial provides only limited insights into 
what drives new product acceptance. This is especially so for three types of products. For 
consumables and services where trial purchases account for only a small fraction of 
customer lifetime value and overall product profitability, managers need to know what 
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drives trial as well as repeat (Gielens and Steenkamp 2007; Shih and Venkatesh 2004). 
For credence goods and complex innovations that generate uncertainty or ambiguity for 
their users even after trial, managers need to understand how these post-adoption 
sentiments operate so they can prevent them from becoming hurdles to repeat (Wood and 
Moreau 2006). For products and technologies targeted towards professionals and 
business users, managers need to understand how intra-organizational factors affect the 
sustained implementation of innovations (Downs and Mohr 1976).  
Third, similarities or differences in who is most influential and influenceable at trial 
versus repeat may provide insights into the nature of the contagion mechanism(s) at 
work—a key research priority (e.g., Aral 2011; Godes 2011; Iyengar et al. 2011b; Lewis 
et al. 2012; Libai et al. 2010). Recent work has documented systematic variations across 
customers in influence and susceptibility, but has done so only in the realm of new 
product adoption (e.g., Aral and Walker 2012; Goldenberg et al. 2009; Hu and Van den 
Bulte 2014; Iyengar et al. 2011a; Katona et al. 2011) or outside the realm of new products 
altogether (e.g., Godes and Mayzlin 2009; Trusov et al. 2010). Studying social contagion 
in both trial and repeat provides the opportunity to assess the effect of peer behavior on 
two different dependent variables. This in turn enables one to more sharply identify the 
nature of the contagion mechanism(s) at work (Oster and Thornton 2012). 
We investigate the presence and nature of contagion in trial versus repeat by studying 
the acceptance of a new prescription drug by physicians. Our study combines individual-
level trial and repeat data, social network data, survey data, and individual-level sales call 
data.  
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There are three novel findings. First, we find evidence of contagion in both trial and 
repeat. Second, who is most influential varies across stages. Physicians who are central in 
the network of discussion and referral and who prescribe the new drug heavily drive the 
contagion at the trial stage (as found in an earlier analysis of the same drug), but they do 
not drive contagion at the repeat stage. Instead, repeat prescriptions are affected by the 
behavior of immediate colleagues, only some of whom are also discussion/referral 
partners. Third, who is most influenceable also varies across stages. For trial, it is 
physicians who do not see themselves as opinion leaders (consistent with prior analysis). 
For repeat, in contrast, it is physicians in the middle of the status distribution as measured 
by network centrality.  
Observing contagion operates in very different ways across trial and repeat suggests 
that different mechanisms are at work at each stage. Specifically, the moderator effects in 
each stage as well as the contrast across stages is consistent with informational influence 
reducing risk in trial and normative influence increasing conformity in repeat. Hence, this 
study answers recent calls to move research from whether contagion is at work to how 
and why it is at work (Aral 2011; Godes 2011). In addition, our evidence of a non-
monotonic status effect extends recent insights into how status considerations affect 
customer behavior (Hu and Van den Bulte 2014). 
Our findings are also relevant to managers, as they suggest that marketers should 
consider leveraging peer influence not only to trigger adoption, but also to support 
subsequent repeat—at least for risky products like the one studied here. Also, marketing 
policies to leverage contagion should be designed and targeted differently, since who is 
most influential and who is most influenceable varies across stages. Finally, the results 
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suggest that marketers of products like the one we study may want to emphasize different 
motivations—perceived risk versus conformity to local norms—in their sales calls and 
other marketing communications targeted towards prospects vs. adopters. 
We proceed by first further developing the research questions, building on theories 
and findings from psychology and sociology. We next describe the research setting, data, 
and modeling approach. We then present the findings and discuss their implications for 
theory, research, and practice. 
2.2. Research Questions 
Though social contagion and trial-repeat behavior have both long been the object of 
active research, and though studying them jointly would provide three important benefits, 
there is virtually no research of this kind to build on. So, we rely mostly on theoretical 
arguments to develop our research questions.  
We first very briefly describe marketing research on trial vs. repeat. We then discuss 
informational and normative influence as two distinct contagion mechanisms. This 
provides the basis for refutable hypotheses on how and why contagion operates 
differently in trial vs. repeat.  
2.2.1. Prior Research on Trial vs. Repeat 
Prior research on social contagion focuses only on adoption or does not discriminate 
between trial and repeat. Similarly, to the extent that new product research has studied 
repeat behavior, it has done so without considering contagion.  
Modeling trial-repeat behavior has a long history in marketing (e.g., Parfitt and 
Collins 1968). However, such work is typically conducted in packaged goods categories 
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for which social contagion was until recently believed not to matter much even at the trial 
stage because of low functional, financial, and social risk (Du and Kamakura 2011). As a 
result, empirical studies of this kind have not provided insights into contagion dynamics.  
Aggregate-level diffusion modeling also has a long history. Several studies of this 
kind distinguish between trial and repeat sales, but do not investigate contagion in each 
stage either (e.g., Hahn et al. 1994).  
Diffusion researchers have also investigated whether initial deployment or trial of 
new technologies by organizations is driven by different factors than subsequent 
deployment within those organizations. However, studies contrasting “inter” and “intra” 
firm diffusion do not investigate social contagion dynamics (e.g., Levin et al. 1992). 
2.2.2. Informational versus Normative Influence 
Peer influence leading up to social contagion in customer behavior can be both 
informational and normative (e.g., Bearden et al. 1989; Deutsch and Gerard 1955, Turner 
1991, pp. 34-39). Informational influence occurs when information obtained from peers 
serves as evidence about reality and so changes one’s beliefs about the true state of the 
world. Normative influence arises from the desire to conform to the expectations of 
others about what is the right and proper thing to do.  
The notion of social contagion through informational influence, affecting awareness 
or beliefs about products’ risks and benefits, is quite familiar to marketing scientists. The 
notion of contagion through normative influence is less so, and two important 
characteristics need to be borne in mind. 
First, normative influence is fundamentally a group phenomenon (Deutsch and 
Gerard 1955; Hogg 2010; Turner 1991, p. 37). Social norms are rules and standards that 
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are understood, endorsed and expected by members of a group (Cialdini and Trost 1988) 
and, consequently, conformity to norms is fundamentally a group rather than 
interpersonal process. 
Second, normative influence can be of two types (Bearden et al. 1989; Kelman 1958, 
2006; Scott 1996, p. 96; Turner 1991, pp. 39, 117-118): compliance based on others’ 
power to mediate rewards and costs, and identification based on the concern to live up to 
others’ expectations of one’s role. Whereas compliance requires public observability and 
monitoring so persons can be rewarded or punished depending on whether they act in 
accordance to the norm, identification requires that the persons care about maintaining a 
positive relationship with other members of their group (Kelman 1958; Turner 1991, p. 
117). Whereas compliance operates mostly through reward and coercive power, 
identification operates mostly through referent power (Warren 1968).24 Whereas 
compliance is about adhering to rules, identification is about enacting roles based on 
others’ expectations (Kelman 2006).  
2.2.3. Informational Influence in Trial versus Repeat 
Trial of new products, especially those presenting substantial risk, can be subject to social 
contagion through informational peer influence. Evidence that contagion increases with 
                                                            
24 Consequently, both theory (e.g., Bicchieri 2006, pp. 11 and 42-44) and empirical research (e.g., Cialdini 
et al. 1990) imply that the actions of any specific people need not be observed for norms to operate. Actions 
of specific influencers need not be observed because people can form normative expectations, i.e., beliefs 
about what others expect them to do, without directly observing the actions of any specific person. E.g., 
people can infer from the presence of litter on the ground that littering is socially acceptable even if they do 
not see any specific person littering (Cialdini et al. 1990). Actions of influencees need not be observed 
either. Though normative influence through compliance involving rewards and punishment requires that 
others can observe one’s actions, public observability is not required for normative influence through 
identification, as the latter involves only one’s own assessment of how well one meets others’ expectations.   
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the sources’ credibility, experience or expertise and that it decreases with the decision 
makers’ self-confidence in their judgment indicates that contagion stems from 
informational influence (e.g., Deutsch and Gerard 1955; Kelman 1958; Iyengar et al. 
2011a). 
Informational influence is less likely to affect repeat decisions, as personal 
consumption experience substitutes for input from peers. Hence, a contagion effect that is 
larger in trial than repeat would be quite consistent with informational influence. Yet, 
some peer influence may be at work in repeat when learning from experience is slow. For 
instance, whereas physicians can quickly learn about the effectiveness of drugs used to 
treat acute conditions with easy to observe symptoms, this is not so for drugs used for 
chronic conditions that are hard to monitor. Learning from personal experience can be 
slow even for such simple products and services as laundry detergents and mobile phone 
service (e.g., Iyengar et al. 2007). Hence, for risky products with slow experiential 
learning, some customers may rely on the judgment of peers even when making repeat 
decisions (Dulleck and Kershbamer 2006). 
In short, for risky new products, informational influence considerations lead one to 
expect that social contagion (i) is at work in trial, (ii) originates from trusted peers, (iii) is 
lower for people confident in their judgments, and (iv) operates with greater strength in 
trial than repeat. As a corollary, a contagion effect with characteristics (i)-(iv) is more 
likely to stem from informational influence than one without these characteristics. 
2.2.4. Normative Influence in Trial versus Repeat 
The acceptance of innovations can be subject to social contagion through normative 
influence (e.g., DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Van den Bulte and Stremersch 2004). Since 
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norms are endorsed and expected by members of a group, customers are more likely to 
experience normative influence from group members than from outsiders, even those 
with experience or expertise (Deutsch and Gerard 1955; Turner 1991, pp. 117-118). This 
suggests that informational and normative influence may very well stem from different 
sources (e.g., experts versus family members or colleagues). 
The extent to which customers conform to social norms is likely to vary by status, i.e., 
their social rank in terms of esteem and respect. Customers with very low status have 
little to lose from not conforming and little to gain from conforming. Whether they 
conform or not simply does not affect them very much (Dittes and Kelley 1956; Harvey 
and Consalvi 1960). The same holds for customers with the highest status. They gain 
little additional esteem from adhering to group norms and are given greater latitude than 
others to deviate from group norms (Hollander 1958). Consequently, it is customers in 
the middle of the status distribution who have the greatest tendency to conform to norms, 
a pattern referred to as middle-status conformity and documented in adoption studies by 
Phillips and Zuckerman (2001) and Hu and Van den Bulte (2014). Along similar lines, 
Bosk (2003, p. 75) describes how physicians of middle status experience the most 
pressure to adhere to their surgical ward’s local norms. 
In contrast to informational influence, there is little theory or empirical research 
suggesting that the susceptibility to normative influence declines as customers proceed 
from trial to repeat. Rather, the opposite is likely. The first reason is that adopters’ desire 
to appear legitimate by conforming to normative expectations increases over the diffusion 
process, as several studies suggest. Whereas early adoptions are affected mostly by 
technical and performance considerations, the evidence suggests, later behavior is 
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increasingly affected by the concern to appear legitimate (Kennedy and Fiss 2009; 
Tolbert and Zucker 1983; Westphal et al. 1997). The mechanism posited to be at work is 
that, as time progresses, products and practices are increasingly evaluated using a “logic 
of social appropriateness” rather than a “logic of instrumentality” (Westphal et al. 1997, p. 
374). This shift is similar to that in Maslow’s hierarchy of needs: As one feels that basic 
functional requirements are met, social acceptability and integration become more 
important considerations. To the extent that customers similarly shift some emphasis 
from functional performance to social acceptability after adoption, repeat use and 
sustained implementation should be more affected by normative concerns than initial use. 
The second reason to expect susceptibility to normative influence to increase as 
customers proceed from trial to repeat is that social disapproval based on deviations from 
the norm are easier to condone for trial than for repeat. Normative disapproval of a trial 
decision can easily be deflected by claiming exigent circumstances (when proven right) 
or by showing contrition and desisting (when proven wrong). These tactics, however, are 
not available to someone who violates norms of proper behavior repeatedly (Bosk 2003, 
pp. 35-70). 
Note that the two reasons to expect the susceptibility to normative influence to 
increase as customers proceed from trial to repeat are of a different nature. The first does 
not pertain to a genuine difference between trial and repeat but to a change over time in 
how much people care about conforming to social norms. So, the difference across stage 
is merely a corollary of a temporal effect. The second reason pertains to a genuine 
difference between trial and repeat, regardless of time since launch. 
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In short, normative influence considerations lead one to expect that social contagion 
(i) is at work in repeat, (ii) originates from group members, (iii) varies in an inverse-U 
fashion with the decision maker’s status, and (iv) operates with greater strength in repeat 
than trial. As a corollary, a contagion effect with characteristics (i)-(iv) is more likely to 
stem from normative influence than one without these characteristics. 
2.2.5. Hypotheses 
The theoretical arguments lead to four predictions for risky products:  
H1. New product adoption is affected by social contagion that originates from trusted 
peers, and people with low confidence in their judgments are more susceptible to it. 
H2. Social contagion that originates from trusted peers and that is negatively 
moderated by the recipients’ self-confidence is more pronounced in trial than in repeat. 
H3. New product repeat behavior is affected by social contagion that originates from 
group members, and people with middle-status are more susceptible to it. 
H4. Social contagion that originates from group members and that is non-
monotonically moderated by the recipients’ status is more pronounced in repeat than in 
trial. 
Two observations are in order. First, the hypotheses are based on the assumption that 
contagion in adoption is driven mostly by informational considerations whereas 
contagion in repeat is driven mostly by normative considerations. Support for the 
hypotheses would provide credence to this underlying assumption, but does not provide 
direct evidence of the informational or normative nature of contagion. This is not a major 
limitation, as theoretical mechanisms are typically inferred from their observable 
consequences rather than observed directly even in experimental research. Second, the 
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hypotheses go far beyond basic main effects. This makes it hard to find credible 
alternative explanations for the data in case the hypotheses are supported. 
2.3. Strengthening Internal Validity in Contagion Studies 
Obtaining good estimates of an effect is rarely straightforward in non-experimental 
studies. Whereas observational designs do not offer the same level of internal validity as 
randomized field experiments (e.g., Aral and Walker 2012; Hinz et al. 2011), researchers 
have found many ways to strengthen the internal validity of observational contagion 
studies. 
2.3.1. Temporal precedence 
One way is simply to be mindful that causes precede effects, and to plan one’s study 
accordingly. For instance, one can avoid simultaneity bias by using panel data with 
sufficiently fine temporal resolution and by modeling contagion in terms of lagged rather 
than contemporaneous peer behavior. As another example, one can avoid endogenous tie 
formation and truncation biases by not operationalizing contagion in terms of social ties 
that can come into existence only after the adoptions that one seeks to explain have 
occurred. 
2.3.2. Technical Fixes 
The second way to boost the internal validity of contagion research consists of using one 
or more of the standard approaches to strengthen causal inference in observational 
designs. These include studying acyclic networks to avoid simultaneity bias (e.g., Iyengar 
et al. 2011a), using covariates or fixed effects to control for common contextual effects 
and attributes (e.g., Nair et al. 2010; Van den Bulte and Lilien 2001), using matching 
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techniques to do the same (e.g., McShane et al. 2012), using instrumental variables to 
capture exogenous variations in contagion (e.g., Land and Deane 1992), and jointly 
modeling ties and behavior to account for endogenous tie formation (e.g., Lewis et al. 
2012). 
2.3.3. Theoretical Elaboration 
The third way to more confidently identify contagion is theoretical elaboration. The idea 
is conveyed in an anecdote involving two eminent statisticians, R.A. Fisher and W.G. 
Cochran.  
“About 20 years ago, when asked in a meeting what can be done in observational 
studies to clarify the step from association to causation, Sir Ronald Fisher replied: 
‘Make your theories elaborate.’ The reply puzzled me at first, since by Occam's 
razor, the advice usually given is to make theories as simple as is consistent with 
known data. What Sir Ronald meant, as subsequent discussion showed, was that 
when constructing a causal hypothesis one should envisage as many different 
consequences of its truth as possible, and plan observational studies to discover 
whether each of these consequences is found to hold.” (Cochran 1965, p. 252, 
emphasis in original) 
The idea, in essence, is that more elaborate predictions cannot be accounted for as easily 
by threats to internal validity. As Shadish, Cook and Campbell (2002, p. 105) note, “The 
more complex the pattern that is successfully predicted, the less likely it is that alternative 
explanations could generate the same pattern, and so the more likely it is that the 
treatment had a real effect.” Shadish et al. call this method of strengthening internal 
validity “coherent pattern matching” whereas Rosenbaum (2002, pp. 209-214) calls it 
“increasing the specificity of predictions.”  
Such theoretical elaboration often entails putting forward boundary conditions and 
moderator effects (e.g., Cochran 1965; Shadish et al. 2002, p. 105). Consumer 
psychologists and other laboratory researchers have made this notion central to their 
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research strategy. Even when using randomized experiments, they put greater confidence 
in results supporting moderator predictions than basic main effects. For instance, a 
moderator effect limits the set of possible confounds to only those that would generate 
the same pattern, e.g., only omitted variables that are similarly moderated.  
Theoretical elaboration may also increase causal confidence by positing non-
monotonic effects, Cochran (1965) notes. For instance, a predicted non-monotonic effect 
rules out monotonic confounds as threats to validity.  
Theoretical elaboration may also involve positing that a specific cause has an effect 
on one outcome variable but not another.  Threats to internal validity in such 
“nonequivalent dependent variables” designs are less plausible when purported 
confounds are expected to affect all dependent variables but one observes only responses 
on those outcomes consistent with one’s theory (Rosenbaum 2002, pp. 209-213; Shadish 
et al. 2002, pp. 110-111). Though specificity of outcome does not guarantee the causal 
nature of associations in observational designs, it makes potential confounds common 
across outcomes less likely and so strengthens the evidence of a causal connection (Hill 
1965; Holland 1986). 
Our hypotheses follow R.A. Fisher’s dictum, as they involve different dependent 
variables, different sources of contagion, different moderators, and a non-monotonic 
pattern. This allows us to be more confident that the analysis detects genuine effects. 
Before we proceed with the empirics, a brief clarification about the role of informational 
vs. normative influence in our application may be in order. We use the experimentally 
documented theoretical distinction between informational and normative influence to 
motivate non-obvious hypotheses involving (i) different dependent variables, (ii) 
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different sources of contagion, (iii) different moderators, and (iv) a non-monotonic 
pattern. The distinction between informational and normative influence is a means and 
not the end in our application of R.A. Fisher’s insight. Accordingly, the hypotheses are 
stated in terms of observables rather than informational vs. normative influence, and 
support for the hypotheses provides indirect credence but not direct evidence of the 
informational vs. normative nature of contagion.  
2.4. Research Setting 
We analyze the acceptance of a risky new prescription drug over a 17-month period, 
studied earlier by Iyengar, Van den Bulte and Valente (2011a), hereafter referred to as 
IVV. We extend that earlier work by investigating (i) both trial and repeat25 and (ii) 
contagion from both trusted expert peers and immediate colleagues.26  
The drug is used to treat a chronic viral infection that can cause severe damage to 
internal organs and—if left untreated—sometimes even lead to patients’ death. Physicians 
cannot observe drug efficacy quickly and adjust a patient's therapy if necessary. Also, 
there is uncertainty in the medical community regarding the best treatment because there 
is no compelling evidence about the new drug’s long-term efficacy compared to that of 
two older drugs. In such situations characterized by high risk, high complexity and low 
observability of results, potential adopters are likely to turn to opinion leaders for 
                                                            
25 We exclude refill prescriptions from the repeat data. So, the repeat events we study involve the 
physicians writing a new prescription.  
26 Hypothesis H1 was already documented by IVV using the same data but omitting immediate colleagues 
as a distinct source of contagion. Though our evidence in support of H1 is hence a robustness check of 
IVV’s earlier finding rather than truly new evidence, H1 is part of our broader aim to document differences 
in social contagion between trial and repeat posited in H2. 
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guidance (Hahn et al. 1994).27  
Social contagion may also be at work after trial. The first reason is the physicians 
cannot quickly assess the drug’s efficacy even after having prescribed it. The drug treats 
a chronic rather than acute condition which is mostly asymptomatic until the patient is 
gravely ill. Not only do patients not feel whether the treatment is working or not, but even 
physicians have difficulty assessing improvements in patient health. They can only do so 
using indirect indicators, such as viral loads. Moreover, even if the treatment is effective, 
progress occurs only very slowly. All this makes the product’s effectiveness with one’s 
patients difficult to assess. The effectiveness of the focal drug compared to its two 
established competitors is ambiguous as well. Even large-scale clinical trials with strict 
test/control conditions provide far from definitive evidence of long-term superiority. 
Considering how difficult it is for physicians to gain much conclusive information from 
experience, it is possible that they rely on their peers’ judgment even after trial.  
The second reason that contagion may affect repeat behavior is that physicians want 
to act in a way that their peers deem proper and legitimate. Physicians look to their peers 
for information as well as normative guidance (Bosk 2003, pp. 35-70; Prosser and Walley 
2006). Normative influence is likely to be stronger in repeat than in trial decisions and to 
vary as a function of status, something which is quite salient among physicians (Bosk 
2003, pp. 36-67, 111-146; Menchik and Meltzer 2010) and can affect their prescription 
behavior (Burt 1987; Menzel 1957).  
                                                            
27 The severity of the medical condition and the limited observability of effectiveness also make willful 
experimentation on patients by forward-looking physician quite unlikely (Chintagunta et al. 2012, pp. 807-
808). 
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Physicians who are influenced by the normative expectations of their colleagues do 
not necessarily make medically suboptimal choices that jeopardize the lives of their 
patients in order to look good. Such cynicism would be misguided in our research setting 
where which treatment option was medically optimal was far from clear-cut. When faced 
with such ambiguity, acting in ways that fellow medical professionals deem proper and 
legitimate is medically reasonable. 
2.5. Data 
The data cover the adoption and repeat prescriptions of the new drug by physicians in 
Los Angeles (LA), New York City (NYC) and San Francisco (SF) over a period of 17 
months from the time of launch time. As the drug was the third entry in its category, the 
relevant population within each city was defined by the firm as every physician who had 
prescribed at least one of the other two drugs in the two years prior to the focal drug’s 
launch. 
The data consists of (i) monthly physician prescription data (excluding refills), (ii) 
answers to a survey by physicians providing information on discussion and patient 
referral ties, self-reported opinion leadership, and several other physician characteristics, 
(iii) the address where each physician practiced, and (iv) company records on sales calls 
to each physician. 
2.5.1. Prescription Data 
For each physician within the network boundary (not only survey respondents), the time 
of adoption is measured using monthly individual-level prescription data from IMS 
Health. Of the 193 doctors who responded to the survey, 68 or 35% adopted within 17 
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months. The average prescription incidence rate after adoption, or monthly repeat rate for 
short, is around 75%.  
2.5.2 Discussion and Referral Ties  
A mail and Internet survey was administered to all physicians in the network boundary. 
The survey asked the respondents to name up to eight physicians with whom they felt 
comfortable discussing the clinical management and treatment of the disease for which 
the drug was developed (discussion ties) and up to eight physicians to whom they 
typically refer patients with the disease (referral ties). Both lists could but did not need to 
overlap. The highest number of discussion partners nominated by any physician was 6 
and that of referral partners was 5. Both these values are below the maximum number of 
nominations allowed. The survey was administered in SF several months before the 
product launch, but in LA and NYC 10 months after the launch. This exogenous variation 
helps us address threats to internal validity. 
67 of the 150 physicians in the population of interest in SF responded. 57 out of 197 
did in LA, and 69 out of 284 in NYC. As discussed in detail by IVV (see also Christakis 
and Fowler 2011), there is no evidence of non-response bias and the 24%-45% response 
rates avoid sizable error in the network-based covariates introduced below.  
The study restricts the relevant networks to physicians practicing in the same city. 
The importance of local as opposed to national opinion leaders is well documented in the 
medical literature and the pharmaceutical industry is keenly aware of the importance of 
such social dynamics at the local level (e.g., IVV 2011a; Liu and Gupta 2012). So, 
physicians who were nominated by survey respondents but were not part of the 
population of interest were excluded from the study. Physicians who were part of the 
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population of interest but did not respond to the survey, in contrast, were included in the 
set of potential discussion or referral partners. A physician who is mentioned as both a 
discussion and a referral partner is deemed twice as influential as another who is 
mentioned as only one or the other. Contagion over this total network describes the 
pattern of adoption better than contagion over only discussion or referral ties (IVV 
2011a). 
2.5.3. Immediate Colleagues  
Normative influence is more pronounced among individuals forming a group, and norms 
often operate locally (Bosk 2003, pp. 51-67; Cialdini and Trost 1998; Deutsch and Gerard 
1955; Hogg 2010; Turner 1991). Consequently, immediate colleagues one interacts with 
daily are likely to exert normative influence through identification. They help define the 
local norm of what is legitimate practice, and the desire to maintain a satisfactory 
relationship with one’s colleagues motivates people to conform to their expectations.28 
We use the group practice or hospital where each physician works to identify his or 
her immediate colleagues. Physicians do not consider each and every of their colleagues a 
trusted expert on the medical condition treated by the new drug. As shown in the top row 
of Table 2.1, physicians in SF report on average only 9% of their colleagues for 
discussion and only 5% for referral regarding this specific medical ailment. The numbers 
for New York and Los Angeles are even lower. However, controlling for the fact that 
                                                            
28 Given our research setting of U.S. physicians making treatment decisions for a potentially lethal medical 
condition, we expect normative influence to operate through identification and referent power, not through 
compliance and coercive/reward power. Though the experiments of Deutsch and Gerard (1955) focused on 
the latter process, the importance of the former is now well documented and accepted (e.g., Kelman 1958, 
2006; Turner 1991, p. 37). 
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there are many more non-colleagues than colleagues available, physicians are 
significantly more likely to turn to colleagues than to non-colleagues for discussion or 
referral (p < .01).29  
Table 2.2 reports what fraction of referral and discussion ties involves colleagues. 
Once again, the evidence is clear that the peers one turns to for discussion or referral 
regarding the ailment treated by the drug are rarely one’s immediate colleagues. 
Table 2.1. Fraction of all Colleague-Dyads that Involve a Discussion or Referral Tie 
 San Francisco (SF) Los Angeles (LA) New York (NYC) 
Discussion .086 .038 .067 
Referral .049 .026 .017 
 
 
Table 2.2. Fraction of all Discussion and Referral Ties that Involve Colleagues 
 San Francisco (SF) Los Angeles (LA) New York (NYC) 
Discussion .170 .042 .176 
Referral .139 .046 .058 
 
 
2.5.4. Contagion Variables  
We model social contagion as the effect of exposure to others’ use of the drug, and do so 
using lagged endogenous autoregressive terms. The extent to which physician i is 
exposed at time t to influence from discussion and referral partners is captured through 
the term 1 1ij jtj w q  where 1ijw  captures how relevant each physician j is to i for 
discussion or referral (0, 1, 2), and 1jtq   is the number of prescriptions written by j at time 
                                                            
29 Standard test procedures like a chi-square test on a 2-by-2 matrix (presence or absence of tie vs. 
colleague or not) do not properly handle the lack of independence among the dyadic observations. We 
resolve that problem by regressing the sociomatrix of discussion/referral ties on the sociomatrix of collegial 
ties (OLS is unbiased even when errors are not independent) and using the permutation-based quadratic 
assignment procedure for assessing statistical significance (Krackhardt 1988). 
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t-1. The volume-weighted contagion from discussion and referral partners captures 
exposure to risk-reducing information. The more a physician’s network contacts have 
prescribed the drug recently, especially in high volumes, the more credible their input is 
and hence the more confident the physician feels that using the drug may help her own 
patients (IVV 2011a).  
The extent to which physician i is exposed at time t to influence from immediate 
colleagues is captured through the term 2 1ij jtw s   where 2ijw  equals 1 if i and j are 
colleagues and zero otherwise, and 1jts   is the share at time t-1 of the new drug in j’s total 
number of prescriptions in the category. Though we use volume-weighted contagion from 
immediate colleagues in our robustness checks, we prefer using the share-weighting 
based on theoretical grounds. As Turner (1991, p. 87) notes, intrapersonal consistency is a 
sign of commitment—an insight that underlies the popularity of share-of-wallet or share-
of-category-requirements as a measure of affective brand loyalty (Fader and Schmittlein 
1993). This implies that share-weighted contagion may capture exposure to colleagues 
strongly committed to the new drug better than volume-weighted contagion. A colleague 
treating 5 patients for the medical condition and prescribing the new drug for all of them 
is more committed to it than a colleague prescribing it for only half of his 10 patients. 
Hence, share-weighting may better reflect how strongly each colleague feels that using 
the new drug is the proper thing to do. 
2.5.5. Confidence: Self-Reported Opinion Leadership  
Self-reported opinion leadership (SRL) captures the extent to which a physician feels he 
or she can learn from others. SRL is measured using a six item scale (for details, see IVV 
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2011a). We construct the SRL variable by taking the average of the six items. The first 
two scale items pertain to frequency of interaction, whereas the last four are an 
assessment of oneself versus others as a valuable source of information about treatment 
options, so high SRL is likely associated with high self-confidence.30 Perceiving others to 
be less knowledgeable than oneself is distinct from being accorded high status by others 
(IVV 2011a) and from disregarding social norms, so there is no reason to expect SRL to 
moderate contagion through normative influence (Deutsch and Gerard 1955).31  
2.5.6. Status: Indegree Centrality 
Status is one’s social rank in terms of esteem and respect bestowed by others (e.g., 
Phillips and Zuckerman 2001) and is measured here as the logarithm of the number of 
discussion and referral nominations received from other physicians.32 Such “indegree 
centrality” is the most basic measure of status in networks, especially those involving 
deferential ties like advice-seeking or favor-seeking (Hu and Van den Bulte 2014; Knoke 
                                                            
30 Several studies have shown that SRL is rather weakly correlated with sociometric status as opinion leader 
(IVV 2011a; Jacoby 1974; Lee et al. 2010; Molitor et al. 2011; Rogers and Svenning 1969, pp. 224-227) or 
other-reported opinion leadership (Gnambs and Batinic 2013), suggesting that SRL need not capture 
opinion leadership. Based on its low correlation with sociometric status and their finding that SRL is 
negatively correlated with susceptibility to contagion, IVV propose that SRL captures self-confidence rather 
than opinion leadership. Subsequent research by Martin and Lueg (2013) finds that the link between word 
of mouth usage and attitude is stronger for people with low vs. high self-perceived knowledge. Along 
similar lines, Szymanowski and Gijsbrechts (2013) find that self-reported market mavens (people reporting 
acting as an opinion leader and sharing their information and experiences with others) learn less from their 
experience, which those authors interpret as possibly stemming from overconfidence.  
31 Also, the middle-status conformity hypothesis does not make any prediction about a change in self-
perceived status. Instead, our application of the hypothesis implies that physicians expect that their 
prescription behavior will affect their true status, which we measure as degree centrality rather than SRL.  
32 Self-reported measures of status like SRL are dubious in general because status by definition involves 
esteem bestowed by others. They are especially useless when testing for middle-status conformity which 
requires a common metric across all actors (Hu and Van den Bulte 2014; Phillips and Zuckerman 2001), a 
requirement obviously violated when using self-reported status measures subject to the well documented 
Lake Wobegon or above-average effect. 
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and Burt 1983; Lu et al. 2013; Menchik and Meltzer 2010; Menzel 1957; Prell 2012, p. 9
9; Sauder et al. 2012; Sgourev 2011; Wasserman and Faust 1994, p. 202). As discussed 
by IVV, many studies show that indegree is robust to random node sampling as long as 
the sampling rate is 20% or higher (e.g., Costenbader and Valente 2003). We use the log-
transformation (after adding 1 to avoid the log(0) problem) because indegree has a highly 
right-skewed distribution which creates numerical problems when testing for middle-
status conformity by interacting colleagues contagion with indegree and its square. The 
log transformation stabilizes the estimation. 
2.5.7. Control Variables  
We control for several other physician characteristics which might be associated with trial 
or repeat. Past Drug 1 and Past Drug 2 are the number of prescriptions written by each 
physician for each of the other two drugs in the market during the twelve months prior to 
the launch of the focal drug. University/Teaching Hospital is a dummy variable indicating 
whether the physician works in or is affiliated with a university or teaching hospital. Solo 
Practice is a dummy variable capturing whether the doctor is in solo practice. Early 
Referral is a dummy variable taking the value 1 if the physician reports sometimes 
referring patients to other doctors before initiating any treatment, and 0 otherwise. 
Primary Care is a dummy variable capturing whether the doctor is a primary care 
physician rather than a specialist more likely to focus on the relevant medical condition 
(internal medicine, gastroenterologists, and infectious diseases).  
Sales calls is the monthly physician-level amount of detailing for the focal drug. 
There was only very limited medical journal advertising and no direct-to-consumer 
advertising. There was no sampling either, because of major concerns about patients 
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developing resistance after taking a sample but not continuing on the drug. City dummies 
for LA and NYC control for city-specific differences. SF is the baseline. 
Time dummies for each month capture the effect of any system-wide time-varying 
factor, such as aggregate diffusion, changes in disease prevalence, or the emergence of 
new clinical evidence. The dummies capture all cross-temporal variation in the mean 
tendency to adopt or repeat, leaving only variance across physicians within particular 
months to be explained by contagion. 
Lagged prescription volume. Including lagged behavior as a covariate often helps 
controlling for both state dependency and unobserved heterogeneity. It also controls for 
endogeneity of sales calls when managers or salespeople allocate their effort based on 
prior prescription volume. In addition, it can capture variation across both time and 
physicians of (i) the number of patients seen by the physician for whom the drug could be 
part of a treatment plan and (ii) the physician’s “enthusiasm” for the new drug (Bell and 
Song 2007). Of course, lagged prescription volume is zero until after adoption, so it can 
be a covariate only when modeling repeat behavior. 
2.5.8. Final Data Set 
Data on past prescription of the two incumbent drugs are missing for 8 doctors, 3 of 
whom adopted the focal drug. After deleting these 8 physicians, there are 185 adoption 
spells of which 65 end with adoption, and 570 opportunities for repeat of which 424 
indeed show repeat behavior. Descriptive statistics for physician-months up to adoption 
(2575), physician-months with adoption (65), physician-months after adoption (570), and 
physician-months with repeat (424) are reported in the Table 2.3.  
The plots in Figure 2.1 show how the average hazard of adoption, sales calls, and the 
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two contagion variables evolved over time among physicians who had not adopted yet. 
Though the hazard is rather flat with only 3 of the 17 values outside the narrow 2%-3.5% 
range, this does not imply the absence of contagion because neither heterogeneity in 
physician characteristics which creates spurious negative duration dependence or sales 
calls which trend downwards are accounted for (see IVV 2011a for details). The amount 
of volume-weighted influence from network ties operating before adoption increases 
steadily, whereas the volume of share-weighted influence from immediate colleagues 
increases more slowly after month 6. Not only do the two kinds of ties exhibit a different 
pattern as discussed above, but so do the contagion variables. 
The plots in Figure 2.2 show how the average repeat rate, sales calls, and the two 
contagion variables evolve over time among physicians who had already adopted. The 
repeat rate in the second month is 100%, as all 6 physicians who adopted in the first 
month also prescribed in the next month. The average repeat rate decreases over time, 
which is consistent with evidence that heavy users adopted the drug early (IVV 2011a). 
Average sales calls decrease after month 5, which is consistent with a “hard launch” 
strategy (Liu and Gupta 2012; Sinha and Zoltners 2000), but may also result from the 
firm’s allocating more sales calls to heavy prescribers while light prescribers, who tend to 
adopt late, make up an increasing proportion of the repeat-prescriber base. The amount of 
volume-weighted influence from network ties increases rather steadily, whereas the 
amount of share-weighted influence from immediate colleagues does so only after 4 
months. The high value in month 2 is not a fluke and stems from the fact that 4 of the 6 
adopters in month 1 were colleagues in a prominent research/teaching hospital.   
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Table 2.3. Descriptive Statistics and Correlations among Covariates 
 
(a) Pre-Adoption Physician-months (Trial) 
  Mean SD Min Max 1 2 3 4  5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1 Adoption (Binary indicator) 0.03 0.16 0 1 1.00               
2 Adoption Volume 0.03 0.25 0 5 0.87 1.00  
3 Detailing (Sales Calls) 0.29 0.83 0 9 0.23 0.22 1.00  
4 Indegree 0.36 1.31 0 36 0.25 0.26 0.26 1.00   
5 Self-Reported Leadership 4.26 1.29 1 7 0.11 0.10 0.18 0.23  1.00  
6 LA Dummy 0.31 0.46 0 1 -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02  0.15 1.00  
7 NYC Dummy 0.37 0.48 0 1 -0.02 0.01 0.04 -0.02  0.02 -0.52 1.00  
8 Solo Practice 0.39 0.49 0 1 0.00 -0.01 0.13 -0.11  -0.12 -0.01 0.10 1.00  
9 Univ. Hospital 0.21 0.41 0 1 0.00 0.04 -0.10 -0.05  0.07 -0.12 0.03 -0.41 1.00  
10 Primary Care 0.13 0.34 0 1 -0.05 -0.04 -0.10 -0.08  -0.24 0.13 -0.14 -0.06 -0.01 1.00  
11 Early Referral 0.35 0.48 0 1 -0.07 -0.06 -0.17 -0.10  -0.44 -0.17 0.00 -0.05 0.13 0.15 1.00  
12 Past Drug 1 10.90 25.76 0 265 0.25 0.26 0.50 0.50  0.24 -0.07 0.15 0.02 -0.07 -0.10 -0.16 1.00  
13 Past Drug 2 10.46 24.87 0 510 0.25 0.21 0.32 0.40  0.05 -0.11 0.09 0.09 -0.06 -0.05 -0.04 0.53 1.00  
14 Contagion from Ref/Dis Ties 7.09 18.39 0 178 0.06 0.04 0.01 0.02  -0.07 -0.23 -0.11 -0.07 -0.10 0.00 0.13 -0.05 -0.02 1.00 
15 Contagion from Colleagues 0.09 0.35 0 4.4 0.07 0.04 -0.05 -0.04  0.03 -0.07 -0.08 -0.08 -0.05 0.02 0.12 -0.05 -0.04 0.31 
Note: Values computed on all physician-month observations for which the physician is at risk of adopting, N = 2575. Correlations with an absolute value equal or larger 
than 0.04 are significant at p ≤ .05.  
 
(b) Post-Adoption Physician-months (Repeat) 
 Mean SD Min Max 1 2 3 4 5  6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1 Repeat (Binary indicator) 0.74 0.44 0 1 1.00                 
2 Repeat Volume 3.36 5.81 0 43 0.34 1.00  
3 Lagged Prescription Volume 3.08 5.43 0 43 0.27 0.93 1.00  
4 Detailing (Sales Calls) 1.57 1.64 0 8 0.18 0.01 0.01 1.00  
5 Indegree 3.63 6.92 0 36 0.23 0.71 0.69 0.11 1.00   
6 Self-Reported Leadership 5.38 1.14 2 7 0.18 0.28 0.28 0.12 0.43  1.00  
7 LA Dummy 0.30 0.46 0 1 0.02 -0.18 -0.18 0.05 -0.27  -0.11 1.00  
8 NYC Dummy 0.29 0.45 0 1 -0.10 -0.07 -0.07 -0.13 -0.14  0.20 -0.42 1.00  
9 Solo Practice 0.37 0.48 0 1 0.08 -0.15 -0.15 0.22 -0.21  -0.43 0.06 -0.24 1.00  
10 Univ. Hospital 0.24 0.43 0 1 0.12 0.04 0.04 -0.03 -0.09  0.34 0.00 0.16 -0.44 1.00  
11 Primary Care 0.02 0.14 0 1 0.08 0.00 0.00 -0.08 -0.07  -0.37 0.19 -0.09 0.16 -0.08 1.00  
12 Early Referral 0.07 0.25 0 1 0.00 -0.06 -0.06 -0.12 -0.14  -0.44 -0.17 -0.14 0.30 -0.15 -0.04 1.00  
13 Past Drug 1 68.63 80.39 0 265 0.30 0.52 0.50 0.11 0.52  0.41 -0.24 0.21 -0.08 0.06 -0.11 -0.19 1.00  
14 Past Drug 2 71.04 108.50 0 510 0.20 0.54 0.51 0.14 0.56  0.19 -0.23 -0.15 0.02 -0.13 -0.07 -0.15 0.68 1.00  
15 Contagion from Ref/Dis Ties 16.99 34.35 0 193 -0.13 -0.04 -0.03 -0.08 -0.06  -0.28 -0.32 -0.24 0.15 -0.23 -0.04 0.31 -0.23 -0.06 1.00 
16 Contagion from Colleagues 0.55 1.19 0 5.7 -0.02 0.52 0.52 -0.07 0.51  0.07 -0.27 -0.11 -0.19 -0.10 -0.07 0.21 0.16 0.35 0.35 
Note: Values computed on all physician-month observations for which the physician has already adopted, N = 570. Correlations with an absolute value equal or larger 
than 0.08 are significant at p ≤ .05. 
  
81 
 
 
 
(c) Prescription Volume and Covariates at Time of Adoption 
 Mean SD Min Max 1 2 3 4  5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1 Adoption Volume 1.37 0.76 1 5 1.00 
2 Detailing (Sales Calls) 1.49 1.43 0 5 0.12 1.00 
3 Indegree 2.40 5.45 0 36 0.12 0.01 1.00 
4 Self-Reported Leadership 5.10 1.25 2 7 0.15 0.14 0.40 1.00  
5 LA Dummy 0.28 0.45 0 1 -0.30 0.29 -0.17 0.08  1.00 
5 NYC Dummy 0.31 0.47 0 1 0.34 -0.23 -0.12 0.11  -0.41 1.00 
7 Solo Practice 0.38 0.49 0 1 -0.18 0.19 -0.18 -0.36  0.01 -0.18 1.00 
8 Univ. Hospital 0.22 0.41 0 1 0.44 0.08 -0.06 0.24  -0.07 0.22 -0.41 1.00 
9 Primary Care 0.03 0.17 0 1 0.03 0.00 -0.06 -0.37  0.09 -0.12 0.04 -0.09 1.00 
10 Early Referral 0.14 0.35 0 1 -0.02 -0.23 -0.18 -0.47  -0.25 -0.07 0.32 -0.10 -0.07 1.00 
11 Past Drug 1 50.62 69.51 0 265 0.19 0.14 0.54 0.40  -0.13 0.17 -0.10 0.06 -0.10 -0.21 1.00 
12 Past Drug 2 48.58 87.49 0 510 -0.03 -0.06 0.57 0.21  -0.17 -0.09 0.00 -0.06 -0.06 -0.18 0.68 1.00 
13 Contagion from Ref/Dis Ties 13.55 30.42 0 142 -0.05 -0.20 -0.15 -0.36  -0.27 -0.24 0.10 -0.21 0.14 0.29 -0.21 -0.12 1.00 
14 Contagion from Colleagues 0.25 0.75 0 4.4 -0.14 -0.29 -0.13 -0.16  -0.16 -0.06 -0.03 -0.08 -0.06 0.40 -0.19 -0.13 0.51 
Note: Values computed on all physician-month observations for which the physician adopts, N = 65. Correlations with an absolute value equal or larger than 0.25 are 
significant at p ≤ .05.  
 
(d) Prescription Volume and Covariates at Time of Repeat 
 Mean SD Min Max 1 2 3 4  5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1 Repeat Volume 4.51 6.34 1 43 1.00 
2 Lagged Prescription Volume 3.95 6.04 0 43 0.93 1.00 
3 Detailing (Sales Calls) 1.74 1.70 0 8 -0.06 -0.04 1.00 
4 Indegree 4.56 7.75 0 36 0.70 0.68 0.05 1.00  
5 Self-Reported Leadership 5.50 1.13 2 7 0.28 0.28 0.10 0.44  1.00 
5 LA Dummy 0.30 0.46 0 1 -0.23 -0.22 0.01 -0.33  -0.24 1.00 
7 NYC Dummy 0.26 0.44 0 1 -0.05 -0.05 -0.06 -0.14  0.24 -0.39 1.00 
8 Solo Practice 0.39 0.49 0 1 -0.22 -0.21 0.19 -0.27  -0.41 0.11 -0.22 1.00 
9 Univ. Hospital 0.27 0.45 0 1 0.00 0.00 -0.05 -0.12  0.34 0.04 0.15 -0.49 1.00 
10 Primary Care 0.03 0.16 0 1 -0.03 -0.03 -0.11 -0.09  -0.45 0.21 -0.10 0.17 -0.10 1.00 
11 Early Referral 0.07 0.25 0 1 -0.07 -0.07 -0.10 -0.16  -0.45 -0.18 -0.12 0.29 -0.16 -0.04 1.00 
12 Past Drug 1 82.72 85.49 0 265 0.49 0.47 0.06 0.49  0.40 -0.31 0.26 -0.10 0.04 -0.15 -0.21 1.00 
13 Past Drug 2 83.79 120.02 0 510 0.52 0.49 0.09 0.54  0.18 -0.28 -0.16 -0.01 -0.19 -0.10 -0.15 0.69 1.00 
14 Contagion from Ref/Dis Ties 14.44 30.13 0 193 0.01 0.01 -0.03 -0.04  -0.20 -0.31 -0.20 0.23 -0.24 -0.04 0.37 -0.22 -0.01 1.00 
15 Contagion from Colleagues 0.54 1.13 0 5.5 0.69 0.68 0.01 0.67  0.27 -0.28 -0.06 -0.30 -0.10 -0.08 0.00 0.27 0.49 0.19 
Note: Values computed on all physician-month observations for which the physician repeats, N = 424. Correlations with an absolute value equal or larger than 0.10 are 
significant at p ≤ .05. 
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2.6. Model 
We model adoption and repeat prescription of the focal drug in discrete time. We model 
repeat conditional on adoption, rendering selectivity moot (Poirier and Ruud 1981). We 
account for possible endogeneity in sales calls using a control function approach. 
2.6.1. Adoption Model 
We specify the appeal or utility that physician i sees in trying the drug at period t ( aitU ) as: 
 
 0 1
a a a a a
it i it itU X     , where ~ (0,1)ait N  and 20 0~ ( , )a ai aN   .  (2.1)  
The row vector aitX contains covariates up to adoption or month 17, whichever happens 
first, and 1
a is a column vector of corresponding parameters. The parameter 0ai  is a 
physician-specific baseline utility and controls for unobserved characteristics related to 
adoption. We assume that 0
a
i  follows a normal distribution. We express the discrete-time 
hazard of adoption or trial as: 
1 0 1( 1| 0) ( 0) ( ),
a a a a a a
it it it i itP Y Y P U X         (2.2) 
where aitY  is an indicator variable that equals 0 before adoption and 1 at the time of 
adoption and later, and Φ is the normal cumulative distribution function. Therefore, the 
likelihood of observing a ait itY y , where  0,1aity  , can be expressed as: 
    11 0 1 0 1( | 0) 1 aa itit yya a a a a a a a ait it it i it i itP Y y Y X X              (2.3) 
Two observations are in order. First, since adoption is a non-recurrent event, the 
lagged dependent variables are always zero and including them as covariates is pointless. 
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Second, we do not include person-specific fixed effects as those generate truncation 
biases in the adoption equation (Van den Bulte and Iyengar 2011). 
2.6.2. Repeat Model 
Whereas trial can occur only once, repeat can occur several times. We specify the utility 
that physician i sees in repeat prescribing the drug at time t given adoption at a prior time 
( ritU ) as: 
 
0 1
r r r r r
it i it itU X     , where ~ (0,1)rit N  and 20 0~ ( , )r ri rN   . (2.4) 
The row vector ritX  contains covariates after adoption, and 1
r is a column vector of 
corresponding parameters. The parameter 0
r
i  is a physician-specific baseline of repeat 
utility, which is normally distributed. The probability of repeat prescription, conditional 
on having adopted earlier, is then given by: 
 
1 0 1( 1| 1) ( 0) ( )
r a r r r r
it it it i itP Y Y P U X       , (2.5) 
 
where ritY  is an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if i prescribes at a time t and is 0 
otherwise. Therefore, the likelihood of observing r rit itY y , where  0,1rity  , is: 
    11 0 1 0 1( | 1) 1 rr itit yyr r a r r r r r rit it it i it i itP Y y Y X X             . (2.6) 
Several points are worth noting. First, since repeat can be a recurrent event, one can 
include lagged dependent variables among the covariates as well as random or fixed 
effects. We use random effects because fixed effects result in inconsistent estimates in 
probit models (e.g., Wooldridge 2002, p. 484). Second, repeat is by definition conditional 
on trial, each physician’s adoption and repeat events occur in non-overlapping time 
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periods, and we assume the absence of forward-looking experimentation by physicians in 
this category consistently with Chintagunta et al. (2012). Consequently, our repeat model 
is conditional rather than unconditional on trial, the random shocks between trial and 
repeat can be treated as uncorrelated, and exclusion restrictions are unnecessary (e.g., 
Poirier and Ruud  1981). However, the time-invariant physician-specific effects may be 
correlated across stages. Third, including both random effects and lagged dependent 
variables is appropriate if the initial value of the lagged dependent variable can be 
assumed to be independent of the random effect (e.g., Wooldridge 2002, p. 494). In our 
setting, this requires the random effects in trial and repeat to be uncorrelated.  
2.6.3. Correlated Random Effects 
We allow the physician-specific random effects of trial and repeat to be correlated as: 
2
0 0
2
0 0
~ ,
a a
i a ar
r r
i ar r
N
   
   
                    .  
(2.7) 
Let itY  indicate whether i prescribes at time t or not, let 
a
iT  denote the period in 
which physician i adopts the focal drug or is right-censored, and let T denote the length of 
data window 
 (i.e., T=17).33 The likelihood is then: 
0 0
1 1 1 1 0,
1
( | , ) ( | 0, , )
a
i
a r
i i
T
a r a a a
it it it it it i
t
P Y y P Y y Y          
  1 1 0 0 0 0 0
1
( | 1, , ) ,  
a
i
T
a r r a r a r
it it it i i i i i
t T
P Y y Y f d d     
 
    (2.8) 
                                                            
33 Right-censored physicians who do not adopt within the 17-month data window have aiT T . 
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We estimate the model using simulated maximum likelihood. 
2.6.4 Control Function Approach for Endogeneity in Sales Calls 
Marketers and sales people may have set the amount of detailing effort towards a 
physician in a particular month based on demand shocks that are not accounted for by the 
covariates in the model. The resulting correlation between sales calls and the error terms, 
if not properly addressed, would bias the model estimates. We handle this possible 
endogeneity using a control function approach that quantifies its severity by directly 
estimating the correlation between the random shocks in physician behavior and sales 
calls, as detailed in the Section 2.11.1 (Appendix). 
2.7. Results 
Our covariates include terms for contagion from expert peers and from colleagues, terms 
for the interactions hypothesized in H1 and H3, and the control variables described in 
Section 2.5.7. We first estimated the model with correlated random effects but without 
lagged volume. Consistent with prior evidence that a non-parametric baseline absorbs 
much of the effects of unobserved heterogeneity in hazard models for non-repeated 
events (e.g., Lin and Wei 1989; Struthers and Kalbfleisch 1986), the model is over-
parameterized. Specifically, the variance in random effects in trial is quite small ( 2a  = 
0.014, p = 0.533). A second model without that random effect and its associated 
covariance performs better in BIC terms (BIC = 9.99).34 Given the absence of random 
                                                            
34 The difference in deviance (-2LL) between the two models is only 3.26. This would not be significant at 
even 10% under a likelihood ratio test with 2 df. However, an LR test is not appropriate here because it 
involves restricting a variance to zero which lies on the boundary of the parameter space. Since we observe 
185 adoption spells and 570 opportunities for repeat, we use N = 755 when computing BIC values.  
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effects in the trial equation, adding lagged volume as a covariate to control for state 
dependency in the repeat equation does not create an initial condition problem. Since this 
third model fits markedly better than the first (BIC = 24.10) and the second model 
(BIC = 14.11; -2LL = 20.74, p < .001), we use it as the main specification. 
Table 2.4 reports the parameter estimates of substantive interest and of several control 
variables. SRL and Indegree (log-transformed) are mean-centered for estimation, so the 
coefficient of non-moderated contagion is the effect for the “average” physician. To avoid 
reporting very small coefficients, volume-weighted contagion is expressed in hundreds of 
units. Though our model includes many control variables and several non-linear effects, 
collinearity is not a concern since the condition index of the data matrix is only 15.47 in 
trial and 15.30 in repeat—well below 30 which is commonly considered a necessary 
condition for harmful collinearity. 
Table 2.4 shows the presence of contagion in not only the trial hazard (-2LL = 
25.36, df = 5, p < .001) but also in repeat incidence (-2LL = 13.10, df = 5, p < .05). 
Unlike the earlier analysis by IVV, we do not find a significant linear effect of 
sociometric status on the adoption hazard. That the lower-order degree effects are 
different is hardly surprising because the higher-order interaction covariates differ 
between the two analyses designed with different objectives in mind (compare Table 2.4 
here with Table 4 in IVV 2011a). We next turn to the findings of key interest: the 
contrasts between advice/discussion ties vs. colleagues as sources of influence, and the 
contrast between trial and repeat as stages in new product acceptance behavior. 
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Table 2.4. Model Estimates 
________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Variables  Trial Hazard  Repeat Probability 
________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Intercept  -2.069 *** -0.333  
  (0.312) (0.467)  
SRL   0.133 -0.088  
  (0.069) (0.157)  
Ln(Indegree + 1)  0.106 0.073  
  (0.228) (0.425)  
Ln(Indegree + 1)2  0.020 0.126  
  (0.132) (0.299)  
Contagion from Dis / Ref Ties (00s)  0.056 -0.067  
  (0.344) (0.423)  
Contagion from Dis / Ref Ties (00s) × SRL -0.677 ** 0.390  
  (0.250) (0.260)  
Contagion from Colleagues  0.759 * 0.479  
  (0.377) (0.257)  
Contagion from Colleagues × Ln(Indegree + 1)  0.625 2.533 ***  
  (0.917) (0.686)  
Contagion from Colleagues × Ln(Indegree + 1)2 -0.787 -0.840 *  
  (1.213) (0.305)  
Solo Practice  -0.044 0.487  
  (0.180) (0.306)  
University / Teaching Hospital  0.226 0.975**  
  (0.186) (0.344)  
Primary Care  -0.223 10 †  
  (0.307)   
Early Referral  -0.286 0.900  
  (0.197) (0.616)  
Past Drug 1  0.000 0.010 ***  
  (0.002) (0.003)  
Past Drug 2  0.006** -0.003  
  (0.002) (0.003)  
Sales Calls  0.556 ** -0.201  
  (0.195) (0.385)  
Endogeneity Correlation  -0.288 0.269  
  (0.201) (0.342)  
Ln(qit-1 + 1)  - 0.892 ***  
   (0.183)  
Random Effect Stand. Dev.  0 †† 0.473 ***  
   (0.166)  
Random Effects Covariance  0 †† 
 
________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
* p ≤ .05, ** p ≤ .01, *** p ≤ .001. Standard errors in parentheses. LL= -406.79, BIC = 1,270.82. 
The model includes several additional covariates: Monthly time dummies (16 for trial, 14 for repeat) and 
city dummies for LA and NYC in both equations. These estimates are not reported to avoid clutter. 
† Dummies for Primary Care and Month 2 are perfect predictors for repeat incidence. We set their 
coefficients to a very large number (10) so the predicted repeat probability for these physician-months is 
essentially 1 and the observations do not affect the likelihood estimation.  
†† Set to zero based on BIC. See first paragraph of Section 2.7.  
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2.7.1. Contagion from Discussion/Referral Ties versus Colleagues 
Peers one turns to for discussion or referral exert contagion in trial, and the strength of 
that influence varies across potential adopters. In contrast, those same peers exert no 
influence in repeat. As reported in the first column in Table 2.4, the main effect of 
contagion from discussion/referral ties on the “average” physician is not significant, but 
physicians with a low SRL are significantly more susceptible to such contagion in the 
trial stage (p < 0.01). In contrast, there is no main or moderator effect at the repeat stage. 
Figures 2.3(a) and 2.3(b) convey the relationship between contagion and self-reported 
leadership visually. Figure 2.3(a) shows that contagion from discussion/referral ties is 
positive at trial for physicians with SRL less than 4.57, which corresponds to 55% of the 
physicians. It is significantly positive at 95% confidence for physicians with SRL lower 
than 3.56 (27% of physicians) and never turns significantly negative. Figure 2.3(b) shows 
a very different pattern for repeat: there is no significant contagion effect from 
discussion/referral ties at any level of SRL. 
The coefficients for contagion from colleagues in Table 2.4 and the bottom two panels 
in Figure 2.3 show that this type of contagion operates quite differently. In trial, 
colleagues exert significant contagion on the “average” physician (p < .05), and the effect 
is not significantly moderated by the potential adopter’s status. In repeat, the effect varies 
in a pronounced inverse-U fashion with the physician’s status (-2LL = 10.64, df = 2, p 
< .01). The latter is conveyed more compellingly by the plot in Figure 2.3(d). The 
expected contagion effect from colleagues is the largest for a physician with Indegree of 
about 5, which is well within the observed range. The effect is significantly positive at 
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95% confidence for physicians with Indegree between 1 and 10 (21% of physicians, 
between the 77th and 98th percentiles of the Indegree distribution).35 The confidence band 
in Figure 2.3(c) is extremely wide because of the insignificant moderator effects of status 
in trial. Though not obvious from the plot, the 76% of physicians with Indegree less than 
1 exhibit positive contagion from colleagues at trial significant at 95% confidence.  
So, discussion and referral ties have a pronounced effect in trial but not repeat, 
colleagues have an effect on both trial and repeat, and an inverse-U relation with status is 
present only for colleagues contagion at the repeat stage. These findings support 
hypotheses H1 and H3. 
2.7.2. Trial versus Repeat 
We now turn to whether contagion operates differently across trial and repeat, as posited 
in hypotheses H2 and H4. Our model structure makes formal testing easy, because the 
discrete-time hazard of trial and the probability of repeat are both modeled using a probit 
specification. We use a likelihood ratio test comparing the full model in Table 2.4 (where 
all coefficients are allowed to vary freely across stages) against a restricted model where 
the two discussion/referral contagion coefficients and the three colleagues contagion 
coefficients are constrained to be equal across trial and repeat. To account for the 
arbitrary scaling in probit models, we specify a model where the five contagion effects 
are restricted to be equal across stages up to a common scaling constant, as proposed by 
Train (2003, p. 26), while all other coefficients vary freely. This model fits significantly 
                                                            
35 The critical Indegree value at the lower end is 0.38. Since Indegree is a count variable we round it up to 
1. Re-estimating the model without mean-centering such that the linear contagion effect pertains to a 
physician with zero Indegree confirms that that colleagues contagion effect is not significant at 95% 
confidence at Indegree = 0. 
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< .01) but not for contagion from discussion/referral ties considered separately (H2, p 
> .10). The latter is consistent with the wide confidence bounds in Figure 2.3(b). 
Our discussion in Section 2.5 proposed two reasons to expect the susceptibility to 
normative influence to increase as customers proceed from trial to repeat. One pertained 
to a genuine difference between trial and repeat, regardless of time since launch, whereas 
the other pertained to a change over time in how much people conform to social norms, 
with the difference between trial and repeat only being a corollary of this temporal effect. 
This raises the question to what extent the cross-stage difference in interactions with SRL 
and indegree reported in Table 2.4 represent mere cross-time effects rather than true 
cross-stage effects. 
Extending the model with interactions between time since launch and the two 
contagion variables in the two stages allows one to answer that question. (There is no 
need to add linear time trends since the time dummies already capture any main effect of 
time.) Adding those four interaction terms does not significantly improve model fit (-
2LL = 6.35, p = .17) and the BIC strongly favors the original model (BIC = 20.15), 
though the influence from colleagues in the repeat stage increases over time (p < .05). 
More importantly, the interactions of substantive interest remain significant. So, even 
after controlling for systematic changes over time in the strength of contagion from 
advice/discussion ties and from colleagues, people who fancy themselves to be opinion 
leaders are less susceptible to contagion from their advice/discussion ties in trial but not 
repeat, and people of middle-status are more susceptible to contagion from colleagues in 
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repeat but not trial (Table 2.5).36  
In short, the results are consistent with both reasons to expect the susceptibility to 
normative influence to increase as customers proceed from trial to repeat: (i) over time, 
people become increasingly susceptible to normative considerations and hence to 
colleagues enacting and enforcing norms, and (ii) as they progress from trial to repeat, 
people find it more difficult to defend their deviations from colleagues’ behavior, 
especially if they are middle-status as one would expect if those deviations are seen as 
normative transgressions. 
2.7.3. Other Variables 
Physician characteristics included as control variables do not show consistent coefficients 
across the adoption and repeat columns in Table 2.4. Sales calls accelerate adoption but 
not repeat behavior. Assuming that sales calls and expert peer influence are both 
informative, this contrast is consistent with the presence of expert peer contagion in trial 
only. The contrast is also consistent with evidence that pharmaceutical detailing is 
effective mostly as an acquisition tool rather than a retention tool (Montoya et al. 2010) 
and with the empirical generalization that marketing efforts like personal selling and 
advertising are more effective early in the product life cycle (Albers et al. 2010; Lodish et 
al. 1995; Sethuraman et al. 2011). More generally, the lack of consistency in the estimates 
                                                            
36 Table 2.5 reports a significant interaction in trial of contagion from colleagues with status squared, 
Ln(Degree+1)2, which is not present in the main model reported in Table 2.4. However, the extended model 
reported in Table 2.5 shows no significant interaction with status itself, and a plot like Figure 2.3(c) for the 
extended model shows no inverse-U pattern. Also, deleting the interactions of contagion from colleagues 
with status and status squared in trial from the extended model does not generate a significantly worse fit to 
the data (-2LL = 0.602, 2 df, p = .740). Hence, the extended model in Table 2.5 does not provide evidence 
of middle-status conformity to colleagues’ behavior in trial. 
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across trial and repeat supports the notion that research conclusions can vary across facets 
of product acceptance (Bell and Song 2007; Chandrashekaran and Sinha 1995).  
2.7.4. Robustness Checks 
IVV already reported quite a few robustness checks, but their analysis did not include 
contagion among co-located colleagues. As reported in the Section 2.11.2 (Appendix), 
our results are robust to (i) alternative specifications of contagion among colleagues, (ii) 
alternative specification of moderators, (iii) controlling for differences in demographics 
among the ZIP codes in which the physicians practice, (iv) controlling for lagged sales 
calls and (v) changing the centering of the status variable to minimize the correlation 
between status and its squared value. 
2.8. Threats to Internal Validity 
Our findings likely reflect genuine behavioral contagion patterns rather than confounds. 
Though some alternative explanations are conceivable, they are not credible given our 
data and analysis. Of course, this assessment is a matter of judgment and depends on the 
set of rival explanations one is aware of (Dawid 2013; Stanford 2006). 
2.8.1. Instrumentation Bias 
It is conceivable that the sociometric survey may have sensitized the physicians to the 
new drug or to their peers, and so may have increased the baseline prescription behavior 
or the susceptibility to peer influence. If that were the case, then one should see an uptick 
in the baseline (intercept) or network contagion after the survey was administered. 
Extending the model with a shift after month 10 in the baselines in LA and NYC 
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Table 2.5. Model Estimates Allowing for Cross-temporal Changes in Contagion 
________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Variables  Trial Hazard  Repeat Probability 
________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Intercept  -2.081 *** -0.311  
  (0.317) (0.472)  
SRL   0.127 -0.103  
  (0.068) (0.157)  
Ln(Indegree + 1)  0.109 0.023  
  (0.223) (0.394)  
Ln(Indegree + 1)2  0.006 0.155  
  (0.132) (0.297)  
Contagion from Dis / Ref Ties (00s)  -0.014 0.008  
  (0.013) (0.020)  
Contagion from Dis / Ref Ties (00s) × SRL -0.610 * 0.404  
  (0.259) (0.260)  
Contagion from Dis / Ref Ties (00s) × Time 0.112 -0.066  
  (0.094) (0.124)  
Contagion from Colleagues  1.057 ** -1.297  
  (0.402) (0.688)  
Contagion from Colleagues × Ln(Indegree + 1)  0.548 2.663 ***  
  (0.373) (0.400)  
Contagion from Colleagues × Ln(Indegree + 1)2 -0.666 * -0.739 **  
  (0.273) (0.248)  
Contagion from Colleagues × Time  -0.026 0.121 *  
  (0.037) (0.050)  
Solo Practice  -0.038 0.510  
  (0.176) (0.302)  
University / Teaching Hospital  0.217 0.997**  
  (0.186) (0.349)  
Primary Care  -0.234 10 †  
  (0.308)   
Early Referral  -0.293 0.887  
  (0.197) (0.629)  
Past Drug 1  0.000 0.010 ***  
  (0.002) (0.003)  
Past Drug 2  0.006** -0.003  
  (0.002) (0.003)  
Sales Calls  0.567 ** -0.239  
  (0.193) (0.377)  
Endogeneity Correlation  -0.292 0.291  
  (0.198) (0.334)  
Ln(qit-1 + 1)  - 0.837 ***  
   (0.186)  
Random Effect Stand. Dev.  0 †† 0.486 ***  
   (0.160)  
Random Effects Covariance  0 †† 
 
________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
* p ≤ 0.05, ** p ≤ 0.01, *** p ≤ 0.001. Standard errors in parentheses. LL= -403.61, BIC = 1,290.97. 
The model includes several additional covariates: Monthly time dummies (16 for trial, 14 for repeat) and 
city dummies for LA and NYC in both equations. These estimates are not reported to avoid clutter. 
† Dummies for Primary Care and Month 2 are perfect predictors for repeat incidence. We set their 
coefficients to a very large number (10) so the predicted repeat probability for these physician-months is 
essentially 1 and the observations do not affect the likelihood estimation.  
†† Set to zero, as in the model in Table 2.4. 
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indicates that they are not systematically higher after the survey was administered (month 
10) than they are before—they are actually all lower, though not significantly so with p 
= .12 or worse. Extending the model with a shift after month 10 in the contagion effects 
in LA and NYC shows that contagion from discussion/referral ties is insignificantly 
lower after month 10 in NYC (p = .23 or worse) and insignificantly higher after month 10 
in LA (p = .64 or worse). The data do not support the presence of instrumentation bias. 
2.8.2. Endogenous Tie Formation: Network Peers  
Another concern is that contagion coefficients do not capture the effect of ties on 
behavior but that of behavior on tie formation. For instance, if physicians with low 
confidence are more likely to build connections with prior adopters of the drug, then the 
finding that self-reported followers are more sensitive to peer influence might reflect 
selective tie formation rather than higher susceptibility to social contagion.  
Several features of the data indicate that such endogenous tie formation is not a 
credible threat to internal validity. The first is the wording in the sociometric survey. The 
questions measuring discussion and referral ties pertained to the medical condition in 
general rather than the new drug specifically (IVV). The second is the correlation 
between SRL and the number of connections made to peers for discussion or referral, 
referred to by IVV as “outdegree centrality”. That correlation is -0.04 (IVV, p. 205), 
indicating that the number of peers one reaches out to is uncorrelated with one’s self-
reported opinion leadership. The third feature is that the network was measured before 
launch in SF but after launch in LA and NYC. Whereas endogenous tie formation, in 
which non-adopters selectively build ties to others they know have adopted, might 
conceivably have affected the measured network in LA and NYC, it cannot have affected 
98 
 
 
 
it in SF. So, endogenous tie formation implies that network contagion effects are smaller 
in SF than in LA and NYC (ceteris paribus). Extending the model with such contrasts 
does not support this notion: network contagion effects are actually larger in SF, though 
not significantly so in either trial (p = .20) or repeat (p = .21). Also, there is no evidence 
consistent with the notion that the new product’s launch prompted physicians to form 
additional ties. There is no significant difference in the mean or distribution of the 
number of peer nominations made by physicians in SF versus LA and NYC jointly (t-test: 
p = 0.52; Wilcoxon rank sum test: p = 0.39, Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnow test: p = 
0.91)., in SF versus LA only (Tukey test: p = 0.99; Wilcoxon rank sum test: p = 0.69; 
Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnow test: p = 0.70) or in SF versus NYC only (Tukey test: 
p = 0.60; Wilcoxon rank sum test: p = 0.29; Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnow test: p = 
0.57). In short, the data are inconsistent with the endogenous formation of discussion or 
referral ties acting as a confound to our contagion findings. 
2.8.3. Endogenous Tie Formation: Colleagues  
Endogenous tie formation is not a credible threat for contagion from colleagues either. 
First, the argument does not apply to our research setting. The threat requires that the 
decisions not to practice solo and to join a specific hospital or group practice rather than 
another are affected by the extent to which prospective colleagues (are expected to) 
prescribe the focal drug. The threat also requires that hospitals and group practices are 
more likely to invite or accept physicians who they (fore-)see adopting the specific new 
drug. Both notions are too risibly farfetched to be credible. Second, the specific pattern in 
colleagues contagion further detracts from endogenous tie formation’s credibility as a 
threat to internal validity (e.g., Rosenbaum 2002, pp. 209-214). Endogenous formation of 
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collegial ties, if it were present, would operate equally across trial and repeat, but we 
observe different collegial contagion effects across stages (p < .01). Furthermore, 
endogenous tie formation cannot account for the non-monotonic interaction we observe.  
2.8.4. Reflection  
Reflection arises when the peer behavior used to explain the behavior of a focal physician 
is actually caused by that very same physician. This is not a credible threat, since we 
operationalize contagion in terms of lagged rather than current peer behavior, all 
physicians at risk of adoption have by definition not adopted before, and we control for 
lagged behavior of the focal physician in the repeat equations. Moreover, the network 
data are almost perfectly acyclic: of the 204 discussion ties and 138 referral ties, only 3 
are symmetric and these three ties form the only triad (IVV 2011a, p. 200).  
2.8.5. Correlated Unobservables 
Unobserved shocks that vary over time but are common across all physicians are 
controlled through time fixed effects. This leaves variance across physicians within 
particular months to be explained by contagion. Time-invariant unobserved differences 
across cities are also captured through city fixed effects. This leaves only factors that are 
specific to physicians and their network peers or colleagues as possible sources of bias 
from correlated unobservables. The latter often are cause concern about the validity of 
main effects in contagion studies, and justifiably so. However, they cannot explain our 
findings involving multiple dependent variables, multiple contagion variables, multiple 
moderators, and a non-monotonic effect. What omitted variable(s) could account for peer 
contagion affecting trial but not repeat, peer contagion being significant only for those 
who do not consider themselves opinion leaders, and middle-status conformity in 
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colleague contagion? Our contagion interpretation provides a coherent account for this 
complex pattern of findings, whereas correlated unobservables do not. Consequently, the 
latter are not a credible threat to validity (Cochran 1965; Hill 1965; Rosenbaum 2002, pp. 
209-211; Shadish et al. 2002, p. 105). 
For instance, it is likely that unobserved preferences for particular treatment options 
are correlated among network peers (Landon et al. 2012), but this cannot explain why 
network contagion is detected in trial but not repeat or why network contagion varies 
systematically with self-reported opinion leadership. Similarly, unobserved preferences 
for treatments, unobserved similarities in patient mix, or unobserved constraints (e.g., the 
absence of the drug from a list of approved drugs) may conceivably have been correlated 
among colleagues. Yet, that cannot account for the presence of a moderator effect by 
status.  
2.8.6. Truncation Bias 
Our hazard analysis of adoption timing includes all the physicians at risk rather than only 
those who adopted. So, our contagion estimates do not suffer from upward truncation 
bias (Van den Bulte and Iyengar 2011).  
2.8.7. Mere Duration Dependence in Usage 
Yet another concern might be that repeat incidence increases not just over time (a “period 
effect” already controlled for by monthly dummies) but also with the time since the 
physician adopted (an “age effect” not yet controlled for). If positive, such duration 
dependence might inflate the estimates of contagion at the repeat stage. However, 
controlling for how long it has been since a physician adopted does not improve model fit 
(-2LL = 0.16) and does not affect the estimated contagion patterns in the repeat stage. 
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2.9. Discussion 
We investigated the presence and nature of contagion in the acceptance of a risky 
prescription drug by physicians. There are three novel findings. First, there is evidence of 
contagion not only in trial but also in repeat. Second, who is most influential varies 
across stages. Physicians with high network centrality and high prescription volume are 
influential in trial but not repeat. In contrast, immediate colleagues—few of whom are 
nominated as discussion or referral partner—are influential in both trial and repeat. Third, 
who is most influenceable also varies across stages. For trial, it is physicians who do not 
consider themselves to be opinion leaders, whereas for repeat, it is those located in the 
middle of the status distribution as measured by network centrality. 
These findings help move the research frontier from documenting whether contagion 
is at work to understanding how and why it is at work (Aral 2011; Godes 2011). The 
pattern of findings is consistent with informational social influence reducing risk in trial 
and normative social influence increasing conformity in repeat. Marketing scientists have 
emphasized the former and ignored the latter, yet our findings indicate that contagion in 
new product acceptance can operate in richer ways than hitherto documented.  
Our work provides fresh evidence about the role of status in social contagion and new 
product acceptance (Van den Bulte and Joshi 2007). Specifically, our findings add to 
recent evidence that social status affects new product acceptance separately from self-
confidence or social class (Hu and Van den Bulte 2014). 
Our findings about the presence and nature of social contagion in new product repeat 
behavior complement and enhance recent work on the role of social contagion and social 
enrichment in customer retention and churn (Haenlein 2013; Nitzan and Libai 2011; 
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Schmitt et al. 2011). Specifically, new insights into customer management may come 
from investigating under what conditions social status and normative considerations 
affect usage intensity and customer churn. 
Our study will also be of interest to researchers concerned about the identification of 
contagion effects in non-experimental studies. We apply R.A. Fisher’s advice on how to 
move from association to causation in observational studies—“Make your theories 
elaborate”. The theoretically informed associations we observe involve multiple 
dependent variables, multiple contagion variables, multiple moderators, and a non-
monotonic effect. Those specific patterns cannot be accounted for by the standards 
threats to validity in contagion studies. Going beyond mere linear associations in a single 
facet of contagion provides empirical insights that are not only substantively richer but 
also methodologically stronger (e.g., Hodas and Lerman 2014). 
A brief discussion of the scope conditions of our theoretical claims and empirical 
application seems warranted. Contagion in repeat, we contend, may occur when the 
product poses some significant functional, financial or normative risk even after adoption. 
This is likely for (i) “credence goods” for which people seek informational guidance even 
after personal use experience, and (ii) products, services or practices the use of which is 
subject to normative influence. Contagion can also exist in repeat for (iii) products and 
services with installed-base effects where the utility of use increases with the number of 
relevant other users, as shown by recent findings on contagious churn among customers 
of telephone providers (Haenlein 2013; Nitzan and Libai 2011). Contagion can also occur 
in repeat when (iv) environmental shocks raise new doubts about an accepted product 
(Nair et al. 2010). In short, even though our study focused on only a single drug and even 
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though our evidence of post-adoption contagion is consistent only with normative 
influence, post-adoption contagion is likely to affect many more product categories than 
risky drugs. 
Because our study was limited to a single product, corroboration in other settings 
would be quite useful. Studies covering multiple products with different risk and status 
characteristics and studies with a longer window extending beyond early repeat would be 
especially valuable as they could further sharpen insight into the nature of the 
mechanisms at work. Also, research of social learning or contagion in new product 
acceptance that uses a more direct measure of self-confidence than self-reported opinion 
leadership or self-reported market mavenship would be useful additions to this study and 
that by Szymanowski and Gijsbrechts (2013). Further research on the nature of 
colleagues contagion would also be welcome. Intra-organizational diffusion is a topic of 
great importance to both users and marketers that we know too little about. 
Our findings are also of interest to practitioners. Marketers should consider 
leveraging peer influence not only to trigger adoption, but also to support subsequent 
repeat—at least for risky products like the one studied here. As Christakis and Fowler 
(2011) note, aptly targeting word-of-mouth (WOM) marketing campaigns requires 
knowing not only who is especially influential but also who is especially influenceable. 
Our findings suggest that the answer to both questions may vary between trial and repeat. 
In-depth assessments of such differentiated targeting at trial vs. repeat, using 
experimental (e.g., Hinz et al. 2013) or simulation designs (e.g.; Aral et al. 2013; 
Haenlein and Libai 2013), would be of clear managerial value. 
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Practitioners willing to go beyond the mere operational definition of our variables and 
seeing value in the theoretical lens we used, should also consider adapting their 
messaging so that considerations of perceived risk, status, and normative conformity 
receive different weights when trying to get prospects to adopt versus trying to get 
adopters to repeat.  
Over the last several years, managers have come to embrace the notion that not only 
attracting new customers but also retaining them has a large impact on the corporation’s 
profits and long-term value. Managers also have become increasingly keen on leveraging 
contagion among customers. Our results suggest that these two major endeavors in 
current marketing practice are related: Not only trial but also repeat can be subject to 
social contagion. 
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2.11. Appendix 
2.11.1. Control Function Approach for Endogeneity in Sales Calls 
Marketers and sales people may set the amount of detailing towards a physician in a 
particular month based on demand shocks that are not accounted for by the covariates in 
the model. The resulting correlation between sales calls and the error terms in the 
incidence or volume equations, if not properly addressed, would bias the model estimates. 
We handle this endogeneity concern using a control function (CF) approach (e.g., Papke 
and Wooldridge 2008; Park and Gupta 2009; Petrin and Train 2010) in a manner that 
provides a direct estimate of the severity of endogeneity. For clarity of exposition, we 
focus on the adoption hazard equation. 
Adoption Model with CF. We start by rewriting Equation (2.1) as: 
0 1 2
a a a a a a a
it i it it itU W D       , where a a ait it itX W D     and 1 1 2a a a      , (2.9) 
Where aitD  denotes the number of sales calls that physician i receives in period t (up to 
adoption) and the row vector aitW  contains all other, exogenous covariates. We next 
express sales calls ( aitD ) as a function of exogenous variables (
a
itW  and 
a
itZ ) in the 
following manner: 
0 1 2
a a a a
it it it itD W Z       , where 2~ (0, )ait aN  . (2.10) 
Vector aitZ   contains exogeneous variables that are related to sales calls, but not to the 
prescription behavior of physician i at time t. We use two such instruments: the average 
number of lagged sales calls (i.e., in month t-1) to physicians who are located in the other 
two cities but who are similar to i in (i) status measured by indegree and (ii) prelaunch 
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prescription volume of the other two drugs. Physicians in other cities are considered to be 
similar to physician i on a variable if the percentile they occupy within their city is within 
10% points of physician i’s percentile within his or her own city.  
The parameter 0  captures baseline for sales calls, 1  and 2  are column vectors of 
parameters to be estimated, and ait  is a random error which is assumed to be identically 
and independently distributed. Endogeneity arises when there is a non-zero correlation 
between sales calls ( aitD ) and the demand shocks ( ait ). Given the exogeneity of aitW  and 
a
itZ , the endogeneity problem stems from the correlation between 
a
it  and ait . We assume 
that the two error terms are jointly normally distributed. Thus, 
2
10
~ ,
0
a
a ait
a
a a ait
N
 
  
                 ,  (2.11) 
where a  denotes the correlation between the error terms and its estimate provides a 
testable measure for the severity of endogeneity in sales calls. 
By using the conditional property of a bivariate normal distribution, we rewrite 
Equation (2.9) as a function of mutually independent random components, ait  and ait , in 
the following manner (Smith and Blundell 1986): 
0 1 2
a a a a a a a aa
it i it it it it
a
U W D          , where  2~ 0,1ait aN  . (2.12) 
The error term ait  is independent of any other term on the right-hand side. Therefore, the 
discrete-time hazard of adoption after controlling for the endogeneity of sales calls can be 
expressed as: 
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0 1 2
1 2
( 1| 0)
1
a a a a a aa
i it it it
a a a
it it
a
W D
P Y Y
   

           
. (2.13) 
The overall likelihood of observing aity  can be obtained by entering this expression rather 
than that in Equation (2.2) into Equations (2.3) and (2.8).   
Because the values of ait  and a  are not directly observed, we estimate the model in 
two stages. First, we estimate Equation (2.10) with OLS, and obtain estimates, ait  and aˆ . 
Next, we estimate the parameters, 20 1 2
a a a
a a        by plugging in the first-stage 
estimates ( ait and aˆ ) into Equation (2.13). As ˆait  and aˆ  are only estimates rather than 
actual values of ait  and a , we use a bootstrap procedure to avoid underestimating the 
standard errors (Petrin and Train 2010).  
The control function approach is a general methodology that can be applied 
regardless of any distributional assumptions for the error terms (e.g., Petrin and Train 
2010). It can be implemented by simply “plugging” ˆait  into the utility function and 
estimating a standard hazard model. However, the corresponding coefficient of ˆait  does 
not really measure the strength of endogeneity a  but only the ratio /a a  . The 
approach outlined here assuming normality is more informative. 
We apply the same approach for repeat incidence, using the same  parameters in 
(2.10). i.e., we use a common control function for detailing across all 185 x 17 = 3,145 
physician-month observations, but use the relevant first-stage estimates it  to match the 
physician-months in each equation. Note, the control function includes all covariates in 
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the adoption and repeat equations, including the monthly dummies and lagged 
prescription volume, as well as the two time-varying instruments. 
Invariance to scaling. The parameter of key interest for assessing endogeneity is 
identified regardless of the error scaling in the utility equation. We briefly show this, 
omitting superscripts for adoption or repeat. Let the utility shocks 2~ (0, )it N  . As a 
result, the covariance term in (2.11) equals  and Equation (2.12) becomes (Smith and 
Blundell 1986): 
0 1 2 2it i it it it itU W D
         , where
2 2~ (0, (1 ))it N   . (2.14) 
The corresponding probit model (2.13) then becomes: 
0 1 2
21
i it it itW D
   
 
         
.  (2.15) 
In this model, the estimated   coefficient of the ratio of first-stage estimates iˆt /ˆ  is 
invariant to the scaling of  . 
2.11.2. Robustness Checks 
Alternative Operationalizations of Contagion. In the main analysis, we assume 
contagion from discussion and referral ties to be driven by prescription volume of the 
focal drug and that from colleagues to be driven by prescription share. This choice is 
based on theoretical considerations under the assumption that influence from 
discussion/referral ties is mostly informational whereas that from colleagues is mostly 
normative. Using a difference in BIC of at least 2 to indicate positive evidence of a 
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difference in descriptive fit (Raftery 1995), this a priori preferred specification fits the 
data about as well as weighting contagion from both discussion/referral ties and 
colleagues by prescription volume (BIC = -1.00) and better than weighting both by 
prescription share (BIC = 7.07). The key results are robust, except that SRL does not 
moderate share-weighted contagion from discussion/referral ties in trial. So, both the 
model fit and the absence of an interaction consistent with theory speak against share-
weighting the contagion from discussion/referral ties. 
We also operationalized colleagues contagion as stemming from the new drug’s share 
of category requirements at the practice level, qnew(t-1) / [qnew(t-1) + qDrug1(t-1) + 
qDrug2(t-1)]. This alternative metric differs from that in the main model in two ways. (i) 
It is affected by the focal physician’s own lagged prescriptions, not just those of his or her 
peers. (ii) It corresponds to the sum of the new drug’s share of the category requirements 
of each physician weighted by the physician’s share in the practice total, whereas the 
metric in the main model assumes that each colleague contributes equally to the local 
norm. Neither assumption (i) or (ii) is appealing a priori if colleagues contagion is meant 
to capture local normative influence. Replacing the colleagues contagion variable in the 
main model by this alternative indeed leads to a markedly worse fit (BIC = 16.65). The 
moderator effects of indegree and squared indegree on colleagues contagion in repeat 
turns non-significant, which is inconsistent with the middle-status conformity hypothesis. 
So, both the model fit and the absence of interactions consistent with theory speak against 
this a priori unappealing alternative metric of colleagues contagion. 
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Additional Interactions. The main analysis indicates that SRL moderates contagion 
from discussion/referral ties in adoption, while indegree moderates contagion from 
colleagues in repeat. To strengthen these findings, we extend the main model with the 
interaction between SRL and contagion from colleagues in the adoption equation, and the 
interactions between log indegree (linear and squared) and contagion from 
discussion/referral ties in the repeat equation. Adding those variables does not improve 
model fit significantly (-2LL = 3.40, df = 3, p > .05). None of the additional interactions 
is significant individually either (p > .05), and all the results from the original model 
remain valid. So, (a) SRL moderates contagion from discussion/referral ties but not from 
colleagues in adoption, and (b) indegree moderates contagion from colleagues but not 
from discussion/referral ties in repeat. 
Spatial Variation in Demand within Cities. It is conceivable that the main effect of 
contagion from colleagues captures not only true contagion, but also spatial variation in 
demand for the new drug. Because the medical condition is more prevalent among Asians, 
we add a control for the percentage of Asians in the zip code where the physician 
practices (2000 US Census). We also add a control for the percentage of households 
below the poverty level in the zip code. Its effect is not clear a priori because one of the 
main causes of contracting the medical condition is more prevalent among poor people, 
yet they are less likely to seek and obtain treatment. There is no clinical evidence that any 
other patient characteristic interacts with drug efficacy. Adding these controls to the 
model does not significantly improve model fit (-2LL = 5.76, df = 4, p > .05) and does 
not affect the substantive conclusions about contagion in either stage. 
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Carry-over Effects of Sales Calls. Prior research has reported the presence of 50%-
70% carry-over in the effect of monthly detailing (IVV 2011a; Liu and Gupta 2012; 
Manchanda et al. 2008). We therefore also extend the main model with lagged sales calls. 
We do so without controlling for endogeneity because the control function approach 
becomes unwieldy with multiple lagged values of the suspected endogenous variable. 
Extending the main model with sales calls lagged either by one period or two periods 
does not significantly improve model fit (both p > .05). None of the lagged sales calls 
effects is significant individually either (all p > .05). More importantly, adding lagged 
sales calls does not affect the research conclusions about social contagion in trial and 
repeat. 
Correlation between Status and Status-Squared. As noted in the second paragraph of 
Section 2.7, SRL and Ln(Indegree+1) are mean-centered for estimation, so the coefficient 
of non-moderated contagion is the effect for the “average” physician. The Pearson 
correlation between mean-centered Ln(Indegree+1) and its square, both of which enter 
the trial and repeat equations to test for middle-status conformity, is 0.86. As this may 
cause concerns about collinearity artifacts, we changed the centering point from the mean 
indegree (0.35) to 2. At this level of centering, the correlation between Ln(Indegree+1) 
and its square decreases from 0.86 to 0.00. Re-estimating the main model in Table 2.4 
with these newly centered covariates produces the same pattern of significant and non-
significant coefficients (Table 2.6) and almost exactly the same pattern of overall 
contagion effects (Figure 2.4). In short, our substantive conclusions do not stem from a 
high correlation between status and its square.  
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Table 2.6. Model Estimates, after Centering Ln(Indegree+1) such that It Is 
Uncorrelated with its Square 
________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Variables  Trial Hazard  Repeat Probability 
________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Intercept  -1.972 ** -0.194  
  (0.322) (0.531)  
SRL   0.133 -0.088  
  (0.069) (0.157)  
Ln(Indegree + 1)  0.137 0.275  
  (0.173) (0.319)  
Ln(Indegree + 1)2  0.020 0.126  
  (0.132) (0.309)  
Contagion from Dis / Ref Ties (00s)  0.056 -0.067  
  (0.344) (0.423)  
Contagion from Dis / Ref Ties (00s) × SRL -0.677 ** 0.390  
  (0.250) (0.260)  
Contagion from Colleagues  0.755  1.968 *  
  (0.598) (0.795)  
Contagion from Colleagues × Ln(Indegree + 1)  -0.635 1.189 **  
  (1.310) (0.458)  
Contagion from Colleagues × Ln(Indegree + 1)2 -0.787 -0.840 *  
  (1.213) (0.402)  
Solo Practice  -0.044 0.487  
  (0.180) (0.306)  
University / Teaching Hospital  0.226 0.975**  
  (0.186) (0.344)  
Primary Care  -0.223 10 †  
  (0.307)   
Early Referral  -0.286 0.900  
  (0.197) (0.615)  
Past Drug 1  0.000 0.010 ***  
  (0.002) (0.003)  
Past Drug 2  0.006** -0.003  
  (0.002) (0.003)  
Sales Calls  0.556 ** -0.201  
  (0.195) (0.385)  
Endogeneity Correlation  -0.288 0.269  
  (0.201) (0.341)  
Ln(qit-1 + 1)  - 0.892 ***  
   (0.183)  
Random Effect Stand. Dev.  0 †† 0.473 ***  
   (0.166)  
Random Effects Covariance  0 †† 
 
________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
* p ≤ .05, ** p ≤ .01, *** p ≤ .001. Standard errors in parentheses. LL= -406.79, BIC = 1,270.82. 
The model includes several additional covariates: Monthly time dummies (16 for trial, 14 for repeat) and 
city dummies for LA and NYC in both equations. These estimates are not reported to avoid clutter. 
† Dummies for Primary Care and Month 2 are perfect predictors for repeat incidence. We set their 
coefficients to a very large number (10) so the predicted repeat probability for these physician-months is 
essentially 1 and the observations do not affect the likelihood estimation.  
†† Set to zero based on BIC. 
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ESSAY 3. THE IMPACT OF HOMOPHILY AND BALANCE IN 
CONSUMER SEARCH FROM SOCIAL CONTACTS 
 
3.1. Introduction 
Consumers often turn to social contacts for information or advice before making 
decisions as mundane as which restaurant to go to on a Friday night or as critical as 
where to have a wedding. They may turn to particular friends with preferences similar to 
theirs because recommendations from similar others are more diagnostic, or because they 
are easier to collect and process. On occasion, they may wish to gather recommendations 
from multiple friends to obtain different points of view. While these different points of 
view help to make a more informed decision, they can also be cognitively taxing. In this 
paper, we model and empirically examine the impact of the similarity of preferences 
among information seekers and their social sources on the benefit and cost of gathering 
social information, and on ultimate purchasing behavior.  
 Marketing researchers have long recognized the importance of social learning, i.e., of 
updating one’s beliefs by gathering information from other consumers (Erdem et al. 2005; 
Roberts and Urban 1988; Zhao et al. 2013). From a managerial stand point, several 
Internet retailers such as opentable.com (restaurants) and netflix.com (movie / DVD) 
have begun providing customers with their friends’ reviews and are now seeking to use 
this feature more effectively. Should customers be given the opportunity to gather 
reviews from others similar to them? Should they be exposed to different points of view? 
The answer to these questions, we show, depends on how the similarity in preferences 
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among consumers and their social contacts impacts the way they search for information, 
learn from the acquired information, and make a purchase decision. 
 How may similarity of product preferences between consumers and their social contacts 
impact the way they seek information? A prevalent feature of social settings is that contacts 
tend to be more frequent among similar people than dissimilar people. This is the principle of 
homophily, which is captured by the proverbial expression “birds of a feather flock together” 
(Lazarsfeld and Merton 1954; McPherson et al. 2001).37 Consumer search has long been 
documented to be more prevalent among similar consumers in various contexts such as 
physician selection (Feldman and Spencer 1965), selection of teachers for private tutoring 
(Brown and Reingen 1987), customer referral programs (Schmitt et al. 2011) and clicking 
behavior for online advertisements (Goel and Goldstein 2014).  
 While the vast evidence of homophily indicates that it plays an important role in 
consumer decisions, it does not directly shed much light on the specific mechanisms at work 
(Currarini et al. 2009; Kossinets and Watts 2009; Wimmer and Lewis 2010 and Zeng and 
Xie 2008). For instance, it is possible that the observed effects are due to opportunity-
induced homophily (which reflects the fact that people have a greater opportunity to meet 
with similar others than with dissimilar others) rather than preference-induced homophily  
(which reflects the purposive contact with similar others). Even when preference-induced 
homophily is largely at work, it may be driven because people perceive information gathered 
from similar others as more diagnostic (Brown and Reingen 1987; Feldman and Spencer 
                                                            
37 Lazarsfeld and Merton (1954) distinguish between two types of homophily, status and value. Homophily 
due to similarity in socio-demographics such as age, gender, race is termed as status homophily. In this 
paper, we focus on similarity in attitudes or beliefs, which is termed as value homophily. We use similarity 
among consumers to refer to the similarity in their preference for a product or service. 
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1965) or due to the ease of interacting with them (McPherson et al. 2001; Price and Feick 
1984). While the origins of homophily are important to understand from a theoretical 
perspective, it is managerially beneficial as well: If homophily is driven largely by 
diagnosticity of information, Internet retailers offering social evaluations for products may 
need to consider which information sources to present to stimulate sales. If, however, 
homophily is driven by the ease of interaction, these retailers may need to focus on how to 
facilitate the collection of reviews from others. 
 Going beyond dyads, social systems typically have a mix of homophilous and non-
homophilous relationships, and we turn our interest to the consistency of the similarity of 
preference in a social system. To do so, we build on Heider’s Balance theory that 
conceptualizes the consistency of liking or sentiment in relationships in a social system 
(Heider 1946). According to Heider’s definition, a social triad is balanced if the affect 
valence (i.e., positive for a liking relationship between two individuals, and negative for 
dislike) in the system multiples out to be positive and the pattern of relationships is 
termed as consistent in the system. For instance, the typical phrase “an enemy of my 
enemy is my friend” applies to a balanced system. We apply the concept of balance to 
denote the consistency of preferences (as opposed to affect) in a social system. The 
following example shows our use of balance. Consider John with two friends Jim and 
Mary and suppose John’s preferences for food are reasonably similar to Jim’s and Mary’s. 
If Jim and Mary are similar (dissimilar) then the patterns of the similarity of preference 
are consistent (inconsistent), and we denote the social system as balanced (imbalanced).  
 We shed light on how balance in a social system moderates the reliability of 
information and cost of search. Statistical theory suggests that information gathered in an 
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imbalanced social system is more reliable than that gathered in a balanced social system. 
The intuition is that differing viewpoints will reduce the bias in information gathered 
from any one source. Consistent with statistical theory, prior studies have shown that the 
agreement on an issue between individuals who have different viewpoints can increase 
others’ confidence about the consensus (Burt 2001; Goethals and Nelson 1973; Orive 
1988). While there is benefit from higher reliability, empirical studies have also shown 
that people incur more cognitive effort to process inconsistent information (Harkins and 
Petty 1981; Mandler 1982), which is likely under an imbalanced system. Thus, people 
may experience greater discomfort of collecting and processing the information from an 
imbalanced system than a balanced system. The net impact of balance on consumers’ 
search and purchase depends on how consumers resolve the tension between 
informational benefit and cost. 
 We investigate the tradeoffs in informational benefit and cost through which the 
similarity of preferences between consumers and their sources impact their search, 
learning, and purchase. We do so using a novel incentive compatible stated choice 
experiment where consumers make purchase decisions for individual music tracks while 
having access to others’ evaluations. Such an experimental approach has several 
advantages over data from field settings for addressing our research questions (e.g., 
Centola 2011; Narayan et al. 2011; Shalizi and Thomas 2011; Aral and Walker 2012). 
First, we manipulate the similarity of preference, which is usually confounded with 
opportunity of meeting similar others, interpersonal affect, or frequency of interaction in 
observational data. Second, the experimental design controls for unobserved confounds 
such as endogenous group formation when identifying social influence.  Third, there is no 
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possibility of passive social learning (from exogenous social information), awareness 
diffusion, or normative pressure in our study. Finally, because we manipulate the content 
and availability of social information, which is difficult to observe in secondary data, we 
can quantify the effect of the similarity of preferences on consumers’ decisions. 
 We analyze our experimental data using a utility-based model of consumer search 
and purchase. Our approach is based on the cost-benefit framework for assessing the 
amount of information that people gather from multiple sources to make a more informed 
purchase decision (e.g., Erdem et al. 2005; Hauser et al. 1993; Ratchford et al. 2003; 
Seiler 2013).  The novel component of our framework is how we capture the features of 
social learning. We extend the standard multivariate Bayesian learning (SMBL) model 
which allows for a correlation of information among different sources (Erdem 1998; 
Winkler 1981). We do so in two ways. First, a consumer may purposely gather 
information from others who may have systematically different tastes compared to his 
own. This is unlike learning from own experience (e.g., Erdem and Keane 1996) or from 
targeted marketing activities such as detailing (e.g., Narayanan and Manchanda 2009) 
where the information provides unbiased signals for consumers’ evaluation.  This is also 
unlike prior models of social learning (Roberts and Urban 1988; Erdem et al. 2005; Zhao 
et al. 2013) that assume social reviews provide unbiased signals. Second, social search 
and learning is allowed to be affected by behavioral aspects related to the similarity of 
preferences among information receivers and providers. For instance, people may 
perceive information from similar others to be more diagnostic than from dissimilar 
others. SMBL model cannot accommodate such aspects (as discussed in detail later). Our 
proposed extended multivariate Bayesian learning (EMBL) model flexibly 
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accommodates behavioral aspects related to the similarity of preferences. While prior 
research has accommodated such behavioral aspects of learning as forgetting (Mehta et al. 
2004), salience of recent signals (Camacho et al. 2011), and valence of signals (Zhao et al. 
2011), a model that accommodates behavioral aspects related to the similarity of 
preferences has not been well developed.  
 Our results provide two key insights regarding social learning. First, we present 
evidence of preference-induced homophily in consumer search. Consumers prefer to 
gather information from similar others, and since opportunity-induced homophily is ruled 
out with our experimental design, this must stem from preference-induced homophily. 
Our modeling framework pinpoints the key driver behind this phenomenon. In our 
context, preference-induced homophily is driven by the higher diagnosticity of 
information gathered from similar others (Brown and Reingen 1987; Feldman and 
Spencer 1965) rather than the comfort of collecting such information (McPherson et al. 
2001; Price and Feick 1984). Second, balance of a social system has a nuanced effect on 
social learning. On the one hand, people understand that information from an imbalanced 
social system is more reliable (Burt 2001; Goethals and Nelson 1973; Orive 1988) than a 
balanced one. On the other hand, people experience greater discomfort under an 
imbalanced system (Heider 1946) and must expend greater cognitive effort to process the 
information under imbalanced system (Harkins and Petty 1981; Mandler 1982), so the 
cost of information-seeking is higher. Our results suggest that people tend to search less 
under an imbalanced system, as compared to a balanced one. However, the lower amount 
of search under imbalance has greater informational benefit. This is consistent with both 
higher informational benefit and higher cost in imbalanced versus balanced social system.  
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 The remainder of the essay is organized as follows. We begin with describing our 
theoretical framework and develop hypotheses. This is followed by a description of our 
research setting, experimental design and description of data. Next, we build a formal 
model for consumers’ decisions in our setting, and specify the model for the empirical 
application. We conclude with our results and its implications for theory and practice. 
3.2. Theoretical Framework and Hypothesis 
In this section, we develop a theoretical framework and propose specific hypotheses for 
the information benefit and search cost through which the similarity of preference 
between consumers and their sources may impact their search decisions and social 
learning. 
3.2.1. Preference Similarity with Sources  
The diagnosticity of information from a source depends on the strength of association 
between an individual’s preference and that of the source. If a source with tastes similar 
to those of a focal consumer gives positive feedback about a product, then that consumer 
may infer that he will like it. If the source has dissimilar tastes to those of the focal 
consumer, then he may infer that he will not like it. According to a normative model of 
consumer learning (SMBL), positive feedback from similar others has equivalent 
information as negative feedback from dissimilar others. In other words, the feedback 
from similar and dissimilar others with the same strength of association should be equally 
diagnostic. Likewise, prior studies of consumer search have not considered the preference 
similarity of the information seeker with their sources and hence implicitly assume that 
there is no difference in the cost of collecting information from similar or dissimilar 
130 
 
 
 
sources as long as a consumer searches for the same amount (e.g., Hauser et al. 1993; 
Ratchford et al. 2003). 
 This prediction is at odds with prior evidence of homophily in social search (Feldman 
and Spencer 1965; Brown and Reingen 1987; Schmitt et al. 2011). However, studies 
using an observational design have difficulty in identifying whether this tendency to seek 
information from similar others than dissimilar others is driven by a greater opportunity 
to meet with similar others (i.e., opportunity-induced homophily) or a purposive contact 
with similar others (i.e., preference-induced homophily). If the evidence of homophily in 
the previous studies is driven only by opportunity-induced homophily, then there is little 
reason to expect that people may find the information from similar others as more 
diagnostic or may have less discomfort of search from similar others. In such cases, an 
SMBL model would hold. However, clear evidence of preference-induced homophily in 
social search would be inconsistent with SMBL. In this study, we test the diagnosticity of 
information and cost of search as two key drivers of preference-induced homophily 
where we rule out opportunity-induced homophily in our experimental setting. 
 Several prior studies using an experimental design provide deeper insights into 
drivers at work. One stream of research shows that consumers find information from 
similar others to be more relevant. For instance, Gilly et al. (1998) suggest that people 
may pay more attention to the information from similar others than that from dissimilar 
others. Yaniv et al. (2011) note that consumers find more personally relevant information 
from similar others, who tend to share similar product needs, than from dissimilar others. 
We build on this past work and propose that the greater diagnosticity of information 
gathered from similar others is actually a driver of preference-induced homophily. 
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Another stream of research has investigated the cost of associating with dissimilar others 
(with similarity based on socio-demographics). For example, Stephan and Stephan (1985) 
show that people have greater anxiety and discomfort when interacting with dissimilar 
others. Please see Pettigrew and Tropp (2006) for a summary of findings from intergroup 
contact theory. Given these findings, we expect that such discomfort may also stem from 
gathering information from others with dissimilar preferences. In sum, we propose the 
following hypotheses.38 
  H1a: For the same amount of search, information collected from similar others will 
be more diagnostic than information collected from dissimilar others.  
 H1b: People incur lower (mental) cost of collecting and processing information from  
similar than from dissimilar others. 
3.2.2. Structural Balance  
Heider (1946) defined balance in a social triad based on the consistency of liking or 
sentimental relationships in a social system. He proposed that a triad is balanced 
(imbalanced) if the valence of liking relationship (i.e., positive for like, and negative for 
dislike) in the triad multiples out to be positive (negative). Cartwright and Harary (1956) 
expanded the definition on balance for social systems larger than a triad. Such expansion 
made the concept applicable to a wider range of situations such as the development of 
intelligence (Piaget 1972), the creation of commonly shared norms and values (Sternberg 
                                                            
38 Little empirical research has jointly tested the impact of the two drivers on preference-based homophily. 
This is likely as without a formal model it would be difficult to disentangle whether the factors that are 
important for search are due to their impact on informational benefit or the cost. The argument is similar in 
spirit to the issue of disentangling persuasive and informative effects of advertising without a formal model 
(Ackerberg 2001). 
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1998), and dynamics of social network formation (Hummon and Doreian 2003). We 
apply the concept of balance to denote the consistency of preferences (as opposed to 
affect) in a social system. Thus, we term a social system as balanced if the valence of 
preferences (i.e., positive for similar preferences, and negative for dissimilar preferences) 
in a system multiples out to be positive. 
 Normative model of consumer learning (i.e., SMBL) indicates that the reliability of 
information is greater from an imbalanced than balanced social system. According to the 
statistics of correlation, the variance of a sum of two random variables is smaller when 
the correlation between the two random variables is negative than positive. This simple 
intuition applies to SMBL:39  Any bias in information gathered from sources in an 
imbalanced system is expected to be in opposing directions, so the overall bias will be 
reduced when one integrates the information. In contrast, the information from sources in 
a balanced system share the bias in the same direction, so bias will be amplified upon 
integration. We explain this notion in detail in Section 3.10.3 (Appendix). This normative 
prediction has related empirical findings that the exposure to the different vantage points 
increases the reliability of information (Burt 2001; Goethals and Nelson 1973; Orive 
1988). As there is greater opportunity of acquiring information from different viewpoints 
from an imbalanced system, we propose the following hypothesis for the manner in 
which balance will affect the reliability of information. 
 H2a: For the same amount of search, information collected under an imbalanced 
system will be more reliable than information collected under a balanced system. 
                                                            
39 The intuition also applies to modern portfolio theory (Markowitz 1952). For a given level of return, the 
overall risk (variance) of a portfolio can be reduced by investing in assets with negative correlation because 
the poor performance of one asset can be offset with the good performance of another. 
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 Prior models on consumer search (e.g., Hauser et al. 1993; Ratchford et al. 2003) 
implicitly assume that the pattern of consistency of relationships among sources does not 
affect the cost of collecting information and processing it. Past research suggests that this 
may be a strong assumption. According to Heider (1946), people tend to feel greater 
discomfort and tension under an imbalanced system when there is inconsistency of liking 
or affect with others. We expect that people will have experience greater discomfort even 
when there is inconsistency in preferences with others. This is likely as people may have 
greater cost of processing information gathered from an imbalanced system where 
inconsistent information is expected and requires more cognitive effort to digest (Harkins 
and Petty 1981; Mandler 1982). Thus, we propose the following hypothesis: 
 H2b: People incur greater (mental) cost of collecting and processing information 
under an imbalanced system than a balanced system. 
3.3. Research Setting and Experimental Design 
3.3.1. Research Setting 
To test how similarity in preferences that consumers have with their sources may impact 
their decision to search and how much they learn, we characterize the research setting 
based on the following features - (i) the number of available information sources, (ii) the 
relationship between consumers and their contacts, (iii) the decision framework, and (iv) 
the type of search decision. 
 Number of sources. Suppose a consumer has N friends who have evaluated the 
product. In this case, the similarity of preference with N friends (his direct connections) 
and the similarity of preference between N(N-1)/2 pairs will impact the way that he 
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collects and processes the information. Even with N=4 (a relatively small number) there 
are 10 different similarity parameters. The general problem is clearly challenging. Thus, 
to maintain the essence of the problem and make it tractable for testing theory, we 
assume that a consumer’s social sources can be categorized into two exogenous groups 
(groups A and B). As an example, a consumer may have several friends who can be 
categorized into those he knows from school or from work. Thus, the consumer and his 
two social groups form a social triad. 
 Type of relationship between the consumer and his contacts. We assume that a 
consumer has a mature relationship with both social groups and so knows the similarity 
of preferences in the social triad.40 Figure 3.1 shows an example of a triad where the focal 
consumer and two social groups form the nodes and the link among any two nodes 
denotes the similarity of preference between them. In the figure, a (b) denotes the 
similarity of preference between a consumer and group A (group B), and c denotes the 
similarity of preference between the two social groups. We operationalize the similarity 
measure as correlation: the value gets closer to 1 (-1) as the positive (negative) 
association of preference between two nodes gets stronger. There is no association of 
preference between two nodes when the similarity measure between them is 0. 
 We denote that a social system is balanced if the valence of preference similarity 
multiplies out to be positive; the triad is balanced when abc > 0, and imbalanced when 
abc < 0. Under balance (imbalance), the pattern of the similarity of preference is 
consistent (inconsistent) with each other. For instance, if a focal consumer has a similar 
                                                            
40 There are contexts where consumers may be uncertain about their similarity of preference with others 
and learn about them over time. In addition, consumers’ social contacts may be categorized into multiple 
(more than two) groups and these may not be exogenous. 
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makes a search decision, processes the information acquired from search, and finally 
makes a purchase decision. 
Figure 3.2. Decision Framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 We posit that respondents make their search decision based on their belief about how 
informative the signals would be and how effortful it would be to collect and process 
them. Respondents make their purchase decision after gathering signals. The purchase 
decision is affected by how informative the collected signals are. However, the cost of 
search (which respondents have already experienced) does not directly affect the 
purchase decision – it only does so indirectly through the search amount. 
 Type of search decision. A consumer makes the search decision before he observes 
any signals, so a search decision in this study denotes simultaneous search (or fixed 
sample search) about a specific product.41 
 While our research setting is appropriate for theory testing, it also captures real world 
contexts in which consumers are time constrained and cannot sequentially decide to 
                                                            
41 Morgan and Manning (1985) have found that either sequential or simultaneous search (or a combination 
of both) can be optimal for a consumer. More recently, De los Santos et al. (2012) estimated both 
simultaneous and sequential search models in the context of online search for experiential products, which 
is also the setting in our experiment, and found that a simultaneous search model fit the data better.  
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collect information. For instance, suppose Ryan is deciding whether or not to dine in a 
particular restaurant on a Friday evening. As he shares a lot of common dining 
experiences with his two groups of friends, for instance neighbors and colleagues, Ryan 
knows how similar his taste for restaurants is to those of the two groups of friends and 
how similar the two groups’ tastes are to each other. Ryan sends out multiple messages 
(e.g., SMS messages) to his friends from each group at the same time, and waits for their 
evaluations. After collecting feedback, Ryan updates his belief about how much he will 
like the restaurant, and then decides whether to visit the restaurant or not.  
3.3.2. Experimental Design 
Our design is a novel incentive compatible stated choice experiment in which we control 
for potential confounds typically found in contexts with social influence (e.g., 
endogenous group formation). Our experiment has two phases: Phase 1 (calibration task) 
and Phase 2 (incentive compatible choice task). Each phase is described below. 
 In Phase 1, participants listen to 10 songs of different genres and rated each song on a 
0-10 scale.42 Participants are told to rate each song carefully as their ratings would be 
used in matching them with other participants and that such matching would be useful in 
the second phase of the experiment.  
 In Phase 2, respondents make a purchase decision for 18 unidentified songs (no artist 
or genre was specified) without listening to them.43 All songs are worth $1.25 on iTunes, 
and participants know it. For each song, a purchase decision for participants means 
                                                            
42 We generated two different lists of 10 songs, and each participant was randomly assigned to one of the 
two lists. All songs have similar average evaluation on iTunes and the order was randomized across 
participants 
43 We did not identify the songs to isolate the causal impact of preference similarity on search.  
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deciding between receiving the mp3 file of the unidentified song or $1 cash (this cash 
was in addition to participation fee). For instance, participants can decide to purchase 
each one of those 18 songs or not purchase any one of them. Participants’ decisions are 
incentive aligned as they are told that one out of all 18 unidentified songs will be 
randomly picked at the end of the survey, and they will be compensated with either the 
actual song (if they had chosen to purchase that song) or $1 additional cash otherwise. 
 Each song is described by six attributes. The first two attributes gives a summary of 
aggregate evaluations for the song - (1) the average of the song’s rating 0( )MjR  from 
iTunes on a 0-10 scale and (2) the standard deviation ( )Mj  which captures the population 
heterogeneity in song evaluations. The superscript M denotes manipulated attributes. If 
the aggregate average evaluation is high, respondents should expect to like the song. The 
average of aggregate evaluation has three levels: low (0.5-3.0), medium (3.0-7.0) and 
high (7.0-9.5). Note that while each level has a range, a respondent sees a randomly 
chosen value in the range corresponding to a level. If the aggregate evaluations are more 
dispersed, respondents will be more uncertain about how much they would like the song. 
The standard deviation of aggregate evaluations has three levels (0.5-1.5, 1.5-3.5, 3.5-
3.5), and the respondent sees an actual value randomly chosen within a range 
corresponding to a given level.  
 In each profile, participants also have access to social information before they make a 
purchase decision. Respondents are told that 200 Undergraduates and 200 MBAs have 
previously listened to the same 10 songs as they did in Phase 1 and also the 18 
unidentified songs that they will be making purchase decisions for. They are then told 
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that genre-specific similarity of preference measures in the triad have been computed 
based on their evaluations of the 10 songs in Phase 1. We explain that the similarity 
measures are constructed by comparing the respondents’ ratings and the average rating 
within each group. Respondents are provided with (3) similarity in preference between 
the participant and undergraduates ( )Mja , (4) between the participant and MBAs ( )
M
jb , 
and (5) between undergraduates and MBAs ( )Mjc . We manipulate all three measures for 
each song (as the superscript indicates). The absolute similarity between the participant 
and Undergraduates as well as the participant and MBAs has three levels each (0.1-0.3, 
0.3-0.7, 0.7- 0.9). A respondent sees a similarity measure for each source which has an 
absolute value randomly chosen within a range corresponding to a given level, and a sign 
randomly chosen to be positive or negative (representing similar or dissimilar preference). 
The similarity in preference between MBAs and Undergraduates ( )Mjc  is randomly 
chosen within a range where the covariance of triadic similarity satisfies regularity 
conditions (Section 3.10.2 in Appendix). 
 Finally, (6) the standard deviation of evaluations within the two social groups ( )Mj  
captures within-group heterogeneity in evaluations. This is set to be equal between the 
two groups, and fixed to be one-half of the standard deviation of the aggregate 
evaluations. We do not manipulate it independently primarily to reduce the complexity of 
the problem for respondents.44 We generate two orthogonal designs of 18 profiles 
                                                            
44 In a pilot study with a convenience sample of 10 students, we found that it was difficult for them to 
understand all the information in a profile where we had different standard deviations for each of the two 
social groups. As our primary goal is to understand how homophily and balance impact consumers’ search 
and purchase behavior, we believe that the lack of orthogonal manipulation of the within-group 
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(unidentified songs) from a full factorial design using Proc Optex in SAS. Each 
participant in the study is assigned to one of the two designs. 
 For each unidentified song, respondents first make the search decision. Based on the 
aggregate evaluations of the song and preference similarity measures, they decide on how 
many individual evaluations (i.e., signals) to acquire from each social group. As each 
group consists of 200 participants, the maximum number of signals that one can acquire 
from each group is 200. Acquisition of each signal is not costless for respondents – they 
have to wait for half a second to retrieve each signal. Figure 3.3a shows an example of 
the search decision interface.   
 After completing the search decision (and having waited for the designated amount of 
time), respondents move to the purchase decision (Figure 3.3b for the interface). 
Respondents are provided with the average rating of randomly sampled individuals from 
each social group with the sample size based on their search decision. In Figure 3.3a, for 
example, a respondent decides to collect 2 (3) signals from undergraduates (MBAs). He 
is told that the average rating among the 2 undergraduates (3 MBAs) is 6.0 (5.4).  We 
manipulate the signals that respondents see. After observing the signals from each group, 
respondents make their purchase decision. This completes the task for one song, and 
respondents go through the same task for 18 songs. 
Figure 3.3. Screenshot of Survey Interface 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
heterogeneity should have little impact. 
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3.3.3. Summary Statistics 
Our data contains 2,736 (=152 subjects × 18 profiles) pairs of search (how many signals 
to acquire) and purchase decisions (whether or not to purchase a song). Table 3.1 
provides the summary statistics of search and purchase decisions. The average total 
search amount is around 20 signals per song.  As a check for our manipulation of the 
similarity of preferences of respondents with those of the two groups, there is no 
difference in the search amount between Undergrads and MBAs (p=0.26).45 In 33% of 
observations, respondents choose to purchase a song, and 88% of them purchase at least 
one song.  
Table 3.1. Summary Statistics of Search and Purchase Decision 
 Mean SD 2.5% 25% 50% 75% 97.5%
Search from Undergrads 9.9 17.2 0 2 5 10 50 
Search from MBAs 9.3 17.7 0 1 5 10 50 
Total Amount of Search 19.2 32.2 0 5 10 20 100 
Purchase Decision  
(0 is no purchase; 1 is purchase) 0.33 0.47      
 
3.3.4. Descriptive Results 
Prior to developing a formal model, we investigate the drivers for the two decisions using 
simple regressions. The results of the regressions broadly support our hypotheses and 
show that the preference similarity with social sources and the overall balance in the 
social system play a significant role in consumers’ decisions. Please refer to Section 
3.10.1 in Appendix for details. In the regression models, however, the endogenous 
                                                            
45 In our study, there is roughly equal number of contacts to undergrads and MBA although 80% of 
respondents are undergrads. Our finding is consistent with past studies which show that the feedback from 
those who share similar preferences impact consumer decisions, but the feedback from those who share 
similar demographics does not (Yaniv et al. 2011). 
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relationship between search and purchase decisions is not accounted for. In addition, 
without a formal model, it is not possible to disentangle whether the attributes that are 
significant for the amount of search are due to their impact on either the informational 
benefit from search or the cost of accessing information (or both). 
3.4. Model  
In this section, we develop a formal model for decisions that consumers make in the 
stated-choice experiment. For each song, a consumer makes two interconnected, but 
temporally separated decisions: In stage 1 (t1), a consumer decides how many signals to 
acquire about song evaluation from other consumers (“search decision”) and in stage 2 
(t2), makes a binary decision of whether or not to purchase the song (“purchase decision”). 
Between the two stages, a consumer processes any collected information. We will make a 
distinction between a normative consumer learning model (SMBL) and our proposed 
specification (EMBL) in the empirical section. 
3.4.1. Utility Specification 
We assume that consumers are utility maximizers and the search and purchase decisions 
are driven by the same utility function. Let  iI t  denote the information set of consumer 
i at time t. For notational simplicity, we omit the song subscript j in the information set. 
The information set at a particular time characterizes the state of the consumer and 
includes all known factors that affect current utility at time t and any future utilities. In 
our setting, there are two time points, t1 and t2, and a consumer has a different 
information set at these two time points.  
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 We define a consumer i's indirect utility from purchasing song j at time t using a 
constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) specification (Narayanan and Manchanda 2009; 
Zhao et al. 2013): 
       ( ) exp ( ) ( )Eij i i i ij i ij iU I t R I t I t      , t = t1 or t2.  (3.1) 
The term EijR  refers to consumer i's rating (or evaluation) of song j and is realized only 
after product experience. We use the term  ( )Eij iR I t  to denote explicitly that consumer 
i’s knowledge about EijR  at time t depends on his information set  iI t . The parameter i  
captures the baseline utility of purchasing a song,46 and i  captures the effect of song 
evaluation on purchase utility. The error term  ( )ij iI t  is also dependent on the 
information set. We assume that at the time of search (Stage 1), the error term is 
stochastic to consumers while at the time of purchase (Stage 2), it is observable. The 
assumption implies that there is a temporal separation between the search and purchase 
decisions. Finally, the utility from not purchasing the song is set to 0.  
3.4.2. Stage 1: Search Decision 
To ease the exposition of the search model, we first explain how a consumer makes the 
purchase decision after conducting a specific amount of search. This discussion illustrates 
the link between search and its impact on purchase. Next, we specify the beliefs that 
consumers hold for stochastic variables at the time of search. Finally, we describe how 
consumers determine their optimal level of search given these beliefs. 
                                                            
46 In the experiment, we did not provide search attributes of the songs (e.g., genre, artist, etc) to isolate the 
impact of aggregate evaluations and preference similarity on consumer search decisions. We can easily 
generalize our model to incorporate search attributes by including the attribute-based utility that a 
consumer associates with a song.  
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 Link between search and purchase. Suppose consumer i collects  ,A Bij ij ijn n n  
signals from the two groups and the average of these collected signals is  ,A Bij ij ijs s s . 
After this search, consumer i’s information set at time t2, 2( )iI t , includes nij and ijs . Let 
2( | ( ))
ER E
i ij if R I t denote consumer i's belief about his own evaluation given this 
information set. 
 As consumer i is uncertain about his own song evaluation, he will determine the 
expected utility of purchasing song j with respect to his beliefs about the song. Consumer 
i will purchase song j if and only if it provides higher expected utility than not purchasing 
it. Equivalently, consumer i will purchase song j if:  
  
2
2( ( ))
( ) 0E
ij
ij iR I t
E U I t    ,        (3.2) 
where E[.] is the expectation operator. Using the expression in Equation 3.1, the term
 
2
2( ( ))
( )E
ij
ij iR I t
E U I t    can be expressed as: 
      
2 ( ( ))2
2 2 2( ( ))
( ) exp ( ( )) ( )E Eij R I tij
E
ij i i i ij ijR I t
E U I t E R I t I t            ,    (3.3) 
                   2 2( ) ( )ij i iju I t I t  , 
where  2( )ij iu I t  denotes the systematic component of the expected utility of purchase. 
Note that the stochastic component of utility, ij , is observable to consumers at Stage 2. 
 The above description emphasizes that a consumer’s decision of whether or not to 
purchase a song depends on his earlier search decision as the number and the content of 
signals (nij and ijs ) alter his information set at the time of purchase.  
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 Consumer beliefs. In this section, we elaborate on consumers’ beliefs about the 
relevant stochastic variables given the search decision, ijn , and the information set at the 
search stage, 1( )I t . We specify beliefs that consumers hold about (1) own evaluation 
prior to search,  1( )EijR I t , (2) signals to be observed,  1( ),ij ijs I t n , and (3) random 
component of utility,  1( )ij I t . 
 Consumer i is uncertain about his own evaluation  EijR  for a song j. Likewise, we 
assume that he is also uncertain about the average evaluations in the two social groups 
 ,A Bij ijR R . Uncertain beliefs that a consumer has about vector  , ,E A Bij ij ij ijR R R R  is 
represented by the distribution,  1| ( )Ri ij if R I t .  
 As explained earlier, a consumer knows the aggregate distribution of song evaluation 
when he makes a search decision (t1). As a respondent’s evaluation is a sample from the 
population distribution of song evaluation, his prior belief about his evaluation  EijR  is 
represented by the aggregate distribution which is normally distributed with mean 0ijR  
and variance 2ij . A consumer also knows the size of the two social groups 
  ,A Bij ij ijN N N , so the average of any signals gathered from the two social groups 
 ,A Bij ijR R  are drawn from the distribution with mean 0ijR  and variance  2 2,A Bij ijij ijN N   
respectively.  
 We assume that the consumer knows the similarity of preference in the social triad, 
 , ,ij ij ij ija b c   – how similar (or dissimilar) his preferences are to those of each social 
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group  ,ij ija b , and how similar (or dissimilar) the preferences of the two social groups 
are  ijc . Therefore, a consumer believes that the vector ijR  is a multivariate sample from 
the population distribution. With the normality assumption, we can express 
 1| ( )Ri ij if R I t  as: 
  
0
0 2
1
0
1
| ( ) , 1
1
A A
ij ij ij ij
ij
R A A A B
i ij i ij ij ij ij ij ij ij ij
A A B Bij
ij ij ij ij ij ij
a N b NR
f R I t N R a N N c N N
R b N c N N N

                    
. (3.4) 
 As a covariance matrix should be positive definite, there are restrictions on the values 
for the similarity of preference  ij  (see Section 3.10.2 in Appendix). Given Equation 
3.4, a consumer i's initial belief about his own rating,  1| ( )ER Ei ij if R I t , is obtained from 
the marginal distribution: 
     0 21| ( ) ,ER Ei ij i ij ijf R I t N R  .       (3.5) 
 A consumer believes that a signal from group A or B is i.i.d. normal with an unknown 
average evaluation (  1( )Aij iR I t  or  1( )Bij iR I t ) and standard deviation ( Aij  or Bij ). With 
these assumptions, the belief about the sample average of  ,A Bij ij ijn n n signals, 
 1| ( ),si ij i ijf s I t n , is 
      
220
1 0 22
| ( ), ,
A A A A B
ij ij ij ij ij ij ijijs
i ij i ij
A B B B Bij
ij ij ij ij ij ij ij
N n c N NR
f s I t n N
R c N N N n
 
 
                
, (3.6) 
148 
 
 
 
where the expression is obtained by combining the uncertainty about the average among 
collected signals from each group and the uncertainty about average evaluation in each 
group.  
 The utility error is stochastic from consumers’ perspective in the search stage. A 
consumer believes that utility error is normally distributed with mean 0 and unit variance, 
i.e., 1( | ( )) (0,1)i ij if I t N
   .  
 Optimal search. For consumer i, let Aijk and 
B
ijk  denote the search cost for obtaining a 
signal from the social groups A and B, respectively. Such cost could be due to the hassle 
of collecting information or cost of processing information. The cost can differ by group, 
and the consumer knows this cost.  
Given the information set of consumer i at t1, 1( )iI t , the utility from search  .SijU for 
a specific amount of search ijn is as follows. 
   2 11 ( ) | ( ), ,( ),  , ij
ij
A A B B
ij i i ij ij ij ij ij nS
ij i ij A A B B
ij ij ij ij n
U I t I t n k n k n
U I t n
k n k n


       
             
           (3.7) 
 Here the term
ijn
 is known to the consumer. The term can be interpreted as a fixed 
cost of gathering ijn signals (De los Santos et al. 2013). We use the term 
 2 1( ) | ( ),ij i i ijU I t I t n  to denote explicitly that the consumer i's utility is based on how his 
information set at t2 will change due to his information at t1 and the amount of search he 
decides to engage in. The term contains two key components that are uncertain to 
consumers at time t1. First, the utility error is stochastic, and consumer believes that it 
when song j is purchased,  
when song j is not purchased. 
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follows 1( | ( ))i ij if I t
  . Second, the consumer is yet to observe any signals, and his 
uncertain belief follows 1( | ( ), )
s
i ij i ijf s I t n . The latter is important as it indicates that a 
consumer does not know what beliefs he will hold about his own song evaluation,
2( | ( ))
ER E
i ijf R I t , at the time of purchase. Thus, a consumer i's expected utility from search 
for song j’s evaluations is:
   
2 1 2
1 ( )| ( ) 2 1( ( ))
( ),  ( ) | ( ),Ei i ijij
S A A B B
ij i ij I t I t ij i i ij ij ij ij ij nR I t
E U I t n E E U I t I t n k n k n              .    (3.8) 
 The above equation implies that expected search utility for a consumer equals the 
expected purchase utility (with respect to uncertain belief about own evaluation after 
search) after integrating over all possible 2( )I t  he may have given 1( )I t . Given Equations 
3.2 and 3.3, we can rewrite Equation 3.8 as: 
      
2 1 21 ( )| ( ) ( ) 2 2
( ),  1 ( ) ( )
i i i ij
S A A B B
ij i ij I t I t I t ij i ij ij ij ij ij nE U I t n E u I t I t k n k n             ,     (3.9) 
where 
2( )
1
iI t
 denotes an indicator which is 1 if a consumer i purchases a song j, and 0 
otherwise. A purchase decision is made based on Equation 3.2, so it is a function of 
 2( )ij iu I t  and  2( )ij I t .  
The expectation operator
2 1( )| ( )
[ ]
i iI t I t
E  , can be decomposed into the expectation over 
signals that a consumer may receive,  2 1( )| ( ) [ ]ij i is I t I tE  , and the expectation over the utility 
errors,  2 1( )| ( ) [ ]ij i iI t I tE  . Equation 3.9 can be rewritten by using the properties of conditional 
expectation and normality of utility error as:  
          22 1 2 11 ( ) 2 2( )| ( ) ( )| ( )( ),  1 ( ) ( )iij i i ij i iSij i ij I t ij i ijs I t I t I t I tE U I t n E E u I t I t                    (3.10) 
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ij
A A B B
ij ij ij ij nk n k n    , 
      2 1 2 1( )| ( ) Pr ( ) ( ) 0ij i i ij i ijs I t I tE u I t I t        
       2 1 2 1( ) ( ) | ( ) ( ) 0 ijA A B Bij i ij ij i ij ij ij ij ij nE u I t I t u I t I t k n k n           , 
        2 1 2 2 2( )| ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ijij i i A A B Bij i ij i ij i ij ij ij ij ns I t I tE u I t u I t u I t k n k n               , 
 
     1| ijb cij i ij nv n I t v n    , 
where   1|b ij iv n I t  denotes the expected informational benefit from search, and  c ijv n  
denotes the cost of search.  
 We assume that the consumer evaluates the expected utility associated with each level 
of search. He then chooses the level ( *ijn ) that maximizes the expected utility from search. 
Given the size of each group  ijN , the consumer cannot contact more than  A Bij ijN N  
number of people from each group. Thus,  
 * 1arg max ( ),  ij Sij n ij i ijn E U I t n    , where *0 A Aij ijn N   and *0 B Bij ijn N  .   (3.11) 
3.4.2. Learning Process (between Stage 1 and Stage 2) 
After collecting signals from each group, consumers update their belief about not only 
their own song evaluation  EijR  but also the average evaluations in the two social groups
 ,A Bij ijR R . We assume that consumers update their beliefs about all evaluations 
according to Bayes rule. The update mechanism outlined in this section is common to 
both SMBL and EMBL models; the difference is in whether update is based on objective 
and manipulated attributes (SMBL) or subjective attributes (EMBL), not in the update 
Informational Benefit from Search Cost of Search 
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mechanism per se. We explain the difference between SMBL and EMBL in detail in the 
empirical section. Given the prior and the signal distribution specified in the previous 
section, the learning process follows multivariate Bayesian learning. As a result, we 
obtain the posterior belief about all three evaluations,  2| ( )Ri ij if R I t , which follows a 
multivariate normal distribution. Thus, we can obtain a consumer’s posterior beliefs 
about their own song evaluation,  2| ( )ER Ei ij if R I t , as a marginal distribution of 
 2| ( )Ri ij if R I t : 
      2| ( ) , ,ER Ei ij i ij ij ij ij ijf R I t N PM n s PV n ,    (3.12) 
where   0 0, A A B Bij ij ij ij ij ij ij ij ijPM n s R s s     , 
   
     
22 2 2
2 22 2 2 4
A A B B B B
ij ij ij ij ij ij ij ij ij ij ij ij
A
ij
A A A B B B A B
ij ij ij ij ij ij ij ij ij ij ij ij
N n a N n b c n
N n N n c n n
   

    
 

  
,  
   
     
22 2 2
2 22 2 2 4
B B A A A A
ij ij ij ij ij ij ij ij ij ij ij ij
B
ij
A A A B B B A B
ij ij ij ij ij ij ij ij ij ij ij ij
N n b N n a c n
N n N n c n n
   

    
 

  
, 
0 1 A Bij ij ij     ,  
and        
2
2 22 2 2 4
ij
ij ij
A A A B B B A B
ij ij ij ij ij ij ij ij ij ij ij ij
PV n
N n N n c n n

    

  
 
            2 2 22 2 2 2 41 1A A A B B B A Bij ij ij ij ij ij ij ij ij ij ij ij ij ij ij ijn a N n b N n n a b c           . 
3.4.3. Stage 2: Purchase Decision 
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In the purchase stage, a consumer determines whether or not to purchase the song. Given 
consumer’s beliefs about their own evaluation at the time of purchase, the expected utility 
from purchasing song j is: 
        
2
2
2 2( ( ))
( ) exp , ( )
2Eij
i
ij i i i ij ij ij ij ijR I t
E U I t PM n s PV n I t
           
   ,        
                     2 2( ) ( )ij i ij iu I t I t          (3.13) 
 Note that the utility error is known to a consumer when a purchase decision is made. 
A consumer purchases the song when its expected utility is higher than not purchasing it. 
3.5. Empirical Specification of the Learning Model– SMBL vs. EMBL 
We propose two different specifications of the consumer learning model – SMBL and 
EMBL. Table 3.2 summarizes both model specifications.   
 SMBL model is the baseline model where people update the belief about their own 
product evaluation according to Bayes rule applied to the objective (manipulated) values 
of all six attributes ( 0MjR ,
M
j , Mja , Mjb , Mjc , and Mj ). As described in the theory section, 
the SMBL model has two key limitations. First, the informational benefit from similar 
and dissimilar sources is forced to be identical. Thus, positive feedback from similar 
others and negative feedback from dissimilar others are equivalent. Clearly, we cannot 
test whether the information from similar others is more diagnostic or not (H1a) by 
employing the SMBL model. Second, the informational benefit is always greater in an 
imbalanced system than a balanced one. The absolute similarity between sources cancels 
the noise of signals under imbalanced condition but amplifies it under a balanced 
condition, so informational benefit is always greater under imbalance.  Therefore, we 
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cannot test whether people find the information under imbalance is more reliable or not 
(H2a) by using SMBL model, as it has that property built-in. Please see Section 3.10.3 in 
Appendix for discussion of these two limitations. 
 
Table 3.2. SMBL vs. EMBL Specification 
(a) Related to Informational Benefit ( i ) 
Attributes SMBL Specification EMBL Specification 
Similarity with Groups  ,ij ija b  Mij ja a  and Mij jb b  
 0 1expM with with Aij j i i ja a neg    ,
 0 1expM with with Bij j i i jb b neg    . 
Similarity b/w Groups  ijc  Mij jc c   0 1M bw bwij j i i jc c imb     
Aggregate Mean  0ijR  0 0Mij jR R  0 0Mij jR R  
Aggregate Variation  ij  Mij j    0expM priij j i     
Within-Group Variation  ,A Bij ij   A B Mij ij j      0expA B M sigij ij j i       
 
(b) Related to Cost of Search ( i ) 
Attributes SMBL Specification EMBL Specification 
Cost of Search  ,A Bij ijk k  A Bij ijk k   0 1exp i i jorder 
 0 1 2 3expA Aij i i j i j i jk order neg imb       ,
 0 1 2 3expB Bij i i j i j i jk order neg imb        
 
 To test our hypotheses, we propose the EMBL model. It maintains the assumption 
that consumers update in a Bayesian manner but adds that they rely on a subjective value 
of attributes for doing so (Camacho et al. 2011). Allowing for subjective interpretation by 
consumers provides substantial model flexibility. As summarized in Table 3.2a, the 
subjective values of attributes depend on the two characteristics of central interest. First, 
to assess the impact of homophily (H1a and H1b), the type of relationship that recipients 
have with their sources is moderated by the sign of similarity of each group ( Ajneg  and 
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B
jneg , which is 1 when a respondent has negative similarity with Group A or Group B, 
respectively, and is 0 otherwise) Second, to test consumers’ attitude towards balance 
(H2a and H2b), the type of relationship between the sources is moderated by the balance 
status in the social system ( jimb is 1 if the relationship is imbalanced and is 0 for balance). 
Note that  0 1,with withi i   denotes parameters related to the subjective similarity with each 
source, and  0 1,bw bwi i   denotes parameters related to the subjective similarity between the 
two sources. 
 In the EMBL specification, let i denote the vector of all related individual-level 
parameters related to informational benefit from others’ evaluations. Subjective similarity 
with each information source (aij, bij) is proportional to the manipulated similarity
 ,M Mj ja b . If consumer i perceives the information from dissimilar others to be less 
diagnostic (H1a), then the parameter 1
with
i  will be significantly negative. Subjective 
similarity between the groups (cij) is specified as a function of balance status. Unlike aij 
and bij, we allow cij to have a different sign from the manipulated Mjc .
47 This flexible 
specification allows us to test whether the informational benefit from search is different 
between balance and imbalance (H2a). For instance, if both 0
bw
i  and 1bwi  are positive, 
people find information under imbalance more reliable than balance as the normative 
model suggests. If, however, both 0
bw
i  and 1bwi  are negative, people find information 
under balance more reliable than imbalance. The reliability of information under other 
                                                            
47 We fix the sign of subjective similarity with each source (aij and bij) as our manipulation ( Mja  and 
M
jb ). 
Otherwise, we cannot identify the subjective correlations. The details of identification are outlined in 
Section 3.10.4 in Appendix. 
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possible combinations of 0
bw
i  and 1bwi  depend on the magnitude of each parameter. For 
instance, people find information under imbalance more reliable than balance when 0
bw
i  
is not different from 0 but 1
bw
i  is positive. 
 We allow for subjectivity on prior and signal distributions as well. We cannot identify 
both subjective prior (i.e., aggregate) mean and variance jointly. See Section 3.10.4 for a 
discussion of model identification. We assume the subjective prior mean is the same as 
the manipulated prior mean while the subjective prior standard deviation  ij  is 
proportional to the manipulated prior standard deviation  Mj .48 Subjective signal 
standard deviation  ,A Bij ij   is also proportional to the manipulated signal variance 
 Mj . 
 In Table 3.2b, we summarize the specification of attributes related to the cost of 
search. For consumer i, let i  denote a vector of all related individual-level parameters. 
Recall that we manipulated the cost of search as the time that respondents have to wait to 
acquire a single signal. Therefore, the parameter 0i  captures consumer i's (baseline) unit 
cost of search (wait time) on the utility scale. If the consumer has greater cost of search 
from dissimilar others (H1b), the parameter 2i  will be significantly positive. If a 
consumer has either greater cost of collecting and processing the information under an 
imbalanced social system (H2b), the parameter 3i  will be significantly positive. Finally, 
                                                            
48 As outlined in Section 3.10.4 in Appendix, we cannot identify subjectivity in prior mean and variance at 
the same time. For consistency of specification, we incorporate subjectivity in prior and signal variance. 
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we allow cost to be a function of the order of songs to control for respondents’ fatigue. 
3.6. Estimation 
We had 152 respondents (i =1…N), and each made search and purchase decisions for 18 
songs (j =1…J). For respondent i and song j, let *ijn  denote the actual search decision and 
let ijy  be an indicator variable that takes a value of 1 if he decides to purchase the song 
and is 0 otherwise. 
 We make the following distributional assumptions on the two errors in our model. 
First, the search utility error (
ijn
 ) follows IID Type I Extreme value distribution with a 
scale parameter i . Second, purchase utility error ( ij ) follows a standard Normal 
distribution. Then, the conditional likelihood that a consumer i makes a search decision 
of *ijn  and purchase decision of ijy  for a song j can be expressed as: 
      * * *Pr , | , , , Pr | , , , Pr | , ,ij ij i i i i ij i i i i ij ij i in y n y n           ,  (3.14) 
where i  denote the vector of utility parameters  ,ln( )i i   defined in the Equation 3.1. 
The first term on the right-hand side is the search likelihood which follows multinomial 
logit and the second term is the purchase likelihood which follows binary Probit.  
 In the experiment, search amount can be any combination of two integers between [0, 
200]. As there are 40,401 possible options of search for each song, it is not feasible to 
estimate the model as is. We used a subset of options to estimate the model by the 
positive conditioning property (McFadden 1978; Train et al. 1987). For consumer i and 
song j, let ijW  denote a consideration set that includes the actual search option (
*
ijn ) and 5 
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other possible options of ijn , which are randomly selected from the empirical distribution 
of search decisions in our dataset.49  Then, the search likelihood can be written as: 
              
* * *
1*
1
exp | ( ), , | |
Pr | , , ,
exp | ( ), , | |
ij ij
b c
ij ij i i i i ij ij i i ij ij
ij i i i i b c
ij ij i i i i ij ij i i ij ij
n W
v n I t v n h W n
n
v n I t v n h W n
   

             , 
           (3.15) 
where  |ij ijh W n  denotes a bias adjustment factor to account for using a subset of options. 
Specifically,  |ij ijh W n  is the probability that consumer i formed a consideration set of 
ijW  given that he made a search decision of ijn . We used importance sampling and 
computed the bias adjustment factors from the empirical distribution of search decisions. 
Lastly, note that  bijv   does not have a closed form expression (Equation 3.15) and is 
computed using a Monte-Carlo simulation. 
 The conditional purchase likelihood is a binary Probit likelihood specified as: 
        1* 2 2Pr | , , ( ) | , 1 ( ) | , ijij yyij ij i i ij i i i ij i i iy n u I t u I t          ,  (3.16) 
where the information set in the second stage  2( )iI t  includes the search decision made 
in the first stage  *ijn .  
                                                            
49 We also estimated a model where Wij consists of 10 alternatives including the observed search decision. 
All substantive findings remained unchanged. Research on case-control modeling indicates that little 
precision is gained by going beyond a 1-5 ratio of other alternatives (e.g., Donkers et al. 2003;Hu and Van 
den Bulte 2014). 
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  Given that there are common parameters  ,i i   in both stages, the two decisions are 
estimated jointly. Therefore, the conditional likelihood of observing the decisions for 
consumer i for all J songs is: 
      12 2
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          . 
 To capture consumer heterogeneity, individual-level parameters ( , , , ln( )i i i i   ) 
are assumed to be distributed multivariate normal with mean vector  , , , ln( )   and 
covariance matrix . The unconditional likelihood L for a sample of N customers is: 
   
1...
| ( , , , ) , , , | , , , ,i i i i i i i i i
i N
L L dF  

            .   (3.18) 
where  , , , | , , , ,i i i iF          denotes the multivariate normal density function.  
 As summarized in Figure 3.2, informational benefit and cost of search have 
asymmetric effects on search and purchase decisions: Both informational benefit and cost 
drives search decision, but only informational benefit drives purchase decision given the 
search decision. Therefore, we can identify the parameters related to informational 
benefit with purchase observations given the search decisions, and identify the 
parameters related to cost of search with search observations. Section 3.10.4 in Appendix 
outlines the identification of parameters in more detail. 
 The model parameters are estimated using standard hierarchical Bayesian Markov 
chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods. We use the following set of priors for all 
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population level parameters. Let  , , , ln( )    be a p × 1 vector and that 1  is a p × p 
matrix. Then, the prior for  , , , ln( )    is a multivariate normal with mean of 0 and 
covariance of 0.1 μIp×p matrix.  The prior for  is a Wishart distribution where the scale 
matrix is 0.1 μIp×p matrix, and p+4 degrees of freedom. The details of the full conditional 
distributions are available from the authors upon request. 
 We ran sampling chains for 200,000 iterations, and convergence was assessed by 
monitoring the time series of the draws. We report the results based on 100,000 draws 
retained after discarding the initial 100,000 draws as burn-in iterations. For each 
participant, we randomly select 15 of the 18 song profiles for model estimation and use 
the remaining 3 for out-of-sample prediction. 
3.7. Results 
3.7.1. Model Comparison: SMBL vs. EMBL 
Table 3.3 reports the model fit of SMBL and EMBL models. We compared the two 
models on several measures of model fit. First, we report deviance information criterion 
(DIC) to evaluate within-sample fit and complexity of each model. Smaller numbers 
denote a better model (Spiegelhalter et al. 2002). Second, we computed within and out-
of-sample hit rates. To assess the prediction for the purchase decision, we used purchase 
hit-rate where cut-off was fixed at 0.5. To evaluate the model prediction for search 
decision, we used search hit-rate. For computing the search hit rate, we discretized the 
observed ݊௜௝஺∗ and ݊௜௝஻∗ into 3 levels (5 levels) each based on their quartiles and thus the 
overall search decision, which is a combination of ݊௜௝஺∗ and ݊௜௝஻∗, is classified into 9 
options (25 options). The search hit rate is the proportion of observations where the 
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observed search option matches the option with the highest search utility based on our 
model estimates. Third, we computed validation log-likelihood (VLL) in the holdout 
sample to assess predictive validity (Montoya et al. 2010; Iyengar and Jedidi 2012). A 
comparison of models on the several criteria shows that the EMBL model generally 
outperforms the SMBL as well as other intermediate model variants. Note though the 
search hit rate for the EMBL model is significantly higher than that from SMBL (a 10% 
difference) while being marginally lower for the purchase hit rate (a 2-3% difference).  
Table 3.3. Model Comparisons 
   (a) Within Sample Fit   (b) Holdout Sample Fit 
 DIC Search Hit Rate PurchaseHit Rate VLL Search Hit Rate 
Purchase
Hit Rate
  9 groups 25 groups   9 groups 25 groups  
SMBL 12,828.5 32.4% 20.1% 77.5% -1,234.1 30.2% 16.9% 75.2% 
EMBL 10,819.2 46.9% 29.9% 75.3% -1,172.9 39.7% 28.3% 72.1% 
 
3.7.2. Estimation Results 
 In Table 3.4, we present the estimation results of SMBL and EMBL models. We 
present SMBL model results as a baseline, and use EMBL results for hypotheses testing 
and further discussion. As is common in Bayesian analysis, we summarize the posterior 
distribution of the parameters by reporting their posterior means and 95% posterior 
confidence intervals. 
 Impact of homophily. Our EMBL model provides several insights on what causes 
homophily in search behavior. A significantly negative estimate of ߠଵ௪௜௧௛ in Table 3.4 
indicates that people perceive information from dissimilar others to be less diagnostic 
than that from similar others (H1a). To be more specific, positive similarity is discounted 
by 13% (=1-exp(-0.14)) and negative similarity is discounted by 47% (=1-exp(-0.14-
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0.50)) compared to what is implied by normative SMBL model. Thus, people discount 
the diagnosticity of information from both types of sources but more so from dissimilar 
others than similar others. 
Table 3.4. Model Estimates for SMBL and EMBL models 
      Population Parameter Estimates (a) SMBL (Baseline Model) 
(b) EMBL 
(Proposed Model) 
      Utility Parameters: Intercept (α0) -0.10 (-0.24,  0.04) 
0.25** 
( 0.12,  0.38) 
      Utility Parameters: Rating (Ln(β)) 1.01** ( 0.81,  1.22) 
0.21* 
( 0.03,  0.35) 
      Similarity with sources: Base (ߠ଴௪௜௧௛)  -0.14** (-0.20, -0.09) 
      Similarity with sources: Dissimilar (ߠଵ௪௜௧௛)  -0.50** (-0.75, -0.36) 
      Similarity between sources: Base (ߠ଴௕௪)  -0.10 (-0.27,  0.09) 
      Similarity between sources: Imbalance (ߠଵ௕௪)  0.70** ( 0.45,  0.92) 
      Prior Standard Deviation: Base (ߠ଴௣௥௜)  1.15** ( 1.01,  1.31) 
      Signal Standard Deviation: Base (ߠ଴௦௜௚)  -0.40** (-0.67,  0.11) 
      Cost: Base (δ0) -0.80** (-1.19, -0.41) 
-0.36 
(-0.77,  0.02) 
      Cost: Order of songs (δ1) 0.61** ( 0.46,  0.76) 
0.65** 
( 0.50,  0.80) 
      Cost: Negative (δ2)  -0.07 (-0.38, 0.15) 
      Cost: Imbalance (δ3)  0.40** ( 0.27,  0.54) 
      Scale Parameter (Ln(λμ103)) 1.83** ( 1.57,  2.12) 
0.42 
(-0.03,  0.86) 
Note: * denotes significance in 95% confidence level, and the corrsponding intervals are in parentheses. ** 
denotes significance in 99%. 
 
 In contrast, as the insignificant estimate of δ2 shows, the sign of similarity does not 
have a significant effect on the cost of collecting and processing the information (H2b). 
In other words, there is no evidence that people have a greater cost of collecting and 
processing the information from dissimilar than similar others. Our finding may appear 
inconsistent with past studies (McPherson et al. 2001; Price and Feick 1984), but it is 
worth noting that there was no face-to-face social interaction in our setting. Thus, our 
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results suggest that the discomfort people feel from getting information from dissimilar 
others in real life need not be from processing the information (which was part of our 
experiment), but may stem from having to interact with dissimilar others (which was not 
part of our experiment). 
 Figure 3.4 depicts the impact of the sign of similarity on consumer decisions. For 
these plots, we computed the search amount and purchase likelihood for each respondent 
under both SMBL and EMBL models. Given the attribute values and the estimates of 
individual parameters, the plots show the average across all respondents. In the SMBL 
specification, where the diagnosticity of information is forced to be identical between 
similar and dissimilar others, the sign of similarity does not have an impact on either 
search or purchase decision (Figure 3.4a and 3.4b). In the proposed EMBL specification, 
where the informational benefit is greater from similar others than dissimilar others, 
people tend to search more from similar others than dissimilar others (Figure 3.4c). 
Search amount is up to 50% greater when both sources have similar preference than when 
one of them has dissimilar preference. Also, people purchase more when the information 
is collected from similar others than dissimilar others (Figure 3.4d). Purchase likelihood 
is up to 8% greater when both sources have similar preference than when one of them has 
dissimilar preference. 
  
  
N
a
a
 
 
h
(
F
(a) 
(c) 
ote:  For gen
ttributes ( 0MjR
verage search
Impact 
and, consu
H2a). To b
igure 3.4. 
SMBL: Sea
 
EMBL: Sea
erating the fig
5 , 2Mj 
 amount and 
of balance. 
mers find th
e specific, t
Comparat
S
rch Amoun
rch Amoun
ures, we only
.5 , 1.25Mj 
average purch
Imbalance 
e informat
he results in
ive Statics 
imilar vs. D
t 
t 
 varied the re
, 0.2Mjb  , c
ase likelihood
has a nuanc
ional under 
 Table 3.4 
of Search /
issimilar
(b) SM
(d) EM
levance of on
0.0Mj  , and
 averaged acr
ed effect on
imbalance 
suggest tha
Purchase D
BL: Purcha
 
BL: Purcha
e source  Mja
 10jorder  )
oss all respon
 social lear
more reliab
t people ign
ecisions:  
se Likeliho
se Likeliho
  and fixed al
. The figures s
dents. 
ning. On th
le than bala
ore the sim
163
od 
od 
l other 
how the 
e one 
nce 
ilarity 
164 
 
 
 
between information sources under balance and consider the sources to be uncorrelated 
(insignificant ߠ଴௕௪). Thus, people find the information under balance to be more reliable 
than what the normative model (SMBL) will imply. This finding is consistent with the 
illusion of validity (Tversky and Kahneman 1974), which suggests that people falsely 
believe information from two highly redundant sources to be more reliable than what is 
implied by the statistics of correlation. In contrast, people do not ignore the similarity 
between information sources under imbalance (significantly positive ߠଵ௕௪). In other words, 
the overall bias will be reduced when people integrate the information from an 
imbalanced system. In sum, people reduce their uncertainty more when the information is 
collected in imbalanced than balanced social systems even when people may tend to 
suffer from the illusion of validity under the latter. 
 On the other hand, as the positive estimate of δ3 shows, people have significantly 
greater subjective cost of gathering and processing information under imbalance than 
balance (H2b). The subjective cost of search is almost 50% greater (= exp(-
0.36+0.40)/exp(-0.36)) under imbalance as compared to balance. Thus, our finding 
suggests that imbalanced relationships have a higher search cost due to difficulty in 
processing the collected information even when there is no real interaction with others 
(which is the case in our experimental setting) . 
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model specifications. The plots show the averages across all respondents. In the SMBL 
specification, where the reliability of information is forced to be greater under imbalance, 
the search amount and the purchase likelihood is always greater under imbalance (Figure 
3.5a and 3.5b). In the proposed EMBL model, however, people search less under 
imbalance because of greater subjective cost of search (Figure 3.5c). People search up to 
45% more under balance than imbalance. However, as the absolute similarity between 
sources increases, so does the informational benefit under imbalance thus shrinking the 
difference in the search amount between the two conditions. Notably, the lower amount 
of search under imbalance still leads to greater purchase likelihood (Figure 3.5d) as 
compared to the balance condition because people can reduce their uncertainty to a 
greater extent under the former. Purchase likelihood is around 4% greater under 
imbalance than balance. 
3.8. Conclusions 
We investigate how the similarity in preferences of consumers with their contacts impacts 
how they collect product information from social contacts, learn, and purchase 
experiential products. We address these questions through an incentive compatible stated 
choice experiment where consumers make purchase decisions for individual music tracks 
while having access to others’ evaluations. We build a structural model of consumers’ 
decisions in which consumer learning is purposive and accommodates information search 
from consumers for a planned product purchase. 
 There are three important aspects of our modeling framework. First, consumers’ 
search and purchase decisions are modeled as inter-related, but temporally separated, 
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decisions thus allowing us to assess the impact of social relationships on each of the two 
drivers – informational benefit and cost of search. Second, consumers can gather 
information from their contacts who may have preferences that are systematically 
different from theirs and the various contacts themselves may have systematically 
different preference among each other. Finally, the model is grounded in the widely-
accepted framework of Bayesian consumer learning but extends it by including the 
impact of behavioral aspects related to the similarity of preferences, more specifically 
homophily and structural balance, on consumer learning. Our model thus adds to a stream 
of research that incorporates the behavioral aspects into Bayesian learning model 
(Camacho et al. 2011; Mehta et al. 2004; Zhao et al. 2011). 
 Our results provide insights into the drivers that impact how consumers collect social 
information. First, social learning exhibits significant homophily as consumers prefer to 
collect information from similar others. A key contribution is that we disentangle whether 
this is due to either the greater diagnosticity of information from similar others or a 
reduction in the cost of seeking information from similar others. The results suggest that 
the main driver is the former - consumers find reviews from similar others to be more 
diagnostic than those from dissimilar others. Second, the impact of balance on social 
learning is nuanced: people prefer imbalanced systems for their higher reliability of 
information, but balanced systems for their lower cost most likely due to the cognitive 
and affective burden of dissonance. Thus, people appear to understand that informational 
benefit is greater under an imbalanced social system but that it can be burdensome to 
process the gathered information.  In sum, the impact of the similarity of preference on 
consumer search and learning is over and above what is captured by the standard 
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Bayesian learning model. As we manipulated the similarity of preference among 
consumers, our results do not suffer from confounds such as interpersonal affect, higher 
frequency of interactions with similar others typically present in observational data. 
 Our study will be interest to researchers who study different moderators of social 
learning. For instance, Godes and Mayzlin (2009) show that, for products with low 
awareness (e.g., a brewery chain), word-of-mouth from less loyal customers is more 
effective than more loyal customers at driving sales. Iyengar et al. (2011) consider the 
adoption of a new drug and find that physicians’ self-perceived opinion leadership 
moderates the weight they put on other physicians’ prescription behavior. There is 
evidence for social learning in online contexts as well. For example, in a study that 
investigated the spatial adoption of a new online retailer, Lee and Bell (2013) show how 
much neighbors trust and communicate with each other makes the social learning process 
more efficient. We add to this stream of literature by specifically considering how 
similarity of preference among information seekers and providers can moderate the level 
of social learning. 
 Our results provide a novel view on how the characteristics of ties in a social system 
can drive informational benefit. Our finding of greater reliability of information under 
imbalance may look analogous to the theory of the strength of weak ties. For instance, 
Granovetter (1973) found that weak ties (e.g., acquaintances) provide new information 
more so than strong ties. Similarly, Burt (1980) noted that individuals that span the 
structural holes in a network (i.e., have ties across different subgroups) have an advantage 
in that they can broker the flow of information. In contrast, we focus on the informational 
benefit from the validation of one’s belief, not from the inflow of novel information. 
169 
 
 
 
Therefore, our study complements prior work, and broadens the understanding about how 
the characteristics of social ties impact the informational benefit from a social system. 
 Our study is in a context in which consumers gather product evaluations from their 
peers. Prior work, however, suggests that people are often persuaded more by experts 
than non-experts (e.g., Petty et al. 1981). How may our results change when there is an 
expert source. It is possible that people may gather a large number of (if not all) 
evaluations from the expert and not rely on similarity of preferences. Recent research 
suggests otherwise. For instance, in pharmaceutical contexts where expertise should 
clearly matter and key opinion leaders play a critical role, modern medical literature has 
actually shown that local opinion leaders are more important that national leaders (e.g., 
Flodgren et al. 2011, Keating et al. 2007, Kuo et al. 1998). This is because nationally 
reputed “expert opinion leaders” are much less representative than local “peer opinion 
leaders” who are members of their own community and face similar patients and working 
conditions (Locock et al. 2001). Thus, even when expertise matters, similarity of 
preferences may continue to play an important role.  
 In the last few years, companies are actively embracing the notion of providing their 
customers with access to their friends’ evaluations. For instance, companies that facilitate 
social search (e.g., Google plus your world, Facebook graph search, Bing social search) 
allow information seekers to search for content from their social contacts. With 
advertising being the major source of revenue for these websites, our results suggest that 
they may be able to increase their search traffic by making consumers perceive that the 
search results are from others whose preferences are similar to theirs and to each other. 
This strategy will increase the search clicks as people perceive that the results are 
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informative (as they come from similar others), and less effortful to process (since they 
come from people who have balanced preference).  
 Our findings are also relevant for companies that provide consumers with reviews for 
experiential products (e.g., Open Table for restaurants, Goodreads for books). Many of 
these websites wish to increase the purchase rate of products and are trying to do so by 
providing consumers with their friends’ reviews. For instance, Open Table, a restaurant 
review portal, receives commission from restaurants when a consumer reserves through 
the website. Our results suggest that Open Table (and other such websites) may be able to 
increase their purchase rate by making consumers perceive that the search results are 
from those who have similar preferences, and that they are also being exposed to others 
with diverse preferences. In sum, the top-line message to practitioners is that effective 
use of social recommendation systems involves paying careful attention to which social 
contacts consumers should access. 
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3.10. Appendix 
3.10.1. Descriptive Results 
We investigate the drivers for the two decisions of total amount of search and purchase 
using simple regressions. We estimate a regression model of (logarithm of) the total 
amount of search (after adding 1 to avoid the log(0) problem) using covariates such as the 
number of groups with dissimilar preferences in a profile (which takes a value of 0, 1, or 
2), an indicator for whether the social system is imbalanced, the mean and standard 
deviation of aggregate evaluations, and (logarithm of) the order in which the song is 
presented (which takes a value of 1, 2, … 18). The latter is included to control for 
respondents’ fatigue as they go through the study. The unit of analysis is a subject-song 
observation, with 2,736 (=152 subjects × 18 song profiles) observations in total. Table 
3.5 shows the results. 
Table 3.5. Drivers for Search Decision 
 Est (SE) 
Intercept 3.01 (0.08)**  
Number of Dissimilar Sources -1.20 (0.01)** 
Imbalance 0.03 (0.05) 
Mean of Aggregate Evaluation 0.05 (0.01)** 
SD of Aggregate Evaluation 0.06 (0.14)* 
Log(Order of song) -0.29 (0.03)** 
Note: * p ≤ 0.05, ** p ≤ 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses 
 The total search amount significantly decreases with the number of sources with 
dissimilar preference (p<0.001). While this finding provides evidence for the impact of 
homophily on the amount of search, it is not possible to disentangle if this is due to the 
impact of homophily on the diagnosticity of information (H1a) or on the cost of search 
(H1b). The search amount is not affected by imbalance (p = 0.57). Interestingly, this null 
effect may be consistent with both hypotheses regarding imbalance – if people find the 
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information more reliable under imbalance (H2a) but have greater cost of search as well 
(H2b), the two effects may cancel each other out. Effects of other control variables were 
not of interest per se, but provide face validity for the experiment: the amount of search 
increased with the average and variance of aggregate evaluations (p<0.001,  p<0.05 
respectively). The results remain unchanged when we introduce the subject-specific 
random intercept. 
 To understand how the purchase decision is driven by the factors of interest, we 
estimate a binary probit model of purchase incidence with covariates such as the number 
of sources with dissimilar preference, imbalance indicator, mean and standard deviation 
of aggregate evaluations, (logarithm of) search amount and social information content. 
We operationalize social information content as the weighted sum of the observed 
average rating from each group where the weights are (logarithm of) the number of 
contacts from each group.50 We also include the interactions of social information content 
with the number of dissimilar sources and the indictor of structural imbalance. As the unit 
of analysis is subject-song observation, we have 2,736 (=152 subjects × 18 song profiles) 
observations in total. Table 3.6 shows the results. 
 The results show that the probability of purchase increased with the search amount 
(p<0.001) and with favorable social information (p<0.001). The number of dissimilar 
sources (p=0.61) and imbalance (p=0.83) do not directly impact the purchase rate, but 
both variables moderate the impact of social information content. Consistent with H1a, 
                                                            
50 We also fit a model where social information content was operationalized as the average of the observed 
average rating from each group (i.e., weighted sum of the observed average rating from each group where 
the weight is 1/2 each). The findings in Table 3.6 remain robust. 
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people tend to be less affected by social information when there are a greater number of 
dissimilar others (p<0.001) and discount the diagnosticity of information from dissimilar 
others. Note that we cannot directly test whether people have greater cost of search from 
dissimilar others (H1b). Consistent with H2a, people are more affected by social 
information collected under an imbalanced system (p<0.001).  This result sheds further 
light on the null effect of structural imbalance on the amount of search (See Table 3.5). If 
people do not have greater cost of search under an imbalanced system, they should have 
searched more under it due to the informational benefit. Therefore, it is likely that people 
experience a greater cost of search under imbalance (H2b). Effects of other control 
variables provide face validity for our findings. People are more likely to purchase a song 
when they collect more signals (p<0.001), the average aggregate rating is greater 
(p<0.001), and the variation of aggregate rating is greater (p<0.001).51 The results 
remain unchanged when we introduce a subject-specific random intercept. 
Table 3.6. Drivers of Purchase Decision 
 Est (SE) 
Intercept -1.28 (0.13)** 
Number of Dissimilar Sources -0.04 (0.08) 
Imbalance 0.02 (0.11) 
Mean of Aggregate Evaluation 0.37 (0.02)** 
SD of Aggregate Evaluation 0.18 (0.05)** 
Log(Search Amount+1) 0.11 (0.04)** 
Social Information Content 0.09 (0.01)** 
Social Information Content μ Number of Dissimilar Sources -0.08 (0.01)** 
Social Information Content μ Imbalance 0.12 (0.02)** 
Note: * p ≤ 0.05, ** p ≤ 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses 
 
                                                            
51 The latter result is a bit surprising but the model is ad-hoc where potential confounders (e.g., search 
endogeneity) are not properly controlled for. We build a formal utility-based model where we control for 
the confounders. 
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 In sum, the results from simple regressions show that the preference similarity with 
social sources and the overall balance in the social system are associated with consumers’ 
decisions. The above regressions, however, we did not account for the endogenous 
relationship between search and purchase decisions. In addition, without a formal model, 
it is not possible to disentangle whether the attributes that are significant for the amount 
of search are due to either their impact on the informational benefit from search or the 
cost of accessing information (or both).  
3.10.2. Regularity Conditions on Similarity Structure 
We have two regularity conditions on the covariance matrix of triadic similarity – 
positive definiteness condition and inference condition.  
 Positive-Definiteness Condition. The covariance matrix for the triadic similarity 
structure should be a proper covariance matrix. Given the expression of similarity in 
Equation 3.4 and A BN N , we can write the positive-definiteness condition in the 
following way. (For notation simplicity, we omit subscripts for respondent and product) 
2 2 21 2 0a b c abc     .       (3.19) 
 Inference Condition. Intuitively, the information from sources with greater absolute 
correlation (e.g., greater |a| or |b|) should reduce the uncertainty more. As an extreme 
example, the information from those who have exactly same preference will completely 
resolve any uncertainty. The same is the case for information from those who have 
exactly the opposite preference. However, some similarity structures violate this intuition 
of learning process and uncertainty actually increases by acquiring information from 
more relevant sources. Suppose a similarity structure is represented by Equation 3.4 in 
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the main text, and the respondent is informed of the values of AR  and BR . Then, the 
conditional distribution for his own evaluation, RE, given AR  and BR  is: 
 | ,ER E A Bf R R R           (3.20) 
     2 2 2 20 0 02 2 21 2,1 1 1A A B B
a b c abca bc b acR N R R N R R
c c c
             
  
 A similarity structure violates our intuition when the conditional variance, which 
denotes the uncertainty after having complete knowledge of AR  and BR , increases as 
absolute similarity (|a| or |b|) increases. As a result of comparative statics, we obtain the 
following condition for the conditional variance to not increase with the absolute 
similarity: 
| |   | |a bc  and | |   | |b ac .      (3.21) 
 We exclude similarity structures where the statistical axiom does not fit our intuition. 
3.10.3. Informational Benefit under SMBL 
The informational benefit refers to the amount of the uncertainty reduction after update. 
We operationalize the informational benefit (IB; for notation simplicity, we omit the 
subscripts for respondent and product) as prior variance (i.e., how uncertain people are 
before the update) subtracted by the posterior variance (i.e., how uncertain people are 
after the update). For ease of exposition, we can rewrite IB as a function of absolute 
similarity with each source (|a| and |b|) and absolute similarity between sources (|c|) in 
the following way. 
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       
  
2 2
2 2
2 2 2 22 2 2 6
2
22 2 4
1 1 2A A A B B B A B
A A A B B B A B
n a N n b N n n D abc ab c
IB
N n N n c n n
     
     
      
    
, 
(3.22) 
where D denotes an indicator of balance status which takes a value of 1 when abc>0 
(balance), -1 when abc<0 (imbalance), and is 0 when abc=0. 
 Sign of similarity. When the balance status (D) is held fixed, the sign of similarity per 
se does not affect the informational benefit. Suppose the similarity of a source (a) 
switches the sign, but balance status remains unchanged. We can think about a scenario 
where either D=0, or one of other similarity measures (b or c) also switches the sign 
when D ≠ 0. Given that a enters Equation 3.22 only in absolute value, the sign of 
similarity per se will not affect informational benefit. The sign of similarity will change 
the informational benefit only through a change in the balance status of the system. 
Figure 3.6a depicts the property of SMBL that the sign of similarity does not have a 
direct impact on the informational benefit. 
 Balance status and similarity between sources. Given all the other values fixed, we 
can immediately see that IB is always greater when D=-1 (imbalance) than when D=1 
(balance). That is, the informational benefit is always greater under imbalance than 
balance. 
 Next, the result of comparative statics shows that the effect of similarity between 
sources (c) on the posterior variance is contingent on the balance status (D). 
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3.10.4. Identification of Population Parameters 
In this section, we outline the identification of population parameters. Given the 
identification of population parameters  , , ,   , one can easily identify individual-
level parameters  , , ,i i i i    with distributional assumptions on individual parameters 
(i.e., normally distributed around population parameters). 
 First, we can identify   and   from observed purchase decisions given the search 
decisions. Observed purchase decisions with  * 0,0ijn   can identify utility parameters 
  ,    and perceived prior variance  0pri .52 Given that there was no search at all, 
the general tendency of purchase is captured by  , the effect of manipulated prior mean 
 0MjR  on purchase is captured by  , and the effect of manipulated prior standard 
deviation  Mj  on purchase is captured by   and 0pri . Thus, subjectivity in both prior 
mean and variance cannot be identified simultaneously. 
 The parameters related to perceived similarity with each sources  0 1,with with   are 
identified from observed purchase decisions given (1) no search from one source and (2) 
a sufficiently large amount of search from the other source (i.e., steady state where an 
additional signal hardly increase the search utility).53 For these observations, purchase 
utility depends only on parameters identified above (i.e., utility parameters and perceived 
                                                            
52 In our data, we have 307 observations with no search at all, and 63 of them converged to purchase. 
53 Our model estimates suggest that perceived prior SD is around 10 times of the perceived signal SD. In 
this case, steady state is quickly achieved – after collecting 20 signals, an additional signal will decrease the 
posterior variance by less than 5%. In our data, 110 observations reached steady state (more than 20 signals 
collected) for one source, but did no search from the other source. Among those observations, 90 
observations collected signals from positively relevant source only (42/90 converged to purchase), and 20 
observations collected signals from negatively relevant source only (7/20 converged to purchase). 
Therefore, we have sufficient information to identify (ߠ଴௪௜௧௛, ߠଵ௪௜௧௛). 
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prior variance) and perceived similarity with the source where the steady state is achieved 
( ja  or jb ). Therefore, general tendency of purchase among these observations identifies 
parameter 0
with , and the difference in purchase driven by the sign of similarity identifies 
1
with . 
 The parameters related to perceived similarity between the two sources  0 1,bw bw   are 
identified from the observed purchase decisions given a sufficiently large amount of 
search from both sources.54 For these observations, purchase utility depends only on 
parameters identified so far (i.e., utility parameters, perceived prior variance, and 
perceived similarity with each source) and perceived similarity between the sources ( jc ). 
Therefore, general tendency of purchase among these observations identifies parameter
0
red , and the difference in purchase driven by balance status identifies the parameter 1red . 
 A general pattern of increase in purchase likelihood with respect to the amount of 
observed search ( *ijn ) will identify the parameters of the perceived signal variance 0sig . 
 Finally, we can identify cost-related parameters    and scale parameter    with 
observed search decisions. Given the identification of   and , the expected 
informational benefit,  bjv   in Equation 3.17, is identified. The effect of the expected 
informational benefit on search decision will identify . The effect of  ,A Bij ijn n  on the 
search decision captured through  cjv  will identify 0 . The parameter 1  is identified 
                                                            
54 In our data, around 265 observations reached steady state (i.e., more than 20 signals collected) for both 
sources. Among those observations, 126 observations were under balance (48/126 converged to purchase), 
and 139 were under imbalance (53/139 converged to purchase). Therefore, we have sufficient information 
to identify (ߠ଴௕௪, ߠଵ௕௪). 
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from a systematic difference in  cjv  when signals are collected from a source with a 
negative similarity as opposed to a source with a positive similarity. Similarly, the 
parameter 2  is identified from any systematic difference in  cjv  when signals are 
collected under an imbalanced system as opposed to a balanced system. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
I have not only provided novel evidence that social learning is a significant driver of 
consumer decisions but also provided a richer, more nuanced understanding of how 
social learning operates. Essay 1 shows that the neighborhood social capital drives social 
learning and the evolution of new trials in aggregate level. In Essay 2, I show that social 
learning operate differently across trial and repeat stages, so who is most influential and 
who is most influenceable varies across the stages. Essay 3 documented the evidence that 
the pattern of similarity of preferences such as homophily and structural balance drives 
consumer search, learning from social contacts, and purchase decision.  
The findings can help marketing researchers deepen the understanding of social 
learning, and further stimulate future study. They are of interest to marketing 
practitioners as well. The findings suggest that social learning, which occurs naturally 
among consumers, can partially resolve consumer uncertainty, so help firms achieve their 
goals. Moreover, the understanding about the drivers of social learning hints what 
practitioners can do to effectively leverage social learning. 
 
